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INTRODUCTION 
 
5 
 
Stating the Question 
 
 
 – What would you like this film to do? 
 – Well, I’d like the film to organize Americans to stop U.S. 
intervention in Latin America.             
 – Pamela Yates, 1985
1
 
 
A film – to stop the U.S. intervention? It simply sounds like an 
overconfident statement to make. When the above-quoted 
interview was taken, the American filmmaker Pamela Yates had 
recently released her documentary about resistance in Guatemala, 
WHEN THE MOUNTAINS TREMBLE (1983),
2
 and she had 
grandiose plans with it.  
Two years prior, at the beginning of the 1980s, the same 
Pamela Yates and her partners from the independent studio Skyline 
Pictures won a commission from CBS to do a television report in 
Guatemala, precisely at the time when the Latin American country 
was going through an unprecedented turmoil: Guatemalan 
                                                 
 
1
 Yates, in an interview with Rosenthal (Autumn 1985), first published in 
Film Quarterly, Vol. 39:1. Here cited from Rosenthal (1988), 151. 
2
 WHEN THE MOUNTAINS TREMBLE. Directors: Pamela Yates, 
Newton Thomas Segel. USA, 1983. 
6 
 
principal guerrilla organizations unified their military command 
under Guatemalan Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Revolucionaria 
Nacional Guatemalteca or URNG). URNG tried to boycott the 
General Elections and declared that reforms were not possible in 
Guatemala without revolutionary changes and that they were about 
to undertake a “popular revolutionary war”.
3
 In order to prevent 
the guerrilla’s plan, the growing state armed forces started a 
counterinsurgency and, between 1982 and 1985, one hundred fifty 
thousand people lost their lives in Guatemala, up to 90 percent of 
them being unarmed civilians.
4
 Out of all losses of lives and 
human rights abuses, less than five percent are today attributed to 
the guerrillas. The heavily armed governmental counterinsurgency 
is today almost entirely held responsible for the crimes in 
Guatemala, and this, revolutions historian Jeff Goodwin put it, 
“would not have been possible without external assistance – 
mainly but not exclusively from the United States”.
5
 
                                                 
 
3
 Degenhardt (1983/1991), 121. 
4
 Goodwin (2001), 198.  
5
 Goodwin (2001), 203. In order to support his argument, Goodwin refers 
here to the comprehensive Report published by the Human Rights Office of 
the Catholic Church: between 1960s and 1996 (the signing of the peace 
accord ) the total number of human victims was two hundred thousands 
7 
 
 
Figure ‎0.1 Pamela Yates recording sound for WHEN THE 
MOUNTAINS TREMBLE (1983). Scene included in GRANITO: 
HOW TO NAIL A DICTATOR (2011). 
 
It is right from the midmost of this unrest that Pamela Yates and 
the Skyline colleagues delivered, for American network CBS, two 
TV reports about the situation in Guatemala. The reports, 
containing balanced statements, were not how the filmmakers 
thought the Guatemalan story should be told in the United States, 
                                                                                                         
 
(ninety percent unarmed civilians); the guerrillas were held responsible for 
less than five percent all human rights abuses. 
8 
 
and “the Skyline group found it of a little value”.
6
 Pam Yates and 
her team returned to Guatemala to do the documentary film they 
thought was urgent toe done. The outcome of this last journey is 
WHEN THE MOUNTAINS TREMBLE, a film which gives a very 
intimate look at the culture of resistance. WHEN THE 
MOUNTAINS TREMBLE documents the communities that went on 
with their struggle, even under ceaseless bombardment coming 
from the Guatemalan, U.S.-backed military government. The film 
was shot with the American public in mind and. In order to make 
the historical background as clear as possible for the large 
American audience that the filmmakers hoped to reach, the film 
introduced two re-enacted sequences, about the U.S. economical 
interests and intervention in Guatemala and the American 
intervention in the 1954 coup.
7
 The docu-drama parts received a 
lot of criticism, but WHEN THE MOUNTAINS TREMBLE did 
                                                 
 
6
 Barnouw (1993), 301–302. 
7
 In 1997, CIA commenced declassifying a dramatic contingent of 
documents which chronicle the CIA involvement in the 1954 coup in 
Guatemala, to be found on the websites of the National Security Archive 
(http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/) and the CIA 
(http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/guatemala). 
9 
 
achieve an extensive theatrical release and “the guerrilla sequences 
proved spell-binding”.
8
  
There was however something else at stake, other than the 
theatrical success, that determined Pamela Yates and Tom Siegel to 
film in both difficult and dangerous conditions. It was something 
else that made them risk their own lives in order for this 
documentary to be made. The menace was a serious one: if the 
Guatemalan government had known that the American crew was 
filming the guerrillas, the director stated somewhere, “we would 
have been declared enemies of the state and either killed or 
expelled”.
9
 It is not even solely the security of the filmmakers that 
was at issue in the making of the film: Yates dedicated the 
documentary film to “the thousands of Latin Americans who 
risked their lives in order that we might tell their story”.
10
 We do 
not know today if the people who showed their faces in the film, 
or those who granted interviews, suffered governmental 
repercussions. There is no information available on what happened 
                                                 
 
8
 Barnouw (1993), 302. 
9
 Yates, in interview with Rosenthal (1988), 546 . 
10
 As it appears on the end credits of WHEN THE MOUNTAINS 
TREMBLE.  
10 
 
to those Guatemalans, many more, who facilitated the making of 
the documentary.  
Hence, what precisely made Yates want to go back to 
Guatemala and do a documentary film, different from the two TV 
reports she did beforehand?
11
 The answer is empathy, in her own 
words: 
We hope that when people come out after the film is over 
they will have had an emotionally compelling experience that 
makes them think or feel that the people of Central America 
and the people of the United States have more in common 
with each other (...).
12
 
So what motivated Pam Yates to do the Guatemala film and 
several others in Latin America, what determined her team to 
spend money, risk their lives and consciously jeopardize the lives 
of the people who allowed themselves to be filmed, was them all 
being of the opinion that there is something within the frames of 
the documentary, in the filmic means of the genre, which will 
make distant spectators identify, or empathise with the people in 
                                                 
 
11
 Yates believed the TV reports were “filmed slide shows”, as she put it in 
the interview with Alan Rosenthal (1988), 545. 
12
 Yates, in interview with Rosenthal (1988), 551. 
11 
 
the film. The filmmakers assumed that this film-generated empathy 
is effective enough to bring along some form of altruistic conduct: 
on Yates’ particular agenda, we should remember here, the action 
desired was the mobilization of the American people to pressure 
their own government in order “to stop U.S. intervention in Latin 
America”. 
Pamela Yates is by all means not an isolated case of 
resistance documentary maker. There are numerous documentary 
films, made by people from within or from outside the conflict 
borders who, up until today, undertake similar risks; in their turn, 
people often endanger their own safety, and that of their families, 
only to be characters in such films, since they all share the 
common belief: documentary moving images have the capacity to 
generate empathy, and consequently trigger action, which might 
eventually attract humanitarian aid or produce outcomes such as 
sanctions or military intervention.  
Scholars of revolutions agree on few things, but there 
seems to be consensus on the fact that, in order to succeed, 
revolutions must benefit from good international relationships or 
12 
 
assistance
13
: revolutionary success has, more often than not, 
“depended on foreign support for the opposition coming at crucial 
times, or on the withdrawal of foreign support for the ruler”.
14
 It is 
equally relevant that many revolutions did not succeed, or had 
been reversed, only because of lack of foreign intervention to back 
them. Hence revolutionary documentaries produced for a foreign 
audience may be seen as yet another tool to achieve this purpose.
15
  
For all the serious implications listed above, one might 
presuppose it is only self-evident that the empathy-generating 
capacity of documentary films has already been properly 
investigated. Moreover, since so much has already been written, in 
a variety of disciplines, on the subject of empathy, one might go 
on in presupposing that the problem was seriously taken under 
scrutiny in the context of film studies. This is not, however, the 
case. There is a very limited amount of existent work on the 
subject of filmic empathy, and almost no research engaging with 
the topic in the context of non-fiction moving image.  
                                                 
 
13
 Sharp (1993/2012), Goldstone (2014). 
14
 Goldstone (2014), 19. 
15
 Sharp (1993/2012), 78–79. 
13 
 
The recent revolutionary movements in the Arab World 
and Ukraine, and the large documentary production emerging 
from these parts of the world, beg the question: what are the 
means and mechanisms within the frames of the non-fiction films, 
which are charged with stimulating empathy – this bond between 
distant people(s) – and what is the relationship between thus 
experienced empathic distress and our moral attitude? This is the 
inquiry in the current work, undertaken in the context of resistance 
documentary – non-fiction films emerging from revolutionary 
situations. 
14 
 
Revolutions and Resistance Documentaries 
 
 
Shot rapidly in January in 1961, during the first period of alert…, it 
aims at communicating, if not the experience, at least the vibrations, 
the rhythms of a revolution that will one day perhaps be held to be the 
decisive moment of a whole era of contemporary history.  
   – Chris Marker, in the Preface to the script for CUBA SÍ!
16
 
 
Revolutions are the events that had an utmost influence in shaping 
the history of the world, its modern borders and the geopolitics, as 
we know them, with some global wars perhaps being more 
important in this respect. We cannot understand the world, the 
way it is now, without understanding revolutions in Iran, Cuba and 
Philippine. And the documentary films made in the heart of those 
events are a great tool towards our incisive comprehension.  
The term resistance, or revolutionary documentary, is used in this 
work to define the variety of the non-fiction film genre which 
emerges from revolutionary situations, filmed in one or more of 
the stages of the revolutionary process. Resistance documentaries 
                                                 
 
16
 Chris Marker (1961), cited in Chanan (2004), 193. 
15 
 
are emergency products, often clandestinely produced by 
filmmakers from within the uprising border, or – as it is the case in 
countries with no film school or no documentary tradition – by, or 
with the help of international crews. With various degrees of 
ideological distance, these films document the perspective of the 
resistance movement, and are produced with a foreign audience in 
mind. In this respect they differ from agit-props
17
 and third-
cinema films,
18
 which have a different function: they openly aim to 
mobilize the people directly concerned with the revolution into 
partaking, in some way, in the resistance movement.  
The making of the early documentaries from this variety of 
films does not coincide with the beginnings of cinema, as they 
emerged much later, in the context of the expansion of 16mm film 
equipment in the 1950s. It is true that this type of equipment was 
already largely used in the Second World War, but it is only in the 
                                                 
 
17
 Agit-props have their origins in kino-trains, or agit-trains (and even agit-
boats). Like the name says, trains were traveling throughout the Soviet 
Union starting in 1918 and continuing all the way into the 1920s. The agit-
trains were mobile film laboratories, having on board an equally mobile 
cinema, sometimes even a theatre. They had a function: keeping people 
united in the ongoing struggle. Descriptions to be found in Barnouw (1993), 
51–54 and Karmen (1949/1996), 61–65.  
18
 A film qualified as third-cinema if it aimes to turn the spectator into an 
active participant in the liberation struggle. 
16 
 
post-war years that their growing use in medical, governmental, 
educational institutions and televisions lead to the extension of the 
16mm network, and therefore reduced the overall costs of 
production. As a direct outcome, filmmaking became increasingly 
available for documentary makers who now could finally work 
outside studios, or independent from any other sort of established 
institutions.
19
 
With production costs reduced, complemented by the new 
development of synchronized sound recording techniques, film 
equipment became much easier to transport and manoeuvre in 
difficult settings and hasty circumstances. Filmic means, in their 
turn, were now liberated from the agenda of production studios, 
and in no imperative need of governmental money. Starting with 
the uprisings in Central and South America, documentary film 
teams became independent witnesses, and sometimes participants 
in the movements, thus creating resistance, or revolutionary 
documentaries (the two terms are going to be interchangeably used 
here to describe the same category of films). 
                                                 
 
19
 Ericson (2009), Aitken (2013). 
17 
 
Two perspectives distinguish our overall understanding of 
both revolutions and the films documenting them. One of the two 
perspectives is heroic, describing by and large the rise of the 
crowds triumphantly rejoicing at the collapse of the unjust leaders, 
bringing in new world orders that are “concerned with both 
liberation and freedom”.
20
 The second perspective we have on 
revolutions, less epic, stresses on the chaos in society, brought 
along by angered or hysteric mobs. And therefore it is not rare 
that, in attempting to define revolutions, historians and social 
scientists first wonder about their moral nature. Jeff Goodwin, 
theoretician of revolutionary movements, raises the question in the 
preface of his book No Other Way Out: “I was once told that before 
I could write sensibly about revolutions, I would need to decide 
for myself whether they were good or just”.
21
 A similar question 
occurs to the documentary film scholar: what is the moral nature 
of revolutionary movements? Which films should be studied in the 
first place, and which is the required distance vis-à-vis the storylines 
happening on the screen?  
                                                 
 
20
 Arendt (1963), 25. 
21
 Goodwin (2001), xvii. 
18 
 
This first moral dilemma appears to get its answer directly 
from the recent history of revolutions: if revolutions are the 
overthrowing of rulers by mobilized masses in order to create 
entirely new political and social orders, in the name of freedom 
and liberty, then the Khmer Rouge taking of power under Pol Pot 
qualifies as a successful revolution, even in the heroic 
understanding of the term, and most historians agree to that. Yet, 
in less than four years, between the 17th of April 1975, when the 
Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, took Phnom Penh, and the 7th of 
January 1979, when Pol Pot stepped back, about 1.7 million 
Cambodians lost their lives because of starvation, overwork or 
execution. This means the perishing of just about 1 in 4 citizens in 
the country, turning it into one of the most horrific and absurd 
crimes against humanity in the modern world.
22
 In all that time, 
the socialist world, including the western elite, persisted in 
applauding the successful Cambodian revolution. The same goes 
for the Iranian Revolution – if we apply even the more narrow 
definitions available, the Iranian one, too, qualifies as a successful 
revolution. Not only successful revolutions lead to social and 
                                                 
 
22
According to the Cambodian Information Centre:  
http://www.cambodia.org/ khmer_rouge/. 
19 
 
political misfortunes; failed ones, and non-revolutions, do too: the 
attempt at overthrowing the Syrian Assad-Family dictatorship 
generated the events that turned Syria into the country with 2.47 
million refugees, close to becoming the largest population of 
refugees in the world.
23
 The paramilitary FARC (Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Columbia), known today for kidnappings and 
narcotics-trafficking, emerged in the 1960s with a Marxist 
program, and turned into the group which nowadays, as Goodwin 
points out, earns “as much as $400 to $600 million annually by 
taxing coca growers and traffickers in southern Columbia”.
24
 
After all the above, there is no way left in which 
revolutions could be solely understood as fundamentally heroic or 
merely morally good, and the history of revolutions, over and over 
again, shows us both its facets. The geologist studies earthquakes, 
but not because he likes to see the world crack, and social scientist 
and historians analyse revolutions, but not because they necessarily 
want to see the world upside down; in a similar fashion, no 
                                                 
 
23
 According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNCHR), at the time of the writing this position is still held by 
Afghanistan: http://www.unhcr.org.uk/about-us/key-facts-and-
figures.html. 
24
 Goodwin (2001), 241. 
20 
 
ideology affected the choices of non-fiction examples in the 
current work. What brings them under the same category is that 
they were all being made in a revolutionary context, partaking to 
various extents in the resistance movements in a particular geo-
political context; they are films which came into existence in order 
to be shown outside that revolutionary setting. 
But to better define resistance documentaries, we should 
first properly look at what revolutionary situations actually are. It 
will become apparent how specific features of revolutionary 
situations influence the ways in which the films documenting them 
are made. 
There is only partial agreement about how to define 
revolutionary situations. In a symbolic manner, they have been 
described by historians and social scientists as “traffic jams”,
25
 
“great volcanoes of the social sciences, erupting to produce a 
broad social changes”,
26
 or even “earthquakes”
27
 of societies in an 
“unstable equilibrium”: 
                                                 
 
25
 Tilly (1993), 7. 
26
 Johnston (2011), 135. 
27
 Goldstone (2014), 15. 
21 
 
Imagine a ball sitting at the bottom of a large depression; if a 
small force moves the ball in any direction, it simply falls 
back into the depression, returning to its former state (…). 
Yet consider what happens if the ball is not sitting in a 
depression, but resting on top of the hill. In the absence of 
any force the ball remains in place, but small force pushing 
the ball now leads it to roll of the hill and head into a new 
direction. This is an unstable equilibrium – a small 
disturbance leads to an ever larger departure from the prior 
condition. This is exactly what happens to a society in a 
revolution.
28
 
When the discussion moves towards a less metaphorical and more 
exact lexis, defining revolutions gets complicated. Are they sudden, 
rapid transformations, or involve changes over a long time span? 
And what kinds of changes are necessary for one to talk of a 
revolution? Do they, by necessity, imply violent confrontation of 
armed forces? Is a non-violent, but yet radical change, a 
revolution? Are revolutions ultimately the fight of the poor against 
the rich, and always trigger redistribution of wealth? Or are the 
grounds that determine revolutions far more diverse? Are all 
revolutions social events, or is there room for other types of 
revolutions, like the anti-colonial model? Are they defined by the 
                                                 
 
28
 Ibid. 
22 
 
ideological change – or do they actually need an ideology 
altogether? And what about insurrections and terrorist actions? 
When do they “transform” into revolutions? There is not always 
agreement concerning the above. Many theoreticians however, like 
Skocpol, Tilly and Johnston, agree on a state-centred definition of 
revolution, where the revolutionary movement seeks control of the 
state, replacing the existent structure, and not just institutions or 
policies. The state itself is not a fixed concept, but rather one 
which suffers great changes throughout time, and as it changes, so 
do revolutions, and the kinds of documentary films emerging from 
revolutionary contexts change with them. 
States have armies to defend them – so for a long time, 
theories which placed the state in the centre of the definition of 
revolution argued that one of their fundamental features must be 
violence: the intelligent way in which the state uses its armed 
forces determines the success of the revolution. This hypothesis is 
two-folded, the other side being that, once the revolutionary 
movement succeeds, the reformation and consolidation of the 
army of the new revolutionary state is essential for the lasting 
23 
 
victory.
29
 In 1963, Hannah Arendt strongly maintained that 
violence, alongside war, is intrinsically related to revolution. 
Revolutions indeed used to be predominantly violent, and violence 
was a visual constant in the narrative of resistance documentaries, 
up to a later point in time. Yet, non-violent revolutions 
predominated in recent years. The Zapatistas resistance movement 
in Mexico is one instance of non-violent revolution, and the films 
documenting it had to invent novel visual ways to show the 
struggle. Like the means for peaceful revolutions, films 
documenting them are also at the beginning, and their innovative 
visual means do not escape criticism: “But as far as war goes, what 
we see on screen is peasants taking control of a few towns and 
ranches, (…) and then being unable to return home to their 
villages”,
30
 a reviewer wrote about A PLACE CALLED CHIAPAS, 
Nettie Wild’s documentary on the Zapatista movement in Mexico. 
“There is a voice-over about a paramilitary reaction later”, the 
                                                 
 
29
 Chorley (1943). 
30
 Konecky [undated archive], cited from CultureVulture, available online at:  
http://culturevulture.net/film/a-place-called-chiapas. 
24 
 
reviewer adds, “when 45 people are killed. Tragic, but not much of 
a war”.
31
 
Another reason lying in the background of revolutionary 
movements, is seen by many “an uneven economic 
development”.
32
 Economic burden plays a role in revolutions, 
however places struggling with the deepest poverty, like instances 
of famine in recent history, did not lead to revolutionary situations. 
Revolutions do often have in their background economic crises or 
wars, and the two are indeed strongly interconnected, since wars 
lead to the weakening of states. It is the case of the war the former 
Soviet Union fought in Afghanistan, which contributed to the 
worsening of economic conditions of the large population, and 
eventually lead to the weakening of the Soviet Union. But even if 
economic deprivation plays an important role in this respect, this 
doesn’t happen in its extreme cases, and Goldstone’s conclusion, 
about what degree of economic deprivation facilitate revolutionary 
crises, might surprise many: “revolutions occur more often in 
middle-income countries than in the very poorest nations”.
33
 In 
                                                 
 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Skocpol (1979), 23. 
33
 Goldstone (2014), 10. 
25 
 
conclusion, there must be other triggers, beyond the realm of 
poverty, which motivate the organizing of resistance movements 
that filmmakers document.  
Resistance movements start to coagulate when many 
people in the society become angry and frustrated,
34
 when they 
think they are treated unfair
35
 and they believe to be part of a 
numerous, united, righteous group.
36
 So it is not essentially 
extreme poverty that leads the furious peoples to revolt, but rather 
various forms of injustice or inequality which lead to a larger 
amount of the population to join rebellious groups in order to call 
attention on their unfair situation and raise demands. We talk 
about a revolutionary situation when, according to Tilly, out of 
those groups grow “contenders, or coalitions of contenders, 
advancing exclusive alternative claims to the control of the 
government which is currently exerted by the members of the 
polity”,
37
 or exercised by “the state, or some segment of it”.
38
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Are revolutions brief instances, or long-lasting processes? 
How long should the filming process last for the revolution to be 
properly documented? Where does the film narrative begin, and 
when do filmmakers know the filming process can safely approach 
its end?  
For Arendt, we speak of a revolution when “the course of 
the history suddenly begins anew”,
39
 it is the idea behind the year 
zero, in Revolutionary France or Cambodia. In her very influential 
work on social revolutions, Theda Skocpol argued that revolutions 
are momentous, “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s class 
structures”.
40
  Yet, Mao Zedong prepared the Chinese Revolution 
for almost 20 years. Some definitions stress on how revolutions 
occur, the context that leads to the mass mobilisations and their 
beginnings, while others emphasize the outcomes. The revolution 
can start as a less radical movement, one that seeks partial reforms 
and not a downfall in the state structures. When the existing power 
does not want to, or cannot fulfil these reform claims, the reform 
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movement breaks into a resistance one. We speak about a 
revolutionary outcome when power is transferred “from those 
who held it before the start of multiple suzerainty to a new ruling 
coalition – which may of course include some elements of the old 
ruling coalition”.
41
 And even for those, very few revolutionary 
contexts, which have clear revolutionary outcomes, there are 
historians who would still insist in labelling them as “doubtful” or 
“marginal” outcomes.
42
 
For those historians studying revolutions, research is rather 
focused on the successful ones. The current work, however, in 
analysing the films of resistance movements, brings under scrutiny 
documentaries from contexts which many historians might qualify 
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as “failed revolutions”
43
 or “revolutions in the process”, or even 
“non-revolutions”,
44
 “revolutions that never took place”
45
 – until 
today. 
Evaluation of the success of the revolutions is difficult in 
itself, since this type of conflict generates outcomes which neither 
could have been previously envisaged, nor expected and, as 
Skocpol put it in her influential book: “Revolutions have invariably 
given rise to outcomes neither fully foreseen nor intended by – nor 
perfectly serving the interests of – any of the particular groups 
involved”.
46
 This curious shift in political realities brings about 
shifts in perspective, and renders it difficult for the documentary 
maker to get an ideological stand towards both the events and the 
people that are being filmed. This is probably why a widespread 
approach to resistance documentaries is the filmed diary where, in 
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a self-reflexive manner, the ideological concerns and shifts in 
perspective are straightforwardly personalized and reflected upon. 
The documentary maker cannot usually anticipate the 
ending of the revolutionary situation, for it to coincide with the 
end of the film, and the ideological dilemmas to be solved, since 
the historical outcomes do not occur rapidly. On the contrary, they 
sometimes require decades to have their effects felt. Jack 
Goldstone estimates an average of ten to twelve years necessary “from 
the fall of the old regime before the features of the stable new 
revolutionary regime are clear”.
47
 In time, the leaders of the 
resistance movement can seek to take the power, or in time turn 
into unarmed political parties, and even participate in the 
government, as it is the case of Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación 
Nacional, or FMLN) in El Salvador. Jeff Goodwin identified 
another category, “the reformist revolutionary movement”, where 
the resistance or its leaders seek state power, but do not wish to 
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change the existent state structures, order and institutions, or at 
most reform them very little.
48
  
But the replacing of an old regime with a new one through 
a revolutionary movement is, in Goldstone’s terms, just “a 
revolutionary honeymoon”. Tilly also stresses on the long time 
span necessary for the unfold of revolutions. For him, an accurate 
definition of revolutions encompasses both revolutionary 
situations and outcomes, and an excessively narrow definition of 
such a diverse process will naturally prove to be inaccurately 
exclusive.
 49
  Following Tilly, we can define a complete, successful 
revolution as a process lasting  
from a sundering of sovereignty and hegemony through a 
period of struggle to re-establishment of sovereignty and 
hegemony under new management. The course of struggle 
and change from the opening to the termination of multiple 
sovereignty constitutes the revolutionary process.
50
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Tilly also adds to his understanding of the process that, for a 
revolution to be successful, “the new regime has to hold power for 
a significant period”.
51
 
It seems now reasonable to agree that revolutionary 
movements, even if they might appear momentous sparks in time, 
are actually not rapid and short, but almost with no exception, no 
matter if ultimately successful or failed, processes which last 
extensive periods of time, aiming at the complete change of the 
existing state order. What is rapid, unpredictable, violent, and often 
short, are the various revolutionary episodes in the chain that 
marks the long, complicated revolutionary process. In the 
revolutionary process radical events unfold with high speed, as 
opposed to settle societies ran by stable, uncontested regimes, 
where changes, even small, happen within a long time-span. This is 
the reason why revolutionary, non-fiction films, regardless which 
stage of the process they document, require promptness in the 
production process and swiftness in post-production and 
distribution. 
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Figure ‎0.2 Last images recorded by Swedish-Argentinian 
cameraman Leonardo Henricksen, before being shot dead on 
June 29, 1973, in an attempt of military coup. Footage 
included in BATTLE OF CHILE, Part I (1975). 
 
“Challengers change, rulers change, claims change, commitment of 
citizens to the claims changes, and capacity of rulers to suppress 
challengers changes”,
52
 and alongside all of the above, the scripts 
of documentary films, which are subject to improvisation – change 
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as well. These films are emergency products, which do not properly fit 
in commissioning editor’s agenda; as they require rapid production 
decisions, there is often no buffer time for budget rising.  
Revolutionary documentaries frequently require concealed 
filming. This is the reason why a tremendous number of these 
films are independent, low or no budget self-produced pieces, 
which get commissioned only in the editing stage, or secure festival 
or television distribution just after the film is completed. The 
filmmakers often require great access, and a trusting relationship 
with members of the resistance movement, no matter which stage 
of the revolutionary process they mainly document: the rise of 
guerrillas, a particular attack, some form of protest or foreign 
intervention, or the first presidential elections. The presidential or 
constitutional elections under the new order are the closing 
sequences of numerous of those documentaries.
53
  
Some filmmakers however are not content with the 
outcomes and continue filming, sensing a new dramatic turn in the 
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events,
54
 or return to the country to do yet another film about a 
new stage of the revolutionary process.
55
 
 
 
Figure ‎0.3 First election in Libya after the fall of Muammar al-
Gaddafi. Footage included in DIARY FROM A REVOLUTION 
(2012). 
                                                 
 
54
 DIARY FROM A REVOLUTION. Director:  Nizar Najar. Norway | 
Libya, 2012.    
55
 Deborah Shaffer’s film NICARAGUA: REPORT FROM THE FRONT, 
documenting the revolutionary struggle of Sandinista National Liberation 
Front (FSLN) under constant American threat made a big impact in the 
United States. In 1987, Shaffer went back to Nicaragua to document another 
stage of the revolutionary process in the film FIRE FROM THE 
MOUNTAIN (1987). This time, the combatants from the first documentary 
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Like any other creative artist, these filmmakers might indeed have 
motivations beyond political and militant ones, like fame, money, 
even spirit of adventure.
56
 Whichever the reasons behind the 
production might be, the makers and the people appearing in the 
film, or those facilitating it at great risk, are doing their part 
because they assume, or they know from previous experience, that 
the film could have an impact, often an emotional one, on the 
outside world. 
Foreign support to the revolutionary faction is proven to 
influence the success of the resistance movement, while support to 
the old structures can obliterate the chances of the revolution to 
succeed or to last. John Foran provides a comprehensive account 
of the failed revolutions in the Third World Countries and the 
relationship towards external powers.
57
 The Aliende revolutionary 
movement in 1970 succeeded because, as Foran put it, “the U.S. 
underestimates threat”, only to be doomed to an abrupt failure 
some few years later, when the U.S. blockade and intervention lead 
to inflation and economical crises. Ultimately, the CIA-backed 
coup d’état in 1973 installed a dictatorship. Similar were the cases 
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of Jamaica (1980) and Grenada (1983), where revolutions were 
reversed, and more recently in Syria, were rebels fought without 
success not only the regime, but alongside, the external support 
that the regime was receiving. 
Not only the foreign support, offered either to the state 
power, or to the resistance movements, can influence the outcome 
of the revolution. When solely the external power simply retracts 
the support offered to a particular regime, the revolutionary 
movement increases its chances. It was in these sorts of 
circumstances, with the US withdrawal of support for Marcos in 
the Philippines in the 1986, that the People’s Power movement 
achieved the downfall of the regime; same goes for the coup which 
ended the Duvalier family-regime in Haiti in the same year.
58 
In 
both cases, films about the revolutions were made over a longer 
period of time, thus documenting the fact that changes were only 
partial (the military, for instance, kept hold on power in both 
countries) and few social reforms happened.  
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Figure 4 Forensic excavations in Guatemala; footage included 
in GRANITO: HOW TO NAIL A DICTATOR (2011). 
 
Yet another type of revolution, the “democratizing” one, happens 
when, like in the Libyan case, or more recently Ukraine, the masses 
“seek to overturn an authoritarian regime that has grown corrupt, 
ineffective and illegitimate, and replace it with a more accountable 
and representative regime”.
59
 According to Goldstone, these types 
of revolutions unfortunately tend to lead to “either frequent shifts 
in leaderships or recurrent authoritarian tendencies”.
60
 In the case 
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of the Libyan democratizing revolution, international intervention 
decisively contributed to the fall of the regime, but soon the 
country tumbled into bloody civil war. The Libyan case is yet 
another example that international support can decisively influence 
the course of the revolution, but it does not go without grave 
consequences when this support is partial or only momentary. 
After a successful revolution, a new state order should be created, 
since states do not exist in a vacuum but, in Goodwin’s words, in 
“the international state systems”
61
: international support can 
contribute to the consolidation of the order and autonomous 
structures in countries coming out of a successful revolution. 
International support, in short, is not the only factor contributing 
to the destiny of the revolutionary movements, but it is beyond 
doubt a key factor, which explains the large production of 
Revolutionary Documentaries. My current work challenges the 
assumptions about the effect these films might have on the 
viewer’s affect. It investigates a particular kind of response, namely 
the empathic one, and its potential relationship to action. 
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Filmic Empathy: An Interdisciplinary Approach 
 
 
Film studies were not opened to interdisciplinary approach until 
very recently, as opposed to research taking place in psychology, 
where for a long time now, film has been used as a tool for 
experiments and argumentations. Film-based experiments (film 
stimuli) are traditionally used instruments for studying empathy in 
the laboratory, thus asserting clearly the agreed-upon belief that 
empathy with the moving-image character is empathy.  
Experienced researchers often support their theories with 
video recordings and films. Already in the 1980s, when the idea 
that empathy is a multidimensional phenomenon was just 
acquiring credibility, experiments were designed around dramatic 
film stimuli in order to prove just that: emotional and cognitive 
stimuli interact into generating a single, complex empathy process. 
The groundbreaking findings of Mark Davis et al. in the field of 
empathy included an experiment which presupposed showing to 
144 male students clips from the films BRIAN’S SONG and WHO’S 
40 
 
AFRAID OF VIRGINIA WOOLF.
62
 Martin Hoffman uses fiction film 
examples to support his hypotheses. An account about viewing 
STEEL MAGNOLIAS describes both how imagining to be the other 
triggers empathy, and how this empathy can subsequently be 
susceptible to egoistic drift, when the viewer focuses more on his 
on painful experience.
63
 Psychologist Daniel Batson, whose life-
long work is dedicated to the relationship between empathy and 
altruism, explains one reason why films can be subject of enquiry 
for the study of empathy:  
We believe that each of these works (i.e. A RAISIN IN THE 
SUN, THE ELEPHANT MAN, RAIN MAN, LONGTIME 
COMPANION), and many similar ones, seek to improve 
attitudes toward a stigmatized group – a racial or cultural 
minority, people with some social stigma, disability or disease. 
The strategy used is to induce the audience to feel empathy 
for one or a few members of the stigmatized group.
64
 
Some of the more sceptical film scholars might still wonder if such 
a thing exists altogether: empathy with characters in the moving 
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image, or what I refer to here as filmic empathy. In order to 
understand the nature of the relationship we have with people in 
films, we should first recall what we know from experience: that 
watching a film is not mere looking, but it implies paying attention. 
And empathy is very much an involuntary process or, as Hoffman 
put it: “if one pays attention to the victim, one should respond 
automatically with empathic distress”.
65
 This is why almost every 
single movie spectator, adult or child, finds it difficult to avoid 
empathising with victims in films. This is not only the case with 
documentary films, but is valid even for fiction films, where it is 
common knowledge that the people we see are actors and 
‘pretend’. The spectatorship of film presupposes paying attention, 
which does not leave room for avoiding empathy. It is nevertheless 
true that it would be possible for the spectator to avoid some 
complex empathic modes, like identification with the people on 
the screen, by thinking distracting thoughts, but as will be shown 
in chapter 3, several less complex modes of triggering empathy are 
involuntary and automatic.  
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The victim does not need to be physically present for the 
empathy to be generated in the viewers, and there are several 
reasons why that is: humans are able to form images, represent 
people and events, and imagine themselves in another’s place – 
and represented people and events can evoke affect.
66
 It must be 
admitted that there are differences of intensity, determined by the 
fact that the distress is represented in moving images and not 
experienced first hand, but these very limitations are not related to 
the victim’s physical absence, but to the viewer’s imagination and 
its limitations. 
We thus may commence from the safe premise that, 
through specific filmic mechanisms, corresponding to various 
psychological modes of triggering empathy, non-fiction moving 
images have the potential to arouse empathic feelings in the 
viewer. 
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Where to Look for Answers? Methodology and 
Outline of the Work 
 
 
Empathy has never been central to film scholarship and, to this 
day, almost entirely absent from non-fiction studies. 67  Under 
various names, however (like sympathy or identification), it has 
been occasionally employed, starting from the works of the earliest 
film theorists until now, to explain a variety of aspects in 
spectatorship theory. Various facets of the same phenomenon 
were interchangeably called character engagement or identification, 
perspective taking or simulation, partial illusion or vectorial 
convergence, emotional contagion or mirroring – to name just a 
few of the approaches towards the complex phenomenon that 
compounds empathy, which will be detailed later in this work. 
The discussion is complicated for at least three main 
reasons. The first problem with empathy is a terminological one: in 
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psychological studies, the limited nomenclature available forced 
researchers to alternately employ only sympathy or empathy to 
describe a wide range of psychological phenomenons. The direct 
effect on empathy inquiry in film studies was that scholars ended 
up using the confusing vocabulary. This was supplemented with 
notions or words from the vernacular (most notably 
identification), but thus scholars continued referring to aspects of, 
as will be showed in chapter 3, is the same wide-ranging process. 
This led to a second, more sensitive problem: the tendency 
in film studies to isolate, to increasingly tighten parts of this single 
empathic process in the attempt to condense it to one essential, 
fundamental feature – simply resulting in an artificial reduction. So 
even if opinions on the filmic empathy, what it means and what it 
does, are diverse, there tends to be a common denominator, 
namely that the tendency was an increasing attempt at making 
definitions more and more punctual, narrowing the sense.  
In psychological studies, however, starting mid-1980s, 
empathy theoreticians found it ever more useful to approach this 
approximately defined phenomenon not (just) in terms of 
outcomes, but in terms of the process, emphasizing on the 
relationship between the observer’s feelings and the victim’s 
feelings, where the observer will have “feelings that are more 
45 
 
congruent with another’s situation than with his own situation”.
68
 
Recent influential research-based theories in psychology show that, 
contrary to previous beliefs, empathy is, above all, a very complex 
and multilayered phenomenon, and a comprehensive definition, an 
“organisational model” 69  of empathy, cannot ignore any of its 
facets.70 The further predicament with the research of empathy in 
film is that it happened too far-removed from psychology – like 
overall the studies of film reception, until very recently, for that 
matter. I argue that empathy is essential for the understanding of 
non-fiction film spectatorship, but it is not possible to properly 
grasp it without adding to the existent body of work the findings 
from psychological experiment-based theory: hypotheses 
confirmed with real measurements on real people. 
Drawing on recent works of psychology scholars, mainly 
Martin Hoffman, Mark Davis and Daniel Batson, and reviewing 
experiments and laboratory measures, the current work brings 
empathy-related constructs and processes within the frameworks 
of a single theory. Departing from here, various means specific to 
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the documentary genre, which contribute to the stimulating of 
empathy, will be identified.  
For the very basic mode of empathic arousal, mimicry, 
most research employs electromyographic procedures (EMG). 
They assess the emotionally-produced movements of the facial 
muscles by measuring facial data which is not visible to the naked 
eye: skin conductance, activities of lips, wrinkles, folds. More 
complex empathic modes of arousal employ equally complex heart 
rate measurements, completed by questionnaires, often on a large 
group of subjects monitored for a long period of time. This, too, 
will be detailed later in this work (chapters 3 and 5.1). At this point 
it must be said that, complicated and expensive as they are, these 
methods are out of the range of film scholars, the solution 
therefore being to integrate results delivered by psychological 
theories in a more rigorous study of filmic empathy. 
Part I of the current work deals with some of the 
conceptual approaches to the vastly debated and not agreed-upon 
notion of “empathy”, and their influence on theories of film 
spectatorship. By the end of this first part, a unified theory of 
filmic empathy should allow for a better understanding of the 
apparatus, specific to moving images, which is able to trigger 
empathy in the non-fiction spectator. 
47 
 
Various theories of empathy, from both film studies and 
psychology, are employed here for identifying means and 
mechanisms of triggering empathy in documentary film. The 
applicability of the theoretical findings will be tested with 
revolutionary documentary examples in Part II of this work. Part 
III investigates the final step of the empathic process, its tendency 
to action, primarily in the context of emergent forms of 
documentary, namely transmedia platforms. 
Incorporating empirical findings from other academic 
fields might seem like a very modern approach to film studies, but 
there is a history to it, which will be assessed in chapter 1. In 
chapter 2, I first revise the understanding of the empathy 
phenomenon in relevant fiction film studies (since in the field of 
documentary, as stated above, it is almost entirely absent). After 
pointing out the problematic juncture of empathy in film theory, it 
becomes evident why the findings should not be discharged 
altogether (or the questions previously raised by film scholars, 
dismissed) but rather the methodology needs to be brought under 
scrutiny. I evaluate the understanding of various contributing to 
the complex process that filmic empathy is, like mimicry and 
identification, and primarily from the works of film cognitivist 
scholars (notably Noël Carroll’s). Their writings cannot be 
48 
 
overlooked in the broader theory of non-fiction spectatorship, and 
in chapter 3 these contributions will be merged with psychological 
findings on the topic. At the end of Part I, an (not exhaustive) 
inventory of filmic means and mechanisms charged with 
stimulating empathy in the non-fiction film spectator will be 
assembled. The findings will be tested in the second Part of the 
work.  
The focus of Part III is action. If empathy did keep some 
theoreticians busy, what comes after the empathic process went 
entirely unexplored. We might empathise with distant people in 
documentary films, and we might understand some ways of how it 
happens – and so what if we do? Resistance documentaries are 
emergency products, and behind the production process there is 
almost always a function: to attract international assistance, leading 
to diplomatic, humanitarian or military aid. Often, the films 
themselves become another tool for the resistance movement. 
Whatever reaction might follow the empathic process, this 
constitutes part of the reasons, and sometimes the reason, 
motivating the production. Part III investigates the assumption 
that documentary films have the potential to generate altruistic 
behaviour. Many of the revolutionary documentaries even end up 
with direct messages addressed to the spectators on the final 
49 
 
credits, telephone numbers and addresses of NGOs, urging action. 
Is the supposition of those documentary makers and characters 
justified? Is empathy is indeed tendency to action?  
However, seeing a film in the cinema venue, or in the 
comfort of one’s own apartment, brings along what in 
psychological terms is translated in “pluralistic ignorance” and 
“diffusion of responsibility”,
71
 in other words, since so many 
viewers peacefully leave the cinema venue, this was “probably not 
an emergency” or, in the case of television broadcasting, so many 
others saw the film, that “somebody else is doing something by 
now” – spectators tell themselves. Film scholar Torben Grodal 
also argued for the film’s incapacity of stimulating that part of the 
brain charged with action. Torben Grodal’s convincing theory of 
the PECMA flow model (perception, emotion, cognition, and 
motor action), solidly based on experimental research, went largely 
uncontested since he first announced it in 1996. According to 
Grodal, that part of the brain responsible for action, the motor 
cortex, is fully activated with only video games (and real life) and 
not narrative films. 
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Part III of the work is thus an addition to the PECMA 
flow theory. I argue that, while not disagreeing with Torben 
Grodal, a new category has been recently emerging in the 
documentary field, cross platform documentary, or transmedia 
documentary, which can activate that part of the brain which 
Grodal only attributed to gaming. Transmedia revolutionary 
documentaries might also enable the empathy-triggered helping 
behaviour, and the last chapter, an analysis of transmedia 
platforms, investigates if these new forms of non-fiction audio-
visual products have the property of activating the innate brain 
area charged with action. 
Many documentary makers openly made revolutionary 
films for their expected empathic effect but however, as 
documentary scholar Alan Rosenthal put it, “one hopes that this 
kind of films will bring about change, thou what documentary 
does is absolutely undocumented”.
72
 There is a rupture between 
the filmmaking production side and its public, and the success of a 
certain documentary might traditionally be measured in the quality 
of the reviews or the festively success – but that does not say 
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much about which of the initial aims the documentary makers 
actually achieved, and even less about what could have been done 
otherwise. The current work aims to shed some light on the 
relationship between revolutionary documentary films, their 
empathic spectators, and the tendency they might have towards 
moral behaviour.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I: FILMIC EMPATHY 
53 
 
1 Theoretical Grounds for an Interdisciplinary 
Approach 
 
 
 The foundations of sympathy shaped a central line in the cinema as we know 
it.  
   – James Chandler73 
 
Empathy is not an easy concept to grasp. Considerations about its 
significance and its function, in film theory or elsewhere, 
constantly shifted the approaches in defining it, as much as debates 
on whether it has a cognitive component (or affective, or both) 
influenced the methodologies used. The choice of definition it 
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essentially affected what researchers chose to measure in the first 
place, and consequently their findings.  
Amidst all divergences, empathy is the one concept most 
frequently employed to account for our selfless, altruistic, prosocial 
behaviour. The capacity to let aside self-centred concerns and 
entertain the perspective of another individual is clearly central to 
documentary viewing, enabling a connection to be established 
between a film spectator and a documentary character,
74
 an 
otherwise remote, anonymous person. This link is what allows, at 
least for the short time of the film viewing, the sharing of 
emotions, thoughts and goals with a very distant individual. 
Empathy also renders possible some of the most altruistic human 
pursuits, allowing us occasions for “true nobility of purpose”, 
contrary to old sceptical warnings from political philosophy that 
“omnium contra omnes”, “every man is enemy to every man”.75     
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By the time film studies joined academia, about 30 to 40 
years ago, research on empathy had already been on-going for 
some time in many other fields. Theology, philosophy, aesthetics, 
among others, all had already tried to see what it is and what it 
means, why it happens and how it develops, and there is extensive 
scholarly literature available, stating which assumptions were made 
about empathy, when and by whom.76 
But what exactly is empathy? Is it a cognitive process? Or 
solely an affective one, “where emotions of one person call out 
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emotional responses in others”?
77
 Or both? Does it parallel the 
emotions of the observed, or diverges from them? Is it voluntary, 
imagination-based, or entirely involuntary? Is it just a basic match 
of emotions, or does it engender distress when witnessing 
somebody else in distress? Does it generate feelings of concern 
and compassion when witnessing somebody else suffering? Is it, 
then, a prosocial, or altruistic response? Does it prompt the desire 
to help? Experiment-based contemporary theory in modern 
psychology shows that all of the above are true – and this led to 
the need for a more all-encompassing model. Empathy is no 
longer understood as a single paradigm, but as “a set of constructs 
having to do with the response of an individual to the experience 
of another”.
78
 Thus, the contemporary direction in various fields 
of psychology (developmental, social, clinical, forensic) 
approached a more complex, multi-layered model, encompassing 
interconnected constructs, which had hitherto been studied 
separately: antecedents, processes, intrapersonal and interpersonal 
outcomes.  
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Since the study of empathy and related issues is, by all 
means, not the domain of aesthetics alone, but central to modern 
psychology, it is here where an interdisciplinary approach should 
start. Measurements commencing as early as the 1960s, and a large 
body of theoretical work, opened a new perspective in the study of 
this psychological phenomenon and brought the various findings 
under one single, unified approach to empathy. Martin Hoffman, 
psychology theoretician whose life-long work famously 
contributed to the multidimensional approach or organizational 
model, 79  defines empathy as “an affective response more 
appropriated to another’s situation than one’s own”.
80
 One feels 
distressed on observing someone in actual distress – and several 
prosocial motives derive from this empathic distress: “sympathetic 
distress, empathic anger, empathic feeling of injustice, and guilt 
over inaction”.81  
Following Hoffman and Davis, it can be safely stated that there is 
not one, but there are various empathic modes which trigger 
empathy. Some are basic, involuntary, automatic, where the visual 
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component plays a key role: mimicry, classical conditioning and 
direct association. And there are others, complex modes of 
empathic arousal, which involve imagination and a complex 
cognitive process: mediated association and role-taking (Fig. 1.1). 
All these modes and the corresponding implications for 
documentary viewing will be discussed in chapter 3. Beforehand, 
however, some preliminary remarks should be made on the history 
of both of these components of the empathic process, with 
important implications for film viewing. Firstly, it is interesting to 
note that both the visual and the imaginative modes of the 
empathic process have been accurately described long before the 
word empathy itself was invented.  
At least since the moral philosophers of the 18th century 
stated that one will not remain indifferent to the misery of another 
human being, 82  empathy and sympathy have always been 
                                                 
 
82
 David Hume and Adam Smith both wrote extensively on “the source of 
our fellow-feeling for the misery of others, that it is by changing places in 
fancy with the sufferer, that we come either to conceive or to be affected by 
what he feels” (Smith, 1759/2009). However, concerns about the 
phenomenon can be traced in antiquity. Aristotle saw sympathy “most 
naturally felt towards individuals most resembling ourselves; our equals in 
age, education, morals, dignity, and those of the same nation or blood; for 
the evils that have happened to persons similarly circumstanced, are the 
59 
 
important concepts for comprehending how we ethically respond 
to other people’s misfortunes. 83  And even if empathy always 
meant many different things to many people, vision and 
imagination were both important components in understanding 
this phenomenon. It is true that sympathy and empathy are today 
interchangeably used, but they emerged from different traditions: 
18th century English Moral Philosophy and 20th century German 
Aesthetics. We should briefly look at both of them. One of the 
first accounts on the phenomenon comes from David Hume, who 
argued that morality is not governed by reason alone. Hume gave 
sympathy an important role in evaluating humans’ emotional 
response to somebody else’s fortune or misfortune, since “all 
human creatures are related to us by resemblance. 
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Figure ‎1.1 Empathy as a process. Following the models put 
forward by Hoffman and Davis, modified by me from Mark 
Davis’ Organisational Model, in Davis (1994), 13. 
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Their persons, therefore, their interests, their passions, their pains 
and pleasures must strike upon us in a lively manner, and produce 
an emotion similar to the original one”.84 The mechanism that 
allows the sharing of emotions with another, real person, 
constitutes for Hume the starting point for explaining what makes 
spectatorship altogether possible. He claims that, without sympathy 
with the person constructed in the ‘tragedy’, and without a 
constant ability to adapt one’s emotions according to those of the 
observed, the mere act of spectatorship would not be possible: 
A spectator of a tragedy passes thro’ a long train of grief, 
terror, indignation, and other affections, which the poet 
represents in the persons he introduces. As many tragedies 
end happily, and no excellent one can be compos’d without 
some reverses of fortune, the spectator must sympathize with 
all these changes, and receive the fictitious joy as well as every 
other passion.85  
Drawing on Hume, Adam Smith (1759/2009) makes the human 
ability to sympathize, to have a “fellow feeling for the misery of 
others”,86 one of the key arguments in Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
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And with this claim Smith commences the first chapter, Of 
Sympathy: 
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently 
some principles in his nature, which interest him in the 
fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to 
him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of 
seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion 
which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, 
or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner.87 
The two attributes, that sympathy has a visual component and that 
our fellow-feeling requires some degree of imagination, are what 
matters here. For Smith, the mere seeing could suffice in generating 
sympathy, but a somewhat imperfect, elementary one – thus 
anticipating the various modes of empathic arousal, which 
laboratory experiments were to demonstrate more than 200 years 
later. There are indeed various modes of arousing empathy, some 
basic, available through, for example, mimicry, and some more 
complex, requiring a cognitive component. Adam Smith seems to 
have had identified what we call today the empathic mode of 
mimicry, understood as the imitation of the facial or bodily 
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expression of the other, hence resulting in some match in 
emotions.88 Smith’s observations were particularly modern and, up 
until today, still topics of debate in film studies. He had foreseen 
that “the fellow feeling” is, at times, different, in type and intensity, 
with that of the observed sufferer. Smith noted that at other 
instances, the viewer’s own imagination shifts the nature of the 
emotions thus experienced, generating a different type of emotion 
than that of the victim:  
By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we 
conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter 
as it were into his body, and become in some measure the 
same person with him and thence form some idea of his 
sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in 
degree, is not altogether unlike them (…) and we then 
tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels.
89
 
Later on, Smith uses thus understood sympathy (as imagination-
based) for explaining some notions about spectatorship, since 
“fellow-feeling” is one of the emotional instances that makes the 
bond between spectator and “the person principally concerned”90 
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possible. The emotional distress is to be contextualized by what we 
call today a cognitive component, not just mere feeling, but also by 
an understanding of the particular set of circumstances that 
concern the character, the situation he finds himself into. For 
Smith, this sympathizing from the side of the spectator is not 
merely an automatic course of action, but intentional, maybe even 
effortful endeavour of the spectator, who must try, “as much as he 
can to put himself in the situation of the other”. 91  However, 
imagination will be necessary to a lesser extent when some degree 
of familiarity comes into play. ‘Familiarity’ is not to be understood 
here in the larger sense, when the situational data of the sufferer is 
in some way known to the observer. Universally recognizable 
states of affairs (like a disappointment in love, in Smith’s example), 
will thus more probably trigger a greater degree of sympathy than 
the merely visually-induced sympathy the spectator experiences 
when witnessing instances of pain. This observation, crucial for 
studying documentary spectatorship as well, has today a name in 
psychology: familiarity bias, which will be brought up again in 
chapters 3 and 5. 
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One last important (and empirically-confirmed) aspect in 
Smith’s understanding of (what he referred to as) sympathy: his 
remark on the relationship between the physical pain, sympathy 
and the excitement felt at the approach of a possibly hazardous 
climax, are held responsible, in film theory, for contributing to 
suspense. While acknowledging the triggering of sympathy in the 
observer at the sight of pain, Smith sees it inferior in intensity as 
opposed to the situational, imagination-requiring one. The instance 
when it is still significant is when it is associated with menace or 
hazard: “Pain never calls forth any very lively sympathy unless it is 
accompanied with danger. We sympathize with the fear, though 
not with the agony of the sufferer”.92 
A great deal of sympathy’s dimension of mimicry 
(imitation of emotion already described by Adam Smith), is to be 
found in the writings of psychologist Edward B. Titchener, the 
first to employ the term empathy in English, in 1909, in his 
Elementary Psychology of the Thought Processes, where he translated it 
from the German Einfühlung. The coining of the word is usually 
attributed to Theodor Lipps, but the employment of Einfühlung 
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and attempts to understand the psychological bases of the 
phenomena can be traced in German aesthetics before Lipps’ 
writings. 
Robert Vischer tried to explore the psychological grounds 
for people’s reception of art, in his doctoral theses on emotional 
projection, Über das optische Formgefühl (On the Optical Sense of Form), 
published in 1873. Vischer distinguishes between Zufühlung, 
Nachfühlung and Einfühlung, and employs the third to account only 
for the viewer’s projection onto the form of the object, yet only 
partially accountable for “the symbolism of form”.
93
 In the 
following years, the concept of Einfühlung went through 
continuous elaborations, the most famous of them being that of 
Theodor Lipps. Lipps attempted a more scientific psychological 
theory of empathy than his predecessor Vischer, who appealed to 
dream interpretation in his explanation of the phenomenon. For 
Lipps, the natural, even unconscious inclination to imitate bodily 
gestures and facial expressions of observed targets leads to the 
recognition of the mental states of the other (a phenomenon 
classified today in psychology under the larger category of motor 
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mimicry). Nowadays, Lipps is no longer properly read or 
republished, but he is however still credited, by and large, with 
introducing the concept into aesthetics. Some very similar 
observations about mimicry date, as I showed, at least as early as 
Smith’s description of sympathy in Theory of Moral Sentiments, and 
the importance of the process for the understanding of 
spectatorship was already evident.  
Moreover, when Lipps coined a word for it, and Titchener 
provided the translation into empathy for the American readers, 
several other hypotheses were being made about the same 
phenomena, at about the same time. And as much as there is no 
agreement about almost anything when it comes to empathy, there 
is no agreement about Lipp’s contribution either. Lou Agosta 
refers to Lipps’ popularity as being “one of the accidents of 
historical contingency”94: 
Lipps might have been the Antonio Salieri to an entire group 
of would-be Mozarts, who, in any case, are better 
remembered today while Lipps is nearly forgotten and 
unread. This means that thinkers such as Husserl, Heidegger, 
Scheler, (Edith) Stein and Freud could not use the word 
empathy (Einfühlung) without invoking an approach which 
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was highly original in its time but is today regarded as 
idiosyncratic in its understanding of empathy.95 
The seeds of discord were thus sown. And what followed is a 
tangled history of definitions and theories of empathy, with 
various writers conceiving it, as we said, as emotional sharing, 
cognitive understanding, emotional response – and the list is long.  
It is only in the 1960s that the first laboratory studies on empathy 
commenced to test and challenge the large body of theory, 
including film viewing-based experiments. Laboratory experiments 
became increasingly complex and heart rate and skin conductance 
were measured on subjects watching films and displaying physical 
pain. Empirical studies confirmed Smith’s intuition, and the two 
aspects have largely gone uncontested: vision is an important 
component in triggering empathy, while more complex empathic 
process requires a certain degree of imagination. But how 
important is the mere seeing for the empathic process? 
Only a few years later, in 1965, for the American 
neuroscientist Paul MacLean, empathy as ‘Einfühlung’, ‘feeling 
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into’, in the sense used by Lipps,96 was not sufficient for grasping 
the intricacy of the empathic process. Something else was 
additionally necessary, something that he called “seeing with feeling” 
into the situation of the other. 97  According to MacLean, the 
unselfish desire to help another depends on empathy: 
The capacity to identify one’s own feelings and needs with 
those of another person or, as we shall say later, in 
considering empathy in the more dynamic sense of medicine, 
it is the ability to ‘look inward’ for obtaining insight required 
for foresight in promoting the welfare of others.98  
Without underrating the role of education in acquiring empathic 
capacities, MacLean is the one who, very early in the day, radically 
argued for empathy being possible in man through vision, or 
rather due to the evolution of the brain structures related to vision 
capacities. In this context, the significance empathy has for film 
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viewing becomes obvious. However, the way film scholarship 
positions itself in relation to the findings in psychology is 
problematic, and empathy as such has only recently been employed 
for understanding the emotional relationship between the 
spectator and the moving image character. As late as the 1990s, 
thanks to the work of those scholars which took a cognitivist 
approach to film studies, the debate on the topic of filmic empathy 
was finally opened, and the concept, for the first time, 
appropriately entered the field. What is interesting here is that, 
under other names (mainly identification) it was always present 
amid concerns of film thinkers; questions about how it occurs, or 
how intense it can be, have been, en passant, approached. On the 
whole, though, film theory ignored an as core a problem as filmic 
empathy is, and when it eventually approached it, the tendency was 
towards an insufficiently scientific treatment. And this is a paradox 
of film theory, since the very beginnings in the field were rather 
promising. 
Already for classical film theorists, the nature of the 
relationship between “the ordinary film spectator”,99 in Pudovkin’s 
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words, and moving image character, came as a natural question. 
Hugo Münsterberg, Béla Balázs, Serghei Eisenstein, Lev Kuleshov, 
Vsevold Pudovkin, Rudolf Arnheim – they all followed with their 
writings, as will be shown bellow, a similar objective: the validation 
of film as art. They were all preoccupied with showing that film is 
not a circus distraction, not just a technical curiosity, but a new art 
in its own rights, unique and, for many of them, superior in terms 
of expressivity and realism and ideological power than, say, 
literature and theatre. And in order to serve the case of film-as-art 
demonstration, they were quite soon facing the need to shed light 
on the relationship between the moved spectator, on one hand, 
and the film and its characters, on the other. 
When film was just in its early stages, at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, two German-American psychologists, 
Hugo Münsterberg and Rudolf Arnheim, independently from each 
other, both alleged the strong psychological impact film can have 
on its spectators, and tried to interpret the potential of this 
emotional effect. Hugo Münsterberg not only described the 
phenomenon, as early as the beginning of the last century, but 
even identified modes of inflicting it in the spectator, and 
described them in what stands as the very first book of film theory 
– one that is inherently interdisciplinary – ‘The Photoplay: A 
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Psychological Study’. The idea that empathy has a visual component 
was just commencing to be of some concern for psychology when 
Hugo Münsterberg wrote about it. Writing at the same time as 
Lipps, Münsterberg accurately describes some of the empathic 
effect film can have on the spectator (though he continues to call it 
sympathy). Commencing from the premises that psychology and 
aesthetics are inseparable when it comes to understanding our 
response to art, he asked some of the very questions which are at 
stake in the present work, questions which remained without a 
satisfactory answer for the following hundred years: what is “the 
psychological effect of the moving pictures themselves”100 and, 
consequently, what exactly is it within the image that can have an 
impact on the viewer?  
As an answer to his first question, Münsterberg hints at the 
empathic process or, in his own words, sympathy, and goes on to 
describe what we today refer to as basic modes of stimulating it. 
Münsterberg defines sympathy as a “mental state”, imitation or 
mimicry of emotions, which is exactly the motor facilitation of the 
emotional understanding of the moving image:  
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The visual perception of the various forms of expression of 
these emotions fuses in our minds with the conscious 
awareness of the emotion expressed; we feel as if we were 
directly seeing and observing the emotion itself. Moreover 
the idea awakens in us the appropriate reaction. The horror 
which we see makes us really shrink, the happiness which we 
witness makes us relax, the pain which we witness brings 
contractions in our muscles; and all the resulting sensations 
from muscles, joints, tendons, from skin and viscera, from 
blood, circulation and breathing, give the colour of living 
experience to the emotional reflection in our mind.101  
For Münsterberg, filmic empathy is a rather primary phenomenon, 
but we should note that he argued it is basic, because the films that 
were available at the time were very basic themselves. But what 
kind of films did Münsterberg watch, when his book was first 
published? Only a bit more than one year prior to the writing of 
The Photoplay, Münsterberg had not yet seen any single film. For a 
long time, he refused to go to the movies, undignified hypostases 
for a Harvard professor, he thought. It wasn’t earlier than 1914 
that Münsterberg watched his very first movie, NEPTUNE’S 
DAUGHTER, a fantasy film with Annette Kellerman, directed by  
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Figure ‎1.2 Poster of NEPTUNE’S DAUGHTER (director: Herbert 
Brenon), 1914.  
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Herbert Brenon, and was inescapably converted to a film 
spectator.
102
 But the condition of the ‘photoplay’ (as Münsterberg 
calls the moving picture), film itself, at its beginnings, was a basic 
form of expression, with no sound or more complex narrative 
strategies which could have triggered more complex empathic 
processes. Some of these limitations have been foreseen, and 
Münsterberg pointed out that because it had to overcome the 
absence of sound, and therefore of words, the ‘photoplay’ had to 
make use of “a heightening of gestures and of facial play, with the 
result that the emotional expression becomes exaggerated”.103 
The German-American psychologist distinguishes two 
different categories of emotional processes. The first such category 
is the “independent affective life” of the spectator, the emotional 
luggage the spectator brings along, from personal background or 
experience, which in its turn will be influenced by “imitation of 
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emotions which we see expressed”104. Münsterberg, very much 
like Rudolf Arnheim some 20 years later, identified a key 
emotional potential in two film-specific means that (as opposed to 
the mimicry of emotions, which happens automatically), require 
some affective or cognitive investment from the spectator’s side. 
He recognised one of them as being depth of field, and the other, as 
the illusion-of-the-real-world-effect that movement has in film, since 
“the subtle art of the camera is reality-like, and therefore has 
reality-like psychological functions”105:  
The Spectator (…) if he faces the film world, the motion 
which he sees appears to be a true motion, and yet is created 
by his own mind […] Depth and movement alike come to us 
in the moving picture world, not as hard facts but as mixture 
of fact and symbol. They are present and yet they are not in 
the things. We invest the impression with them.106  
Rudolf Arnheim (1933/1966) is the other German-American 
psychologist who, at the beginning of the 20th century, was 
concerned with the emotional effect film has on the spectator. 
Quite like Münsterberg, he saw a clear relationship between filmic 
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reality-illusion interplay and their effect on emotional, sympathetic 
response: “the consciousness of the unreality of the situation 
works as a psychological inhibition on the automatic instinctive 
response”.107 Arnheim correctly observed that the more reality-
like the employed film and filmic means are, the more intense the 
emotional response would be but, for the sake of unfastened 
artistic possibilities, Arnheim commenced his venture in writing on 
film by vehemently pleading against reality-like effect in film. What 
constitutes the specificity of film, and what makes it art, is 
reducing reality to filmic essentials, with the dissimilarity between 
reality and film being left in the care of the spectator to correct.
108
  
For Arnheim (whose object of study, we should not forget, 
were silent films from the 1930s), the dilemma seems to be 
between reality-like and partial illusion. Reality-like filmic means, 
which enable a better imitation of reality in film, should be 
avoided, in order to preserve the specificity of film as art. Thus, 
even if the reality-like filmic means trigger a stronger emotional 
response, “the technical development of the motion picture”, 
Arnheim insists, “will soon carry the mechanical imitation of 
                                                 
 
107
 Ibid., 49.  
108
 Arnheim (1933/1957), 30–34. 
78 
 
nature to an extreme. (…) They do not see that the film is on its 
way to the victory of wax museum ideals over creative art”.109 It is 
one specific step towards imminent damaging of the intrinsic 
quality of film as art – the implementation of synchronized sound 
in film – vis-à-vis of which Arnheim was openly sceptical.  
Reality-like means play their part, and Arnheim, too, re-
evaluated his early radical views, only five years later. It is not that 
Arnheim did not maintain his position against the spreading of 
synchronized sound in film, seeing it onwards, as many other 
critics of the phenomenon, as impure: a technicality which narrows 
the specificity of what is filmic per se, anything but good news for 
the film as art. But synchronized sound in film brings along 
discussion, discourse, conversation as such. For all of the above, 
Arnheim commenced to clearly see the positive side, “the possible 
advantages of film dialogue”.110 He identifies exactly the empathic 
potential that sound will bring (through dialogue, and what we 
know today as more complex empathic modes): “the felt presence 
of the events is enormously enhanced by the sound of voices and 
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other noises”.
111
 Arnheim celebrates the introduction of sound, 
because it enables the spectator to figure out the more complex 
emotional state of mind of the character, thus allowing the 
audience “to take part in exciting events as fully as possible”.
112
 
Taking part in events might have an ideological influence, 
and the first proper attempts to understand the interconnection 
between the emotional and ideological power of film come from 
Pudovkin and Eisenstein, the Russian filmmakers concerned “to 
force the spectator to think in a certain direction”113: 
My new conception of the film is based on the idea that the 
intellectual and emotional processes which so far have been 
conceived of as existing independently of each other—art 
versus science—and forming an antithesis heretofore never 
united, can be brought together to form a synthesis on the 
basis of cinedialectic, a process that only the cinema can 
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achieve. A spectator can be made to feel-and-think what he sees 
on the screen.
114
 
By praising the acting method of Stanislavsky and his influence on 
social realism, and by assessing film editing as the core of film 
montage, Pudovkin tried to see the perspectives of the emotional 
power of film over the spectator, some sort of identification 
theory avant la lettre. He describes an identification of the 
spectator’s eye with the camera, through the help of editing as 
instrument of impression: “editing is not merely a method of the 
junction of separate scenes of pieces, but is a method that controls 
the ‘psychological guidance’ of the spectator”. 115  This, 
complemented by the support of a realistic actor, would then 
enable the spectator to care for the joy and suffering on the screen. 
Pudovkin seems to suggest that the novelty of cinema brings 
alongside realism, and together with the possibility of seeing the 
fellow human being objectively, cinema is just the ideal art field for 
exciting real-life emotions.  
Pudovkin’s main concern was film’s capacity for triggering 
an emotional response, in order to deliver to the audience means 
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and a point of identification: “The lens of the camera is the eye of 
the spectator”. 116  Through convincing acting and editing 
techniques, the spectator has no other option, but to follow with 
excitement and care the evolution of various characters on the 
screen, and even simultaneous ones. Even if Pudovkin’s line of 
argumentation sounds today a bit manicheistic, he must, however, 
have been aware that different audiences receive various films in 
different ways. In a comprehensive analysis of Pudovkin’s Film 
Theory, Peter Dart complains against the romantic belief that the 
spectator’s attention will follow the dictatus of the director. In 
Dart’s view, this has no solid basis, since the Russian theoretician 
and filmmaker does not give any explanation for the principle of 
identification.117 But an attentive reading shows that Pudovkin was 
very well aware of the empathy debate that was going on in 
psychology and aesthetics at the time of his writing, had 
subsequent thoughts about emotional transfer, and described both 
mimicry (“There is a law in psychology that lays it down that if an 
emotion give birth to a certain movement, the correspondent 
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emotion can be called forth” 118 ) and the more complex 
understanding of the other’s emotions: “the actor was brought close 
to the spectator, who could thus perceive the most subtle 
expression of human emotion”.119  
There are reasons why these early film writings are valuable 
today, and are of use for studying filmic empathy, and broader 
theory of resistance documentary viewing: the complex 
phenomenon that empathy is had been successfully acknowledged, 
and alongside, its importance for spectator engagement. Attempts 
at defining it were undertaken, both basic and complex modes of 
triggering it have been recognized (mimicry, identification), and 
even effective filmic means charged with stimulating empathy have 
been described. Béla Balázs, on his turn, wrote extensively on the 
emotional power of filmic means, completing the findings of his 
predecessors by further describing the empathic role of close up 
and cross cutting.120  
Although already early attempts to understand film 
spectatorship took some interdisciplinary approach, one of the 
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first accurate uses of the psychological understanding of empathy 
in the context of theory of film spectatorship dates no earlier than 
1953. In attempting to establish the theoretical basis for the 
emotional involvement of the spectator in the action represented 
on the screen, Belgian experimental psychologist Albert Michotte 
van den Berck defines film empathy as affective “participation”.121 
For it is the same empathic process that occurs while watching 
sport, or a theatre spectacle, or even while reading a novel – just 
that the intensity of the empathic experience is stronger when it 
comes to film viewing:  
Ceux-ci se manifestent lorsque le spectateur d’une action 
executé par une autre personne, la ‘vit’ lui-même en quelque 
sorte, et ne se borne pas à la comprendre d’une façon 
purement intellectuelle, en la classant dans telle ou telle 
catégorie conceptuelle.122 
Michotte’s forward-looking, interdisciplinary approach, primarily 
deals with the capacity of the film scene to stimulate the motor 
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system of the viewer. In other words, he describes mimicry, the 
facial or bodily responses the spectator might have while watching 
the person on the screen. Michotte describes four possible ways 
(corresponding to various intensities) of responding to visually 
experienced moving performances (“performance motrique”, 
display of movements), out of which the fourth, specific to 
moving images, is the empathic response, described here as a 
‘projection’ in an exterior object. Following Lipps, Michotte pleads 
for a full projection, the spectator–character complete 
identification, when “one enters the skin of the actor”.123 
What is at stake for Michotte is the psychological (and 
physical) response to seeing movement in film, in other words 
mimicry as basic mode of stimulating empathy; he calls it 
“empathie motrique”. Even if only briefly, Michotte draws 
attention to a few other significant aspects, such as the lack of 
congruency between the emotions of the spectator and those of 
the character (when, let’s say, the situation amuses the character, 
but the spectator, holding more data, experiences anger). Michotte 
seems to acknowledge one main feature: that the 
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observer/spectator comes with his own set of previous 
experiences, background and knowledge, and therefore situational 
differences in response will always occur. Even only by holding 
more data about a particular given situation in the film, through 
personal experience, the spectator might have a different 
emotional response to the same filmic happening: while the 
character is infuriated, the spectator might be just amused – 
Michotte’s exemplifies with the burlesque film genre, but the 
observation should apply to all film genres. 
As an answer to our functional question, Michotte notes 
what might be one of the means through which this identification 
is made possible: establishing the space in the film sequence. In other 
words: cut-aways, general shots and the concern of preserving a 
realistic filmic space construction. And there is another element, 
which plays a role in the empathic arousal, this time from outside 
the frames of the film: the attentiveness of the spectator, his focus 
being guided, concentrated on the main hero.124 The ‘attention’ 
condition, Michotte draws on several musts, like “the darkness of 
the cinema, the brightness of the screen, the fluctuations of retinal 
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stimulation and the attitude of sustained concentration, and 
hypothesises that the cinematographic empathy is one of 
‘complete identification’”.
125
 
The identification explanation of the empathy 
phenomenon, that Michotte pleads for, is still part of the debate 
on the topic to this very day. The discussion rests anywhere 
between opinions that identification always happens, and that it is 
total, to scholarly texts which question the existence of such a 
thing altogether. For some theoreticians, if identification does not 
occur, neither does empathy with film characters, since 
identification is closely related with empathy. But are the two even 
related, or quite the opposite; are not identification and empathy 
actually describing the same phenomena? In the following 
chapters, we will return to identification and show how most of 
the debate evolves from terminological, rather than conceptual 
disagreements, and that identification is just one of the ways, the 
most complex one of them, of mobilizing empathy with characters 
in moving images.  
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At the time of his writing, Michotte had a unique 
interdisciplinary approach, using his expertise in psychology, in 
order to study a new domain, cinema, and one’s empathy with a 
person/character in the moving image. Only a few years later, 
beginning with the 1960s, did empathy become a main subject of 
empirical research for psychology. Film theory, on the other hand, 
followed a very different path. The emotional response to the 
destinies of the people in cinematographic works received 
attention from mainly two theoretical schools of thought: film 
psychoanalysis and, only in recent years, film cognitivism. Up until 
today, psychoanalytical film studies and cognitivism are the two 
models available for dealing with the study of empathy, for 
understanding more out of moving image spectatorship. 
For the psychoanalyst, identification with the camera, and 
through it, with the character in the moving image, is a way to 
demonstrate that the ‘cinematic apparatus’ is ideological. 
Identification, a process in two stages as understood by the French 
theoreticians Jean Louis Baudry and Christian Metz, is a closed 
circle: it is a means to annul the boundaries between spectator and 
character, creating a complete unity, based on an unconscious 
desire to regress to an infantile stage, that has too little to do with 
features of an individual spectator’s psychology, with specific 
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characters in a given film, and with possible connections between 
the two. 
It is only as late as the end of the 1980s that the 
psychoanalytical model of analysing spectatorship started to lose 
terrain in favour of the more scientific methodologies of the 
cognitivists. The academic dispute between the two approaches 
took many years, and studies of spectatorship, empathy included, 
were part of the matters of dispute. One of the most influential 
and vehement foes of the hegemonic grand paradigm of Film 
Theory (Lacanian psychoanalysis, structuralism and post-
structuralism, Althusserian Marxism), is Noël Carroll, who over 
many years brought consistent evidence that the method is neither 
desirable, nor is it scientific.
126
 Other theoreticians made similar 
points, convincingly arguing that an appeal to psychoanalysis 
should be approached, like almost in any other academic field 
other than film studies up to that time, only after standard rational 
modes of enquiry fail to provide answers: 
It is worth noting the oddity of this situation: in most fields 
of enquiry, it would be an appeal to psychoanalyses, rather 
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than a decision not to appeal to it, that would require a 
defence.127 
I align with the above position, that psychoanalytical film studies 
do not bring much to the understanding of filmic empathy, but I 
do not engage in a consideration of the psychoanalytical model 
here, since extensive critique is already available; in the following 
chapter, I will only give a close look to the psychoanalytical view 
on identification.128   
The cognitivists took it upon themselves to challenge the 
one scholarly model available at a certain time, the psychoanalytic 
approach. They started to give increased attention to spectatorship 
theory, providing increased attention the phenomenon of empathy 
in film. The interdisciplinary approach to film studies incorporated 
findings from other scientific fields and, alongside neurosciences 
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and philosophy, the self-labelled cognitivists gave a special 
attention to recent discoveries in psychology.  
We have seen by now how the theoretical grounds are 
paved for an interdisciplinary approach towards the exploration of 
empathy in film studies, one which applies findings from 
psychological researched-base theory. In the following chapter, I 
will look at the main explanations for the complex phenomena 
that filmic empathy is. Where relevant, earlier film literature is 
going to be brought under scrutiny, but the focus is however 
primarily on the findings in the context of the cognitivist film 
theory. I will show how, even among the cognitivists, 
terminological disagreements and the concern to limiting the 
definition occupied too much of the discussion: what it is and how 
we should name it were questions more significantly approached than 
how it occurs, what it means and where it leads. However, these 
questions should not be rejected altogether, but rather, with a 
more scientific, psychologically-grounded take on the matter, the 
findings should be encompassed in a more complex, single theory 
of filmic empathy.  
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2 From a Narrow Definition Towards an All-
Encompassing Theory of Filmic Empathy 
2.1 Sympathy or Empathy? A Never-Ending 
Terminological Disagreement 
 
 
The cognitivist film theory is by no means a unified one. What 
unifies the film cognitivists under the same label is the common 
belief that theories and findings of science – cognitivist science, 
psychology, philosophy – should be applied to the study of film, 
thus contributing to the largely neglected field of the film-spectator 
relationship.  
It is within this self-labelled cognitivist film theory that, 
ultimately, some valuable work has been done in recent years 
concerning mood, point of view, mimicry, as aspects related to 
film spectatorship and empathy. Among the film cognitivists there 
is, nonetheless, serious divergence when it comes to explaining the 
empathic nature of the relationship we have with film character. 
The lack of agreement goes as far as disputing that such a thing 
exists in the first place (Noël Carroll), while other film scholars 
insist that, quite on the contrary, not only empathy with film 
characters exists, but it is fundamental for our experience of the 
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moving image (Torben Grodal, Alex Neill). There are, however, 
recent convincing clarification that the debate might actually be 
one of the nomenclature rather than concept (Carl Plantinga),
129
 
and what appears like conflicting views on empathy are actually 
compatible ones, in a complex theory of cinematic engagement, 
where we do need more distinctions instead of fewer (Berys Gaut): 
“Cinema is a sophisticated art form, and our emotional 
relationships with characters can in the best films be more 
complex than our relationships with real people”.
130
 Hence the 
aesthetics-inherited old dispute, namely the sympathy-empathy 
distinction, has lately been keeping the film scholars, and 
preponderantly the cognitivists, busy.  
  At this point, it must also be said that the above-described 
approach to film studies, with an utmost caution in defining the 
notions, did not surface in a vacuum. It is a reply to the void left 
behind by that film scholarship which was holding the monopoly 
on theoretical frameworks for film studies since the 1970s. It was, 
in Noël Carroll’s terms, the ‘monolithic’
131
 film theory – a term 
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ironically referring to the theory with a singular body of ideas, as 
opposed to the (much more desired) pluralism of theories.  
Alex Neill makes the point that the body of ‘monolithic’ 
film theory granted too little care for distinctions and nuances 
(including when it comes to defining empathy), when the better 
chance to understand these aspects of spectatorship would be to 
acknowledge the variety, rather than treating them as a 
‘homogenous class’.
132
 While Neill is right when pleading for more 
nuances, which the complexity of the empathic process obviously 
requires, he however steps on more dubious ground when he 
returns to the old confusing distinction between sympathy and 
empathy. Surely, emotional responses are not all of the same kind. 
Alex Neill identifies two distinct categories, other-focused and self-
focused (sympathetic and empathetic). Sympathy for Neill is 
feeling for another, a response that does not depend on what the 
other is feeling: at times, the other might not feel anything at all, or 
the viewer might feel pity for a victim which, for various reasons, 
such as not understanding his situation, is, however, happy. On the 
other hand, in responding empathetically to the other, we come to 
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share the other’s feelings, “to feel with him”: “however, in feeling 
with another, empathetically rather than sympathetically, we may 
find ourselves feeling in ways that are not only new to us, but in 
ways that are in a sense foreign to us”.
133
 
Neill’s definition of empathy has its emphasis on the 
sharing of emotions between viewer and victim, emotions that can 
only be type-identical: “loosely speaking, empathy involves my 
feeling as I do because you feel as you do”.
134
 In underlining the 
differences between the two categories, the sense of empathy is 
limited to those emotions, which are accurately understood and 
thus imitatively shared: 
Sympathizing with the other doesn’t depend on my getting 
her mental state, or for that matter anything else about her, 
right. If I don’t, my sympathy may well be misplaced, but it 
would none the less be sympathy. In contrast, if I am wrong 
about the mental state and/ or situation of another, I won’t 
be able to empathise with them at all.
135
 
But what Neill divides into sympathetic (I fear for you) and 
empathic (“for I may also feel fear with you”) is to be understood 
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in the current work as two distinct aspects of the very same 
phenomenon. A greater degree of involvement of cognitive 
processes and imagination leads to a better understanding of the 
other’s situation, thus determining emotional responses which can 
be different in various ways, in type of intensity, than those of the 
character.   
Amy Coplan commences from the same premises. 
Pleading for empathy as explanation for many of our connections 
with film characters, and acknowledging the benefits of 
empirically-studied empathy for understanding this relationship, 
she draws some interesting conclusions. Coplan is surely right 
when she insists for more distinctions rather than less: 
Despite this advantage, accounts of spectatorial response that 
highlight empathy face many of the same difficulties that 
plague identification accounts, namely, multiple competing 
conceptualisations of empathy that refer to distinct 
psychological processes that vary, sometimes widely, in their 
function, phenomenology, mechanisms, and effects. Only if 
we employ a more precise conceptualisation of empathy will 
we make progress in our attempts to understand it.
136
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Accounting empirical findings in psychology, Amy Coplan’s 
definition of empathy encompasses a very important distinction – 
namely the understanding that the other (film character making no 
exception) is not the viewer. While sharing some of the character’s 
psychological states, this “self/other differentiation”
137
 allows the 
spectator to have various psychological experiences, which may be 
triggered by, but not identical to, those of the character. In order 
to evaluate a certain dramatic situation from the character’s point 
of view, the spectator’s imagination plays a distinct role: it is 
through the imagination that the sharing of some of the character’s 
experiences, beliefs and so on, is rendered possible. Thus 
understood, filmic empathy is in concordance with Hoffman’s 
explanation of the phenomenon, namely that we talk about 
empathy when the observer knows the experience is not his own; 
the observer is not the same person as the observed, and therefore 
they can have congruent, but also very different emotional states, 
such as pity for pain:  
To empathise with a character, a spectator must accurately 
represent the character’s relevant psychological states to a 
greater or lesser degree, but she may also experience 
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additional states as part of her own separate response. A 
separate response is made possible by her clear self/other 
differentiation. Empathy allows spectators to connect to 
characters while remaining separate from them. Spectator’s 
involvement in characters’ experiences in this case is deep, 
but it does not come at the expense of a separate identity, 
which means that the spectator can continue to have a wide 
range of psychological experiences that do not match those 
of the character.
138
 
In the last twenty years, the most extensive body of work about 
the relationship(s) between spectator and characters in movies 
comes from Noël Carroll who, in a manner similar to Coplan’s, 
emphasizes the importance of a proper understanding of the 
character’s beliefs, goals, values, for the empathic relationship to 
take place. If the character is built up in such a way, so that his 
beliefs and projects are aligned with those of the spectator, his 
values, congruent with those of the viewer, than a pro-attitude is 
triggered. The spectator will consequently experience feelings of 
distress when the character is endangered, and relief when things 
turn out well for him or her.
139
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Noël Carroll explores a non-exhaustive list of such 
emotional relationships, with a focus on fictitious characters: type-
identical; vectorially converging emotive states – his “favourite 
candidate for the title of empathy”; sympathy, which at times is 
vectorially-convergent; solidarity, when the spectator has similar 
response to the antagonist as the character would have, but not 
because he or she copies the protagonist’s feelings, but as a result 
of our own emotional review.
140
 Out of them, Carroll argues, the 
spectator’s sympathy, once secured, is, alongside antipathy for the 
villain, the more long-lasting emotional process. The sharing of 
values and goals (which has to do to with the empathical 
phenomenon of familiarity bias, and) which Carroll calls sympathy, 
is what assures the emotional, lasting spectator-character bond:  
It is our sympathy towards the character that disposes us to 
regard her as inside our network of concern, and, therefore, 
to assess an injustice done to her as something perpetrated 
against one of “our own”.  The negative emotions that we 
muster in response to the protagonist’s setback are a function 
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of our sympathy to her. Sympathy is the real foundation 
here.
141
 
There is evidence that people are inclined to empathise with family 
members, friends and with people who are part of the same group, 
ethnical, religious more than they do with strangers. We are even 
inclined to empathise more with those with whom we share some 
similarities or values, rather than with those with whom we do not. 
The phenomenon finds plausible explanations in evolutionary 
theories since, because people evolved in small groups, altruism 
for the members of the same group was necessary for survival, 
while lack of resources turned members of different groups against 
one another.
142
 Carroll’s observation, that the protagonist of 
moving images can prompt our empathy because we get to associate 
him or her with one of ‘our own’ is theoretically exceptionally rich. 
It is of use for criticism and praxis, and a valuable ‘bringing home’ 
to film studies of empirical findings. Only that, at times, it seems 
that Noël Carroll is complicating, not simplifying the nomenclature 
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further, when he chooses sympathy for defining our pro-attitude 
towards, or liking of the protagonists.
143
   
While Carroll’s life-long work on affective relations 
between characters and spectators is of great importance (and its 
relevance for non-fiction film is apparent), the grounds on which 
he rejects empathy as a theoretical framework are debatable. He 
manifestly avoids the use of empathy, even more so in recent 
years, by arguing that he has been “unable to find much consensus 
in either ordinary language or the relevant technical literature about 
how we are to understand empathy”.
144
 The argument simply does 
not stand since, when it comes to sympathy, the disagreement is 
equally deepened – if not more so. It is not clear which “relevant 
technical literature” Carroll refers to here, but if he means the 
current film literature, it is exactly when we should try to come out 
from the misapprehensions in our own field, and attempt an even 
more interdisciplinary understanding of emotional spectatorship. 
The cognitivists are, once more, correct in insisting that more 
distinctions are necessary, not less, however, I will argue, we 
should continue making them in the context of the same 
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phenomenon, not try to artificially skater unitary concepts into 
minor, dissimilar ones.  
What follows is an account of various instances of filmic 
means for triggering empathy in the writings of cognitivist film 
scholars. However, I will not be departing from the belief that 
empathy is a single, complex phenomenon. This view, that 
empathy is a unitary, multifaceted process, is in harmony with 
most recent empirical findings in psychology. Hence, applying 
findings from this scientific field in the study of film spectatorship 
is in the very sprit of the cognitivists.  
 
 
2.2 Identification: Traditional Theoretical 
Explanation for Filmic Empathy 
 
 
Empathy and sympathy are new approaches for understanding the 
relationship between film character and spectator but, as shown in 
chapter 1, the topic has been of concern since the beginning of 
film and film theory. However, it used to be differently labelled. 
Engagement with character was what absorbed the field’s attention 
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on the matter, and the concept most frequently employed to 
describe it was identification.   
It was pointed out earlier that there is some body of 
writing on the notion of identification, but it is basically limited to 
the relationship between spectator and fictional characters, with 
almost no attempt to expand the findings towards documentary 
film. However, some of the questions asked are the same for 
fiction and non-fiction and therefore, thankfully, research in 
documentary does not have to start from scratch in answering 
them: what is there within the moving image that makes spectators 
care about the well being of characters (fictional or real people) on 
the screen? 
The Hungarian-born film theoretician Béla Balázs was one 
of the first to underline, as early as 1945, the existence of a 
psychological, inherited dimension, which allows sharing emotions 
with the film character, and that it is essential to the experience of 
watching a film. Whereas theoreticians before him were mainly 
concerned in their writings with the validation of film as a unique, 
even superior art form, Balázs proceeded on a different path. He 
gave extensive attention to the emotional power of filmic means. 
His end goal was, nevertheless, to establish the ‘absolute artistic 
novelty’ of the new medium. But in doing so, he identified its 
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intensity in generating emotions, unprecedented in other art forms. 
The key element recognized by Balázs is the experiencing from the 
inside, from the film character’s perspective, which allows various 
degrees of character engagement:  
 (…) in the cinema the camera carries the spectator into the 
film picture itself. We are seeing everything from the inside as 
it were and are surrounded by the characters of the film. They 
need not tell us what they feel, for we see what they see and 
see it as they see it.
145
 
In other words, Balázs remarked the capacity film has to elide the 
distance between the moving images and spectators. It is this 
production of character/person oriented-emotions, which can 
occur solely through moving images, even without narrative or 
dialogical support, which Balázs described as the key element, that 
broke the emotional distance between spectator and work of art. 
This break in emotional distance is produced through specific 
filmic means, starting with mere cut-aways, which enable the film 
spectator to experience the happenings on the screen through the 
eyes of the protagonists, hence the sharing of emotions: 
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 Although we sit in our seats for which we have paid, we do 
not see Romeo and Juliet from there. We look up at Juliet’s 
balcony with Romeo‘s eyes and look down at Romeo with 
Juliet’s. Our eyes and, with it, our conscious is identified with 
the characters in the film, we look at the world out of their 
eyes and have no angle of vision of our own.
146
  
This new psychological effect, where the uniqueness of film art 
resides, is for Balázs ‘identification’.
147
 Balázs recognised more 
aspects from the multifaceted, empathic spectator-character 
relationship, and used identification to gather them under the same 
concept: the more basic mimicry, but also role taking or 
perspective taking. At its apex, Balázs emphasizes, identification 
does not only happen remote from the filmmaker’s control, but 
there are auctorial filmic ways and mechanisms available to guide 
the entire process: the immersion of the spectator in the story 
presented on the screen, the fact that the film “does away with the 
distance between the spectator and the work of art”
148
 and 
“deliberately creates the illusion in the spectator that he is in the 
middle of the action reproduced in the fictional space of the 
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film".
149
 Particular choices of field sizes (close-ups), the variation 
in angulations, with the help of the editing process, might 
contribute to the triggering of an empathic response, or such 
choices will at least determine a degree of intensity.  
It is of a peculiarity of film studies that Béla Balázs’ 
scrupulous approach to theorizing the moving image spectatorship 
was abandoned for such a long time, and his is not even the first 
name which occurs to us when we discuss nowadays identification 
as explanation for sharing of emotions. But rather, when bringing 
up identification, many might split into associating it with 
psychoanalytical film theory, which provided a very different 
understanding of the matter. There is debate as to whether the 
psychoanalytical theory should be dismissed altogether. Some 
argue that, for the benefit of theory, it should be just 
reconceptualised.
150
 Is there anything, within the frames of 
psychoanalytical writings, that can be of any use to the scientific 
approach of theorizing filmic empathy, or from which the criticism 
or the praxis could benefit? In a concise manner, we should show 
why film psychoanalysis is not of use for us here. 
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The film psychoanalyst Christian Metz described several 
types of identification, naming the one with the camera as the 
main type of identification, a form of recognition with the self, to 
which the identification with a character falls only as secondary. 
For Metz, identification is central for the cinematographic 
experience (film viewing itself is a “lovable fetish”
151
), but 
understood in a problematic way, a view that is extensively and, I 
will claim, unjustifiably quoted to this day: 
Ainsi, le film est comme le miroir. Mais en un point essentiel 
il diffère du miroir primordial: bien que, comme en celui-ci, 
tout puisse venir se projeter, il est une chose, une seule, qui 
ne s’y reflète jamais: le corp propre du spectateur. Sur un 
certain emplacement, le miroir devien brusquement glace sans 
tain.
152
  
This is what Metz seems to ask: with what exactly does the 
spectator identify throughout the film projection? Drawing on 
Freud’s Interpretation of dreams (1914), Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety 
(1926) and Lacanian work on the Mirror stage, Metz finds 
identification as being crucial to the experience of watching a film, 
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which in a far-fetched manner he compares with “the sexual act”, 
in the sense that, for both intercourse and the watching of a film it 
is essential that all psychical faculties would be intact, for the act 
(sexual, as well as watching movies) to be considered normal, 
outside psychoses and neuroses. For Metz himself, the theory 
remains valid for fiction and documentary alike: “Fiction ou pas, il y a 
toujours quelque chose sur l’écran”,
153
 implying elsewhere that all 
cinema is fiction, “tout film est un film de fiction”.
154
 
The famous Metzian identification appears to be quite 
detached from what the film per se, and the act of viewing, are 
really about. First, let us briefly look at its “stages”, as Metz 
describes them: the infant, in the mirror, recognises familiar 
objects (the mother holding him in her arms) but, above all, he 
identifies his own image (“la formation du Moi”
155
). In other 
words, when the child identifies his reflection, himself as an object 
in the mirror, this is when, for Metz, the self is formed. With time, 
the early type of identification ceases to be a necessity, however, 
the adult, now film spectator, carries on some evolved sort of 
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continued identification when going to the movies. Metz is 
drawing on the Lacanian theory of identification, without taking 
into account the potential diversity of implications which might 
occur in various films, or between various spectators, or the 
complicated relationship between the two, spectator and film. 
Consequently, it comes across as an artificial, ‘monolithic’ 
approach.  
  The identification with the film character, or actor, would 
only be for Metz of a secondary type. “L’écran, en ce sens, n’est 
pas un mirroir”,
156
 since the spectator does not find himself or 
herself on the screen as object, but rather objects which are “without 
him”:  
Et il est vrai que, s’identifiant à lui même comme regarde, le 
spectateur ne peut faire autrement que de s’identifier aussi à la 
caméra, qui a regardé avant lui ce qu’il regarde a présent, et 
dont le poste(=cadrage) détermine le point de fuite.
157
 
It is because of this identification with the camera, Metz thought, 
that some spectatorial behaviours are explicable, and it sheds light 
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on why, for example, the spectator does not turn his head left or 
right when the camera describes a panning, and so on.
158
  
The final stage of the abstract identification theory of Metz 
is the doubling of the spectator with the projector, machine to be 
found in a fantastic way behind the spectator’s head. Even if one 
might try to make sense of the theory up to this point, the 
projector argument is still confusing, and highly outdated, since it 
is by all means not with a projector in the very back of our heads 
that we experience a film. To a lesser extent, that was still the case 
at the time of Metz’s writings. 
For Metz, the mirror stage-generated identification 
happens with both the projector and with the screen, in a film-
spectator theory where neither the film nor the spectator play any 
role, and are ever replaceable. It appears as an implausible theory 
about film experience where fine distinctions do not find any 
place. But what seems to entirely annul the psychoanalytical film 
theory from any scientific debate on spectatorship is the implied 
and puzzling assumption that understanding the film means the 
spectator takes himself for the character, considers himself as 
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being the character, as if the spectator is some empathy-less puzzle 
piece, ready for being robotically and routinely infantilised. The 
filmic product does not get too much of a chance for proper 
theory, or analysis either, since it is just the creation of the 
“identified” spectator.  
Metz talked about regression in the darkness of the cinema 
venue, and regression in the darkness it was: seized by 
psychoanalysis, there was no alternative approach for film 
identification, other than the one described above, one that has its 
followers to this day. It is only as late as 1989 that a fundamentally 
different perspective on identification emerged. In his opening 
essay from Post-Theory (a book which could almost be seen as a 
cognitivist manifesto), David Bordwell criticises this “subject-position 
theory of the mid-70s”, which was applied to film throughout the 
‘70s and the ‘80s: “for the subject-position theorist the 
communication, because it is an interplay of subject and another, 
requires something like identification to take place”.
159
 Bordwell is 
surely right when stating that the “subject-position theory”, 
                                                 
 
159
 Bordwell (1989), 15. 
111 
 
according to which the spectator believes he or she is creating the 
film, is extremely improbable. 
Without giving too much attention to identification, David 
Bordwell, however, pointed to the exact same issue that I find 
fundamentally problematic with Metz’s identification theory, that 
is, the spectator not being acknowledged as a person, with the 
variety of psychological functions carried along. Bordwell 
proposed a radically different take on identification, for him a 
concept imported in film theory from the field of criticism, where 
it emerged from a concern for effect, which naturally followed 
style; more specifically, driven by the concern of making criticism 
understandable, the critic was the first who needed to take into 
consideration the spectator “as a person”: 
I have also argued that when interpreters “apply” theory, they 
do so principally in a piecemeal, ad hoc, and expansionist 
manner. Theory functions as a black box; if it gets the job 
done, there is no need to look inside. While the constraints 
on “pure” theorizing are logical and broadly empirical, the 
constraints on using theory in interpretation arise from the 
needs of the immediate task. Reciprocally, pre-1970 film 
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criticism furnishes contemporary film theory with many of its 
central concepts.
160
 
Bordwell seems to suggest that, only with the help of other 
academic fields, film theory should seek to compensate for the 
(again) regressed stage the topic of filmic identification is to be 
found in. In cultural studies, he continues arguing, identification is 
more “straight forward”: “In grasping features of race, class, 
gender, or other sub-cultural attributes, the spectator identifies 
with the figures on the screen or the cultural allegiances offered by 
the film”.
161
 Bordwell’s observation, inspired from cultural studies, 
is congruent with the significant similarity for the keen component of 
empathy, which will be described, in connection to documentary 
film, in the third chapter of this work.  
By and large, film theory mainly defines identification as 
the positive connection with the movie character, especially with 
the protagonist. In a similar manner, viewers themselves generally 
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describe their positive emotional relationship with moving-image 
characters using identification: I really identified with one or the other 
character in the film, the moved spectator would say, so I was really sad 
about what happened to him/her. Identification is also the concept 
employed to define several other instances of the spectator – film 
character relationship, in both film studies and in the vernacular, 
and sometimes is used in contradictory and misleading ways.  
To avoid confusing terminology, in the context of this 
work I will however limit the use of identification exclusively to 
the complex, imagination-requiring empathy-arousing mode of 
role-taking (or perspective-taking).  
 
 
2.3 Against Identification: Alternative 
Explanations for Filmic Empathy 
 
 
One of the most outspoken critics of identification (understood as 
explanation for our relationship with film characters) is Noël 
Carroll. This is a view from which I distance myself: a certain 
degree of identification with moving image characters, I argue, is 
possible, though requiring a complex imaginative process. The 
114 
 
dissention is not irreconcilable: it is Noël Carroll’s years-long work 
that first properly shed light on the overall relationship that we 
have with film characters – or in his terms, relationships. Carroll 
identified multiple ways in which we emotionally relate to 
characters in moving images: type-identical, vectorially converging 
(including at time sympathy), emotional solidarity (an emotional 
response to the antagonist, similar to the one the character has). 
Identification is to be discharged from the list because, in 
Noël Carroll’s view, if one identifies with the protagonist, the 
spectator would thus be “infected” by the protagonist’s emotional 
state. And this is a vision Carroll rejects for not being relevant for 
analysing the spectator-character relationship. Carroll pleads for 
what he calls asymmetric emotions: “Since quite frequently, our 
emotional states often have different causes and take different 
objects than the putative mental state of the protagonist”.
162
 This 
is the reason why, at times, he also seems to plead for more 
distinctions rather than fewer, namely “a distinction between 
emotions that are held in common or coincidentally and emotions 
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that are shared due to some intimate causal relation between 
them”.
163
 
But while more distinctions are needed, and while 
identification, overused and misplaced, has been at times 
exhausted of meaning, could we however dismiss altogether that 
something like this exists: assuming the perspective of the 
character, and feeling some of the relevant emotions that come 
along with the lack of well-being of the protagonist? In Murray 
Smith’s understanding, Noël Carroll “has argued unequivocally 
that spectators never really adopt the viewpoint (in a general, 
rather than in a purely optical sense) of characters”.
164
 However, in 
earlier works, Carroll did not seem to question this particular type 
of spectator-character connection, namely putting oneself in the 
filmic situation, be it fiction or non-fiction, and eventually 
imagining, to various extents, how the victim feels or felt like. The 
underlined problem is the naming of psychological hypostases with 
a persisting lack of rigor and specificity: 
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Obviously, character-identification could mean a range of 
things and could be connected to a variety of different 
psychological theories. But the term is often used – even by 
professional critics – in a way that fails to specify exactly how 
we are to characterize the mental state to which speakers are 
referring.
165
 
The existent terminology seems to imply, in Carroll’s more recent 
writings, some kind of exact symmetry, some sort of blending with 
characters, which would suggest that the spectator either 1. 
confuses himself for the character or 2. fuses with the character, 
duplicating his or her emotional states. 
It is not this particular instance of responses that Carroll 
seems to reject (i.e. fusion and confusion with the character), since 
there are regardless multiple instances of emotional response, 
many still out of our reach – in Carroll’s own words: “There are a 
number relations; I do not know how many”.
166
 The predicament 
seems to be a terminological one. For Carroll, the phenomenon of 
identification would imply that we respond to a filmic situation as 
the character would respond to it. This, of course, would be a 
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mistake, since spectators give a response while ‘assimilating’, and 
not ‘duplicating’ the character’s situation.  
Carroll is right that the spectator-character emotional 
relationship is not always congruent, but so is every other 
emotional relationship for that matter, with fictitious characters, 
non-fiction ones and real people alike. Furthermore, as will be 
discussed in detail later, the two higher-order psychological modes 
of empathic arousal both do imply more or less similar emotional 
states to those the observed finds himself in: mediated association 
(where the observer processes and assimilates information about 
the one observed) and role-taking (imagining how the 
victim/spectator feels or how one could feel in an identical 
situation). Carroll’s categorical position against identification 
extends against empathy as well, on the grounds that there is not 
enough agreement on what the term empathy really refers to, and 
he finds it reason enough to introduce new terminology in order to 
refer to the phenomenon. The new nomenclature was not meant 
to bring the field to a consensus, but rather deepened the 
disagreement. One of the defenders of the identification approach 
is Berys Gaut, who recently convincingly showed how the 
arguments Carroll gave throughout time to support the various 
118 
 
instances of the spectator-character relationship are in reality 
compatible with the identification view.
167
 
However, for Noël Carroll, instead of empathy or 
identification, a different approach to defining the complex 
emotive relationship has more significance, namely assimilation.
168
 
The emphasis is on the necessity on the spectator’s side that, while 
giving an emotional response to the character, one understands 
that the character is not oneself. This conclusion is, however, 
already in full agreement with the way that, for some time now, 
psychologists define precisely empathy: as a process at the end of 
which a person would have feelings more appropriate to someone 
else’s situation than to his own, the emphasis being on the fact that 
the viewer knows at all times that the other is not oneself, a fact 
crucial for the empathic process to be accurate.
169
 
The very same goes even for moral philosophy: Martha 
Nussbaum makes an interesting distinction between the different 
terminology in this field and what the terms represent. In this wide 
range of emotional responses to somebody else’s undeserved 
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misfortune, Nussbaum uses empathy to underline its imaginative 
component.
170
 She sees it as an important thread, an instrument 
that enables us to understand what the other is going through, 
generates our apprehension and establishes connection. It easily 
generates compassion and establishes altruism. For Nussbaum, it is 
an important aspect that, while understanding the suffering of the 
other, one is aware that the pain is not one’s own. “If one really 
had the experience of feeling the pain in one’s own body”, she 
explains, “then one would precisely have failed to comprehend the 
pain of another as another”.
171
 In order for us to empathize, let’s 
say, with someone who just lost a spouse, it is not relevant to 
imagine how we would feel in that very situation, but rather to 
understand more closely what the suffering is for that particular 
person, with his or her particular background, family situation, 
religion and so many others: “the person with a lip injury is a 
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bassoon player, as one is not oneself”.
172
 It is the truthful position 
from which one could more fairly evaluate the distress of the 
other, and experience the consequential emotion.  
Even if he avoids naming the process empathy, and resorts 
to assimilation, Noel Carroll’s view is congruent with the 
definitions of empathy from various other fields, as stated above. 
Thus, for Carroll, part of this assimilation demands that the 
spectator has an understanding of both the filmic situation and the 
way the character evaluates this situation: 
For example, in horror, when a character is beset by a 
monster, part of my response is grounded in the recognition 
that the protagonist regards herself as confronting something 
that is threatening and repellent. In order to do this, I must 
have a conception of how the protagonist sees the situation; 
and I must have access to what makes her assessment 
intelligible.
173
 
And exactly this access to the other’s assessment of the 
situation implies assimilating it, and that I, as spectator, replicate 
the feelings, which by necessity implies that I also take an external 
view of it, I evaluate it, to some extent from an exterior point of 
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view (i.e. my own). The understanding and sharing of emotions 
between spectator and character depends on the understanding 
and sharing of the character’s situation, structure, principles and 
ideas. The convincing account that Noël Carroll gives of 
assimilation corresponds to some aspects of another empathy-
arousing mode in psychology scholarship: the direct association of 
cues in the victim’s situation, which makes the viewer bring 
personal emotional responses to the given situation (through 
memories etc.).  
In conclusion, it is safe to admit that what Carroll calls 
infectious identification (identical replication of the emotions of 
the film character), cannot be responsible for the entirety of the 
character-audience spectrum of emotional relationships, as this 
dynamic can encapsulate a much vaster degree of variation than 
the spectator simply replicating the emotions of the character. The 
emotions of the spectator can be identical, but they can also be 
similar to those of the characters, or different to them. This 
departure from the affective state of the character and variation 
into a new emotional direction depends on a number of factors, 
like what kind of information we as spectators possess, or what do 
the characters themselves know. In documentary film, indexed 
with reality-status (the film comes to use labelled as documentary, 
122 
 
with real stances, real people), the spectator’s digression from the 
emotional state of the character leading to an entirely new 
emotional state, unique only to the spectator, is even more 
important than in fiction film. The cheerful march of the 
Salvadoran guerrilla soldiers in the documentary IN THE NAME OF 
THE PEOPLE,
174
 their smiles and songs and energy, can only 
frighten the spectator, who probably has the distressing thought of 
real people in the real-world marching to a sure death. 
Our emotions, as Carroll puts it, have here “different 
causes and take different objects than the putative mental states of 
the protagonists”,
175
 and there is no faithful match between them. 
Nevertheless, I argue here that these asymmetric emotions fall, 
too, under the frameworks of a single, complex empathic process.  
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2.4 Mobilizing a Pro-Attitude in Character’s 
Construction 
 
 
Proponents of the identification explanation for filmic empathy 
have suggested that there is some sort of natural, automatic trace 
to filmic empathy, due to its two main features – the visual and the 
imaginative: “(…) the imaginative activity that is characteristic of 
empathy involves taking another’s perspective on things, 
imaginatively representing to oneself the thoughts, beliefs, desires, 
and so on of another as though they were one’s own”.
176
  
So even if some empathy arousing modes are automatically 
triggered, and the spectator can imaginatively share the character’s 
desires of beliefs, for a complex empathic experience he or she has 
to have some knowledge or belief about what those thoughts or 
desires or beliefs of the character actually are, and appropriate some 
of them. After sharing of some of the same values, interests and 
goals with the film character, some sort of benevolence will be 
installed. It is central to securing the empathic response to film 
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characters, fictional and non-fictional alike, and strong sympathy 
(and antipathy) will in their turn trigger solidarity. But how is it 
mobilized, and once mobilized, how is it sustained throughout the 
duration of the movie? 
In real life, our benevolence concerns firstly those with 
whom we share same values or same interests, members of the 
same group – gender or political, or simply people with whom we 
share the same loyalties and system of belief, or simply a similar 
sense of humour. But it appears not so simple to secure 
benevolence for film characters, which are aimed to appeal to a 
large audience. The wider the audience, the more complicated the 
filmmaker’s task seems to be, a task which involves a way to elicit 
these feelings in very diverse audiences, pertaining to highly 
distinct groups.  
More often than not, documentary films aim to address a 
wide audience, not one group or the other and, in the case of 
documentary films from revolutionary contexts, it is exactly the 
empathy of trans-cultural audiences that is at stake. So how do you 
secure benevolence from a wider, diverse, or cross-cultural 
audience? One rich clarification comes, again, from Noël Carroll. 
As showed above, Carroll is taken aback by the amount of 
contradictions and lack of agreement about the simple 
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terminology, which gravitates around the notion of empathy, and 
by the fact that findings of new phenomena employ older 
wordings, in the detriment of coherent linguistic accuracy. 
Though, is it not the same history behind so many other concepts 
in film theory and elsewhere, when “our nomenclature gets 
confusing, because we do not have enough labels to go 
around”?
177
 Is it not the case with notions such as popular, and 
fiction, and character – to use just some key-terms Carroll decided is 
safe to use, while being cautious with empathy, a word he decides to 
bypass? Consequently, Carroll replaces empathy with “vectorially 
converging emotions”, in other words, emotions which are not 
(type-)identical, but tend in same direction, “converge vectorially” 
in distinct ways: in a positive way (love, pride) or in a negative one 
(discomfort, distress); the experiencing of feelings belonging to the 
same extensive category.
178
 And the pivot of the emotional trigger 
for the “vectorially converging emotions” is the spectator’s 
sympathy towards the characters, sympathy meaning in this case 
benevolence, kindness, wishing-good, and an overall pro attitude. 
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Therefore, in gaining benevolence from a larger or more 
diverse audience, the construction of a main character with some 
very broad, universally-agreed upon moral traits is helpful, the 
building up of the good-guy who can appeal very diverse people:  
As a matter of empirical generalization, protagonists who 
command the audience’s moral endorsement. In other words, 
morality, of an extremely broad cast, provides the 
moviemaker with an interest, or project, or loyalty upon 
which the viewer of diverse backgrounds can converge.
179
  
Hence, if the main characters are morally appealing, benevolence 
from a larger and more diverse audience can be secured, for the 
spectator has a special bond with the protagonist who, starting 
from this one element, seems more a part of his or her group: 
Good guys are precisely what the movie doctor calls for – 
characters likely to engender a pro-attitude from 
heterogeneous audiences of otherwise varied and often 
conflicting interests and loyalties. Morality of the fairly 
generic sort found in movies is just what people from 
different backgrounds are apt to agree upon, at least 
roughly.
180
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And by good guy, or “morally good”, Carroll seems to mean fair, 
just, loyal, the one who cares for the weak, family-oriented, 
truthful and trustful, in a word, moral in a universal sense (or at 
least as moral is generally perceived by western audiences).
181
 The 
‘good-guy’ type of character construction should not be 
understood as a single, one-sided feature but, in order to win 
sympathy, the film characters have more chances when perceived 
as morally good. Hence chances are greater to win the sympathy of 
a larger audience, when there are characters portrayed as 
encompassing ‘a variety of virtues’. Even if at the beginning he or 
she seems anti-social, shortly he or she must prove to be 
“prosocial at heart”. Protagonists win our benevolence because of 
the multitude and diversity of their virtues, and this is why the 
spectator hopes the protagonist will just do well (and their 
antagonist, if any, do badly). A character whose virtues we might 
find doubtful, to say the least, who puzzles us with his choices or 
with his morals, can still trigger our empathic feelings, with well 
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developed features. This can be possible because (and only when) 
our pro-attitude is secured.
182
  
Solidarity is another important instance of the spectator-
character relationship. As Carroll puts it, solidarity can be defined 
as “sympathy and antipathy viscerally felt”,
183
 mainly when a 
strong bond is established with the good guy, whose misfortune 
will trigger the viewer’s distress, distress which could be alleviated 
when the well-being of the character is achieved. But in extreme 
scenarios, solidarity can be established with the not-so-morally-
rightful, too: this happens when antipathy towards the antagonist 
reaches high intensities. Alongside benevolence (sympathy in 
Carroll’s terms), solidarity is a key factor in securing a pro-attitude, 
and consequently responsible for triggering empathy. Leaving at 
time the reserve I have at times with Noël Carroll’s terming of the 
concepts at stake, his works appear to be the most comprehensive 
theoretical frameworks film scholarship currently holds.  
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However, the work in the field seems to be just at the 
beginning, since so many other spectatorship-related issues have 
not been brought sufficiently (or at all) under scrutiny: the various 
valences of mimicry (not only the length of shots and angulations, 
but also posture and movement), and their empathic effect on the 
film spectator, the use of dialogue and language association, as well 
as the complex interplay of protagonist/antagonist. The following 
chapter is a possible approach to such a list of empathy-generating 
filmic mechanisms, and it is by all means not exhaustive.       
Many more pages are being written on how exactly we 
should name the affective response we give to characters, and 
amid this favoured dispute, I argue that the more stringent 
questions keep unfortunately pending: how is empathy mobilized, 
how is it sustained and what follows the empathic process?  
130 
 
3 How Does Filmic Empathy Work? Means for 
Empathic Arousal 
3.1 The Many Empathies: Empathy as a 
Process 
 
 
Films are also effective means of presenting larger life sequences, which 
can promote viewers’ empathic identification with others’ lives. Seeing 
that people in other cultures have similar worries and respond 
emotionally as we do to important life events, while sitting in the 
audience and feeling the same emotions, should contribute to a sense of 
oneness and empathy across cultures.  
  – Martin Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development. 
Implication for Caring and Justice, 2000184 
 
Up until this point, we have looked at the multiplicity of 
understandings when it comes to empathic response to film 
characters, and how this variety led to a narrowing of the sense of 
the concept. Various scholars strictly delimited their theoretical 
territory by distinguishing their understanding from other 
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definitions in circulation. As a result, explanations of empathy, 
which could have otherwise cohabitated, started excluding each 
other. This particular problem of studying empathy is not specific 
to film scholarship alone, but rather an old heritage of psychology. 
Here, likewise, empathy and sympathy were routinely used to 
address concepts that were interrelated, as if they were entirely 
different psychological states. In an attempt to bring this oddity 
closer to resolution, social psychologist Daniel Batson identified 
eight distinct concepts for which empathy is employed, and the 
fine distinctions between them
185
: 
 Knowing another person’s internal state, his thoughts 
and feelings, “cognitive empathy” or “empathic 
accuracy”
186
; 
 Adopting the posture or matching the neuronal 
responses of an observed other (which implies mimicking 
the other, and the match of feelings deriving from it); 
 Coming to feel as another feels187; 
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 Projecting oneself in the situation of another, the closest 
to Lipps' initial use of Einfühlung in aesthetics – the 
imagining of what it would be like to be somebody else; 
 Imagining how the other is thinking or feeling, or 
imagining the perspective of the other
188
; 
 Imagining how one would think or feel in the place of 
the other, which is similar to the projecting oneself in 
another’s situation, while “the self remains more focal 
here”
189
;  
 Experiencing distress when witnessing somebody else 
in distress, which in the current work, following Martin L. 
Hoffman, will be referred to as “empathic distress”;   
 Feeling for another person. This particular use of the term 
empathy does not imply feeling the precise distress of the 
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other, but rather that there is a certain congruency of 
emotion generated. In this case, the emotional response to 
the other in need is not identical, but “other-oriented” (like 
pity for pain). 
Scholars embracing one or the other above-listed understandings 
of empathy incline to exclude the rest. As a direct consequence, 
what psychologists decided to measure was exclusive, as were the 
conclusions they thus reached. For example, a comprehensive 
review of measurement scales available (for role taking) done by 
Robert D. Enright’s and Daniel K. Lapsley’s shows how at the 
time different constructs employ different measurements, leading 
to different conclusions. It is exactly by the beginning of the 1980s 
that numerous measure scales were employed for the study of 
empathy. The most routinely used were the Hogan Empathy Scale 
and the Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy (QMEE); 
in time, through research, they had been both confirmed as valid 
scales. But the QMEE and the Hogan scales measured different 
aspects of empathy, thus reaching different results: Hogan 
134 
 
Empathy Scale originates from the cognitive view on empathy, 
while QMEE measures emotional aspects of empathy.
190
  
In other words, in analysing the two main phenomena 
carrying the same name (cognitive role-taking and affective 
reaction), researchers had the tendency to unnaturally exclude 
elements of the other phenomena. Growing around each other as 
they did, the above-described measuring traditions led, for 
psychology scholar Mark Davis, to the Balkanisation of the study of 
empathy.
191
 By the beginning of the 1980s, an all-encompassing 
empathy measurement scale was urgently required.  Mark Davis 
foresaw empathy as both cognitive role-taking and affective 
response to someone else’s situation, consequently putting forward 
a new approach to measurement scales and correlating it with the 
existent subscales: the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI).
192
  
Davis’ IRI is a system of four subscales, measuring various 
understandings of empathy: cognitive perspective taking (PT), 
fantasy, or the capacity of the respondent to identify with fictional 
characters (FS), the capacity to answer with compassionate feelings 
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or empathic concern (EC), and personal feeling of distress, the 
response to the other’s negative experience with feelings more 
appropriate to the other than to one’s own (PD). Amidst 
psychology theorists, Mark Davis’ extensively used today IRI 
gathered evidence for a novel approach: the development of a 
complex understanding of empathy, for better incorporating the 
two main empathy models, cognitive and affective, based on the 
relationships and commonness between the elements. In 1994, 
Davis argued in his book, Empathy: A social Psychological Approach, 
for a multidimensional model, including four categories of 
interrelated constructs: antecedents (the given data of the observer 
and the given data of the situation in which the empathic incidence 
might happen), the types of processes involved and the outcomes 
of the empathic processes, which can in their turn be non-
interpersonal (not directed towards the victim) and intrapersonal 
(directed towards the victim). Out of Mark Davis’ 
multidimensional approach, what concerns the current work are 
the modes of arousing empathy, initially put forward by “the most 
comprehensive attempt thus far to deal with these issues”,
193
 the 
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seminal work of the “most ambitious of the modern empathy 
theorists”,
194
 Martin L. Hoffman. As indicated in the 
organisational model, the viewer’s responding with prosocial 
behaviour or helping when witnessing someone else in distress 
depends on three categories of processes. These three distinct 
categories are borrowed from Hoffman’s two groupings of 
empathic arousal modes (first put forward in 1978)
195
: lower order 
processes (automatic, triggered by mere viewing) and higher order 
processes (involving sophisticated cognitive functions, 
imagination). 
 Martin L. Hoffman is a development psychologist, 
therefore he primarily focused on how our empathic capacities 
develop, and how they evolve from infancy throughout 
adolescence.
196
 Starting from here, he advanced a very complex, 
multifaceted, (and today extensively cited) theory, one that film 
scholarship has a lot to benefit from. His theory, which will be 
furthered analysed, is mainly concerned with affective empathy 
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(“feeling what the other feels”) – while still acknowledging the 
existence of the second type, cognitive empathy (the understanding 
of the other’s feelings). The two types of empathy occur at times 
together, as it is when a documentary film viewer sees the 
character in distress, shares some of the disconcerting experience, 
becomes aware of the victim’s drama, understands the condition 
and imagines the pain. The empathic involvement can turn the 
experience of the victim (and documentary character makes no 
exception here) into the viewer’s personal experience. Understood 
in this way, empathy is a complex process, dependent on the 
countless liaisons that can be established between the observer’s 
and the characters’ feelings. For Hoffman, empathy is an “affective 
response more appropriate to someone else’s situation than to 
one’s own”,
197
 the prerequisite for such a response being “the 
involvement of psychological processes that make a person have 
feelings that are more congruent with another’s situation than with 
his own situation”.
198
 It is precisely this part of Hoffman’s theory, 
the mechanism behind the empathy, and the psychological 
processes involved in generating it, that are of interest to us here. 
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3.2 Empathy, with Whom?  
3.2.1 The Watching of a Documentary, a 
Moral Dilemma 
 
 
The core of the Hoffmanian theory of empathy is its contribution 
to principles of caring and justice. Above all, the psychologist 
seems to wonder: what is the influence that empathy-generated 
feelings have on our moral judgment? Under the same broad 
model, emotion is intertwined with action. According to Martin L. 
Hoffmann, there are five types of moral encounters, out of which 
the one best corresponding to the documentary spectatorship is 
also the simplest moral confrontation. It implies mere seeing of 
someone in pain, danger or any other form of distress, termed by 
Hoffman the innocent bystander model.  
The other modes of moral encounter are transgressor, 
virtual transgressor, multiple moral claims and caring versus 
justice. Transgressor is the one who is about to harm another, the 
moral dilemma being if one refrains from hurting again, or 
experiences guilt. Virtual transgressor is the one who, though 
innocent, believes he or she has hurt someone. The fourth type, 
multiple moral claims, involves choice: who does one help and 
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how does one feel about disregarding the other in distress? The 
fifth type, caring versus justice, comprises the clash between caring 
or helping others, and more abstract issues, such as rights and 
justice. 
All models of moral-justice dilemmas might prove 
important when discussing reception of documentary films but, 
for the study of filmic empathy, we are going to closely look at the 
first one, a pattern for all the other four types of moral encounters: 
the innocent bystander. The victim, we have grasped that already, 
does not need to be present for empathy to occur, and therefore, 
alongside face-to-face seeing, the bystander model extends to other 
forms of perceiving the sufferance of the other. One might turn 
into an innocent bystander by perceiving the distress of the other 
in various other scenarios: while reading a letter, or hearing the 
voice of the victim – and film viewing makes no exception from 
such encounters. The spectator of resistance documentary watches 
the suffering of other human beings, experiencing some of the 
distress in the person on the screen, and the spectatorship gets 
additional nuances of innocent bystanding. The innocent 
bystander model is in agreement with the spectatorship model put 
forward by Noël Carroll, where the moral emotions are a 
subcategory of emotions, activated in the following fashion:  
140 
 
We are riled by the injustices suffered by protagonists and 
innocent bystanders, angered by children who fail to pay 
proper deference to their parents, while feeling a sort of 
moral satisfaction and even admiration towards characters 
who protect the weak and worthy, and we experience a sense 
of elevation or joy when justice is restored.
199
  
  
3.2.2 The Other: Documentary Character 
  
 
We have now a better understanding of the role of the spectator in 
the empathy equation, and we have a name for it, but what about 
the other side? Who is the other, the one in distress, victim in the 
non-fiction moving image: a real person, a creative construct, or 
both? In order to properly define the documentary character, we 
should, at this point, briefly look at what a documentary essentially 
is. 
One way of defining documentary film has been by stating 
its function, or role in society. Michael Renov identified four such 
functions of the documentary film: to record, reveal or preserve; to 
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persuade or promote; to analyse or interrogate; to express.
200
 
However, this list of documentary purposes is inexhaustible or, as 
film theoretician and documentary maker, Carl Plantinga put it, the 
purposes of documentary can be limited “only by the breadth of 
human communication itself”.
201
 However, explaining what 
documentary is by explaining what it should do is as old as the genre 
itself. John Grierson who produced the word for it in the first 
place, also came up with the understanding that documentary is 
not a copy, but a creative treatment of reality, assuming that all 
documentaries must by necessity have a clear social purpose. Dziga 
Vertov’s instructions to the Kino-Eye group were, too, 
emphasising the function, or the bigger purpose of the genre:  
The movie camera was invented in order to penetrate deeper 
into the visible world, to explore and record visual 
phenomena, so that we do not forget what happens and what 
the future must take into account.
202
  
The praxis followed the desiderata, and what the genre must be was 
for long what Grierson said it should. Definitions diverge, from 
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the prejudicial delineations, such as the popular understanding of 
documentary as propaganda “trying to persuade us of 
something”,
203
 to equivocal ones.  Metz ambiguously stated, as we 
have seen in the previous chapter, that documentary is fiction, 
because “all film is fiction film”,
204
 while for Dai Vaughan, 
documentary is “signifying what it appears to record”
205
, because 
“what makes a film documentary is the way we look at it”.
206
 More 
recently, ideal-type definitions, coming from the philosophy of art, 
instituted the ideal-box in which, if some do not find room, too 
bad for them: those are not to be considered documentaries.
207
 
It is exactly this kind of ideal-approach that the work of 
Carl Plantinga invalidates in his argumentation of the 
indexing/assertive stance view, possibly the most comprehensive 
modern understanding of documentary film as art. It is, of course, 
not primarily linguistic assertions that Plantinga refers to in his 
description, but rather moving images, sounds, montage cuts, and 
the multiplicity of non-fiction assertions. In the core of Plantinga’s 
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wide-ranging definition resides the belief that, for a medium of 
communication as complex as the documentary, a simultaneous 
cohabitation between rhetoric and techniques, interpretation and 
recording is indeed possible: “the fact that a film has a perspective 
does not make it inauthentic or untruthful”.
208
 Primarily, like art 
itself, documentaries are no closed concepts, but have blurred 
boundaries. Carl Plantinga attempts to characterise documentary 
through a “prototype theory” explanation. “Prototypical 
examples”, placed in the centre of the category, share many of its 
family resemblances, while a peripheral member of the category 
might encompass only some or even one sole common attribute, 
while still fitting into the given category. 
The argument is drawn from aesthetics, and especially 
from Morris Weitz’s 1956 influential essay The Role of Theory in 
Aesthetics.
209
 For Weitz, traditional theories and methods of 
investigating art with their “necessary and sufficient” types of 
definitions are “doomed to fail”.
210
 In a similar fashion, what 
Plantinga argues for is that traditional attempts of defining 
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nonfiction by finding its essential features failed, since not all 
nonfictions share a single core characteristic,
 
but only “a braid of 
family resemblances”.
211
 For open concepts, such as tragedy, 
comedy and novel (and documentary makes no exception) there is 
no single property that the entire category has in common. Morris 
Weitz’s 1956 proposal for future theories was that, rather than 
finding yet another essentialist definition, they are to make 
“recommendations to attend in certain ways to certain features of 
art”.
212
 So the role of the theoretician should change from 
implying “correct criteria for recognizing members of certain 
legitimately closed classes of works of art into recommended 
criteria for evaluating any putative member of the class”.
213
 It is this 
recommendation that Carl Plantinga follows when prompting the 
theoretically rich view of documentary, that of the 
indexing/assertive stance. 
Plantinga’s understanding is not entirely novel: it adds to 
Noël Carroll’s definition of documentary as “reality-indexed”.
214
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For Carroll, the core of the distinction is that spectators know they 
are watching a documentary, because the film comes labelled as 
such by its makers – directors, producers, even distributors.
215
 The 
problem with the “reality-indexed” understanding is that 
sometimes, as Thomas Austin argues, a film could be ambiguously 
labelled for a multitude of reasons, most commonly marketing 
strategies. In this case, the viewer can still have a documentary 
experience, without having watched a film labelled as such. 
Therefore Plantinga’s enhancement of Carroll’s “reality-indexed” 
understanding is the addition of the assertive stance or, as he put it 
in 1997: “nonfictions assert a belief that given objects, entities, 
states of affairs, events, or situations actually occur(red) or 
exist(ed) in the actual world as portrayed”.
216
  
The patient reader might wonder where exactly all this will 
fall into an understanding of the empathy equation in the context 
of documentary film spectatorship. We have seen by now that the 
documentary spectator can function as an innocent bystander who, 
seeing someone in pain, grief, fear or other form of distress, 
experiences some of this distress, too. But who is this someone, 
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we asked. In the spirit of Plantinga’s theory of non-fiction film, 
our understanding of character would rather benefit from an 
example-oriented definition. Also, to put forward an all-
encompassing definition of the character in non-fiction film would 
be impossible, and even to approximate one for the purpose of the 
current work would be improbable, since the films we analyse here 
are produced over a period of more than 50 years, furthermore, 
the documentary prototype changed in time.  
A film character, by and large, as straightforwardly 
described by Bordwell and Thomson, is the main vehicle 
prompting cause and effect in the film’s narrative (narrative 
understood as “a chain of events in cause-effect relationship 
occurring in time and space”).
217
 A character in documentary film 
is thus any entity triggering events, or to whom events occur in the 
non-fiction moving images, delivered to us with the claim that the 
character essentially exists, or existed in reality, in the way 
portrayed in the documentary, or at least left traces to have existed 
as such.  
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The 1954 dinner scene between USA Ambassador John E. 
Peurifoy and Guatemalan President Jacobo Árbenz Guzman in 
When the Mountains Tremble is a re-enacted scene. Eddie Jones 
interprets the role of the ambassador, while originally Puertorto-
Rican Shawn Elliot plays the role of the president. What we see are 
the actors, but knowing that the scene is based on declassified CIA 
documents from 1954 is what provides the two characters with 
reality stances. Bordwell and Thompson make a valuable 
distinction between novel characters and film characters. When it 
comes to film characters, they point out, “[they] typically have a 
visible body”
218
 – but this is not always the case. Serious 
repercussions come along with the participation in the making of a 
resistance film, and filmmakers try to find creative ways of 
documenting the distinct traits of the characters (abilities, aims, 
ambitions, aspirations) without revealing their recognisable 
physicality. For this reason, director Iara Lee opens her THE 
SUFFERING GRASSES (2012) with genuine but effective 2D 
animation scenes, portraying the Syrian revolutionaries as simple 
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colourful spheres, and the members of the repressive regime as 
cubes. 
Even when it comes to such a highly particular example, 
such as these colourful spheres, the documentary spectator, an 
innocent bystander, is aware of watching traces of people who 
exist, or existed in the real world. Therefore, when seeing some of 
them suffering or in pain, the spectator will experience some of 
that distress, “which in turn can usually best be alleviated by 
helping that person”.
219
 It is this empathic distress that correlates 
with the helping behaviour: it precedes helping, reduces in 
intensity once one helped, or persists when one does not help and, 
according to Martin L. Hoffman, people know from experience 
that after helping they will feel better.
220
 Hoffman’s theory revises 
a substantial number of laboratory tests, and following his findings 
will make it easier to: firstly, understand how various definitions of 
filmic empathy are actually interconnected and integrate them in a 
single theory, and secondly, to better understand the mechanisms 
behind triggering empathy. Hence, we will be closer to elaborating 
a model for documentary-film generated empathy, as well as to an 
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answer to the question: what particular filmic means uphold the 
process?  
Since the modes of empathic arousal are complex and 
many-sided, it would be useful to consider one category at a time.  
The first three (mimicry, classical conditioning and direct 
association) are automatic and, for the most part, involuntary, 
whilst mediated association and role-taking involve complex 
cognitive processes. 
150 
 
3.3 Modes of Empathic Arousal 
3.3.1 Motor Mimicry and Close-Ups 
 
 
One reason of discord in film theories, exposed previously, was 
that a match between the feelings of the viewer and those of the 
person on the screen is not achievable, the argument most 
frequently invoked being that the spectator has his own personal, 
intimate feelings and thoughts, and that they cannot be identical 
with those of the viewer. Others support the theory according to 
which, in order for this match to happen, a very accurate 
understanding of the emotions of the character should precede the 
imitation. There is however an instance of empathy which indeed 
involves imitation of feelings, without presupposing any 
understanding of those particular feelings. 
Empathy is an innate capacity, and imitation of the distress 
in others starts in infancy. Newborns will respond with a cry at the 
sound of another baby crying. It is as early as 1917 that 
investigations collected data confirming this newborn-empathy 
151 
 
from infants between 1 and 14 days.
221
 At the time only a 
gramophone was available to record the cries, but as science 
evolved, measurements based on sophisticated spectrograms left 
no room for doubt “that vocal properties of an infant's cry contain 
stimulus elements that are effective in promoting crying in other 
newborns”.
222
 
The most basic empathic mode of arousal, mimicry, is 
precisely defined by the matching of emotions, when the 
expression of feelings in the observed is, to some extent, copied: 
an automatic imitation, principally preceding any accurate 
understanding of the other’s feeling. In 1906 Lipps called that 
“objective motor mimicry”. As we pointed out in the first chapter, 
Adam Smith as well observed the phenomenon. Smith didn’t 
restrain this imitation to the facial expressions, but rather noticed 
that people respond imitatively and automatically with their body 
as well as their posture: 
When we see a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon the 
leg or arm of another person, we naturally shrink and draw 
back our own leg or our own arm; and when it does fall, we 
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feel it in some measure, and are hurt by it as well as the 
sufferer.223 
Martin L. Hoffman, for whom mimicry is even “the very essence 
of empathy”,
224
 insists that it is a process in two stages. Imitation 
is just one of the two, widely verified by laboratory experiments, 
which frequently employ empathy-EMG studies. The second stage 
in the empathy-arousing mode of mimicry is feedback: the facial 
expression we adopt influences our affective response. Studies 
starting in the mid-1970s brought about evidence for the impact 
facial expression has in the way people feel, or how challenging it 
turns out to be for a person to experience feelings dissimilar to the 
facial expression they have at that moment in time. Display of 
cartoons is a favoured method for proving the feedback theory. A 
German-American team of psychologists, Strack, Martin and 
Stepper, investigated this hypothesis using cartoons from Gary 
Larson’s The Far Side.  
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Figure ‎3.1 Paul Ekman/ Photographs from the Papua New 
Guinea Exhibition 
154 
 
 
In a preliminary stage of the experiment, the cartoons had been 
tested and positively rated as funny. For the actual test, subjects 
different than those in the pre-test were instructed to tightly hold a 
pen with their lips, while not using their teeth – thus inhibiting the 
muscles involved in smiling. Under these conditions, they were 
asked to rate the same cartoons from The Fare Side. Interestingly 
enough, as opposed to the respondents in the pre-test, those 
subjects, whose muscles associated with smiling were inhibited, 
found the cartoons far less funny. This is just one demonstration, 
out of the many, showing how the innate, automatic motor activity 
influences the emotional response, thus giving validity to the 
feedback stage of mimicry. 
The culturists might claim that the connection between 
facial expressions and emotions is culture-specific, but several 
experiments of Ekman and his colleagues brought conclusive 
evidence about universal reading of emotions on facial 
expressions. In an initial experiment, Ekman, Sorenson and 
Friesen showed images illustrating various facial expressions to 
people from different cultures, who identified in the same way 
155 
 
sadness, surprise, disgust, happiness, fear, surprise.
225
 A couple of 
years later, in order to straiten the universality theory, Ekman 
travelled twice to Papua New Guinea, to test the theory and 
photograph the faces of South Fore people, tribes’ people who 
were illiterate, isolated from any media, and who had no previous 
contact with westerners. They, too, accurately identified matched 
facial expressions with the corresponding emotions, thus proving 
that a series of such expressions do not mirror social conventions, 
but are universal display of our emotions.
226
 And not just 
somebody else’s facial expression of feelings is mimicked: people 
recurrently engage in bodily and postural mimicry too. Hatfield, 
Cacioppo and Rapson have shown that emotional experience is at 
all times affected by such activation and feedback (emerging from 
this mimicry, since people mimic each other at all times), and 
therefore have the tendency to “catch” other people’s emotions.
 
227
  Summing up evidence from development, behavioural, clinical 
and social psychology, anthropology and cross-cultural research, 
Hatfield, Cacioppo and Rapson convincingly argued that this 
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catching of emotions happens “in all times, in all societies, and, 
perhaps, on very large scales”.
228
 
This should solve some of the dispute behind the various 
understandings of empathy in film studies: the emotional life of 
the spectator as innocent bystander is indeed only in part 
influenced by the emotions of the characters on the screen, but 
there are instances when the spectator shares these emotions in an 
identical fashion, even in a situation of cross-cultural reception. 
That is, through facial mimicry – and mimicry is perceived at its 
best in cinema via the use of close ups. The spectator’s access to 
the mental state of the characters in film is dependent on the types 
of close ups used, and on the way they are incorporated in the 
entirety of the film.  
Close ups are framings of shots, and the framing of a shot 
is the very basic aspect of the creative involvement of the camera 
in recording the realities in front of it, in order to transmute them, 
as Marcel Martin put it, in “matière artistique”.
229
  
The broad distinction would be between large, medium 
and extreme close-ups (namely between framing of the character 
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from waist, shoulders and neck up). The tighter the framing, the 
more the facial expressions will be emphasised. An enhanced 
effect might be achieved by the use of camera or lenses 
movements: changing the frames from a larger framing to a closer 
one would cue the spectator to focus on the facial expressions, 
enabling a mimicking effect. As will be later shown in an analysis 
of an early movie made in apartheid South Africa, THE END OF 
DIALOGUE (1970), the use of close ups in a documentary largely 
constituted out of general shots will obviously trigger more mental 
tension.  
158 
 
3.3.2 Simple Cognitive Modes of 
Empathic Arousal: Conditionig and 
Association 
 
 
The simple cognitive modes, classical conditioning and direct 
association represent the next, still rudimentary level in the 
development of empathic arousal in children. Davis defines 
classical conditioning as follows: 
Affective reactions to others result from past situations in 
which the individual perceived affective cues in another 
person while directly experiencing the same affect. The 
pairing of these two events makes it more likely that 
subsequent exposure to such cues will evoke the affective 
state.
230
  
Classical conditioning differs from mimicry in two ways. Firstly, as 
opposed to the first one, which is automatic, classical conditioning 
requires the observer/spectator to invest at least some very basic 
cognitive activity; secondly, while mimicry is a response to the 
victim’s facial expression, conditioning is a response to the 
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victim´s situation. This conditioning-generated empathic distress 
may bring along in the viewer feelings similar to those of the 
victim because, as Hoffman added, following Ekman et al.:
231
 (a) 
All humans have certain distress experiences in common (loss, 
injury, deprivation), (b) they are structurally similar to each other 
and therefore likely to process distress-relevant information 
similarly, and (c) they are therefore likely to respond to similar 
stressful events with similar feelings.
232
  
The other simple mode of empathic arousal, direct 
association, is similar to classical conditioning, but however more 
general. The name refers to the association the observer makes 
between the victim’s distress, on the one hand, and on the other 
the memory of similar instances the observer experienced. This 
does not refer to a one to one match, neither is it obligatory for 
the observer to have ever experienced anything close to the exact 
situation the victims experienced, but rather, as Hoffman noted 
already in 1984:  
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Their facial expression, voice, posture, or any other cue in the 
situation that reminds us of past situations associated with 
our experience of that emotion may evoke that emotion in 
us.
233
 
To this, Hoffman added in 2000 that the only requirement would 
be for the observer to have some feelings of the same nature. The 
sight of a wounded arm might remind the little boy of his own 
previous experience, and the boy might experience again some of 
those past painful experiences (but clearly, only if the little boy 
already had himself some sort of a wound of his own). 
Mimicking, classical conditioning and direct association 
require very basic cognitive processes (they might not even lead to 
the viewer’s comprehension that his or her feelings of distress are 
actually a response to somebody else’s painful situation). They are 
innate and demonstrate without a doubt that human beings are 
built up in such a way as to experience the emotions of others, and 
even mere seeing or hearing can evoke empathy. 
We see now that there is no purposefulness in limiting our 
use of empathy to those emotions imitatively shared and very 
accurately understood (as Alex Neill suggested). Identical share of 
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emotions does exist, only that it accounts for just one instance of 
the empathic arousal modes. We also see now how empathic 
arousal is susceptible to similarities, and as Noël Carroll 
maintained, the more universal the goals, values, traces the 
character will have, the more plausible that the necessary bound 
for sharing emotions will be established, since people are inclined 
to respond to similar distressful situations in similar manners, and 
even if not everybody shared a tragic past, there are common, 
universal grounds when it comes to fear of disease and dying, or 
the loss of a dear one, or a betrayal in love. And the nature of 
scenarios does not have to be so dramatic: regret, defeat, longing, 
are common language in a cross-cultural reception. 
Hugo Münsterberg and Amy Coplan, a hundred years away 
from each other, remarked that the spectator has his own personal, 
independent emotional life, and this is why his or her emotional 
reactions might in some cases be still a result of the emotions of 
the characters in the moving images, but very different in type and 
intensity (like pity for pain).  This, however, requires the 
performing machinery of the advanced cognitive modes.  
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3.3.3 Advanced Modes of Empathic 
Arousal: Language Mediated 
Association and Perspective-Taking 
 
 
Mediated association and perspective taking require imagination, 
and more creativity in employing ways to trigger viewer’s empathy. 
Triggering empathy will however require more time and more 
mental effort than the previous three modes.  
Verbal mediated empathic arousal, or mediated association 
refers, like direct association, to a correlation between the victim’s 
feelings and some past situation the observer himself experienced, 
just that this time the association is not automatic, but it is 
intermediated through language. It requires interpretation, because 
what triggers empathic response are not the words per se, but their 
semantic meaning. It is therefore an asset if the documentary 
character is not only a good speaker, but also an expert in putting 
feeling into words. Mediated association makes voice over an 
important tool for arousing empathy; voice can then accompany 
explanative or unrelated images, and sound cues – cry, moaning – 
supplement the language, accelerating the empathic response when 
the viewer can only imagine a face expression. 
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Through mediated association, empathic stimuli might 
already precede the first encounter with the character (when the 
information about the victim proceeds the sequence where the 
victim is shown). It would be a far-fetched conclusion to reach, 
that the trauma and distress can be recorded and shown as such in 
the resistance documentary. In fact, the situations when 
filmmakers actually “catch” the most traumatic moments on 
camera are rare and exceptional. It is true that, with the on-going 
expansion of recording devices, when anyone can film or be 
filmed, documentary makers might get their hands on the recorded 
traumatic scene, but they would still have to creatively incorporate 
it in the non-fiction film, which often implies providing a 
descriptive, verbal context. In other instances, a traumatic event 
has not been filmed at all, but it is reminisced and evoked by the 
victim. It is in the above-described hypostases that the verbally 
mediated association comes into play. If characters describe their 
experience vividly enough, and the strength of the filmic means 
counterweighs the absence of the actual “proof”, the spectator will 
be driven to imagine the traumatic episode, and these imagined 
164 
 
scenes can be as clear and vivid to the observer, as they are to the 
victim.
234
 
The verbal stimuli have the particular property of 
establishing some distance between the observer and the victim’s 
situation, due to encoding and decoding involved in the complex 
process, but are more effective combined with mimicry, classical 
conditioning and direct association, which are vivid and, thus 
combined, suitable to hold the viewer’s attention for a longer time.  
 From the verbal association, there is a single more 
sophisticated step we can still take in the empathy venture, and 
that is role-taking, or what people popularly name “stepping inside 
the other’s shoes”, in order to envisage what the other is feeling, 
thinking, even what and how one sees. Or in Mark Davis’ terms: 
“the tendency of individuals to entertain the perceptual, cognitive, 
or affective perspective of others”.
235
 Already early in the 
development process, children acquire flexibility in assuming 
several viewpoints belonging to affective states of other people 
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(Chandler & Greenspan, 1972), although a complex entertaining of 
the perspective of others requires a very advanced mechanism of 
cognitive processing, more demanding than for other empathy-
arousing modes. Moreover, perspective taking is a voluntary act: 
the placing of oneself in the other’s situation and eventually 
imagining, to various extents, how the victim feels or felt like.  
 Out of all empathy arousing modes, perspective taking is 
the one that film theory paid more attention to. It was employed, 
for example, in attempts of defining the effect of the point of view 
editing. The core of the empathy debate in film studies mainly 
inquired if the spectator either identifies with the character, or 
takes the character’s perspective of the situation, or only imagines 
how he or she would be in that particular situation.  
We will now see how the above listed three hypostases do 
not deny each other, but cohabitate within the framework of the 
single empathic mode of role taking and its three categories. As we 
saw at the beginning of this chapter, measurements employed 
distinguished between affective and cognitive,
236
 however 
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Hoffman sorts role taking differently, in other-focused role taking, 
self-focused role taking, and a combination of the two. 
For the other-focused role taking to happen, people need 
to imagine how the other feels in the particular given situation, and 
in doing so, they might even experience some of the same 
emotions the other is feeling. Memories from a past similar 
experience, or even just concerns that something similar might 
have happened to the observer – even if it never did – might 
enhance these emotions. Self-focused role taking, like the name 
implies, presupposes that, when one observes someone in a 
distressful situation, the observer imagines how she or he would 
feel in that given situation. Information about the victim, the 
context and circumstances, or cues from voice and posture or 
verbal association, they all might enhance the intensity of role 
taking. Hoffman’s conclusion seems to be that the intensity of self-
focused role taking is higher than that of other-focused role-taking. 
In other words, imagining how you would feel in the place of the 
other has a higher empathic effect, than imagining how the other is 
feeling. Hoffman partially followed Stotland (1969) in this, who 
provided the best known experiment in measuring empathy, by 
manipulating the perceptual set with which someone observes 
somebody else’s distress. The key to Stotland’s approach 
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introduced a set of instructions which manipulated the objective 
observations with the “imagine” type of instruction. The basic 
settings of the experiment implies instructing different groups of 
subjects to either imagine how the other is feeling, how one would 
feel in that particular situation, or to try to remain objective and 
follow what happens to the victim (on the screen, through a mirror 
glass etc.). In over fifty years, multiple such empathy-manipulating 
experiments were undertaken, relying on a variety of measuring 
methods, from palmar sweat measurements to self-reporting 
questionnaires. Results showed without a doubt that, when 
instructed to imagine, people have more intense empathy-
generated feelings than when trying to stay objective, and 
attentively observe the victim. Furthermore, the ones who imagine 
how they would feel in that given situation have been reported to 
have even more intense feelings, than those who only tried to 
imagine how the victim feels like.  
Some instances of self-focused empathic feeling can be so 
intense, that the thus-generated distress entirely moves the 
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attention from the victim to the observer’s personal distress, 
fatigue witch can no longer be defined as empathy.
237
  
The combination of the two, the “other-focused”, 
concentrated interest in the victim’s distress, and the more potent 
“self-focused” role taking is, according to Hoffman, the most 
powerful scenario, and that presupposes that the observer shifts 
back and forth between the two. At this point, it became apparent 
that, in order to describe the phenomenon that enables the 
spectator to place himself or herself in the situation of the 
character on screen, it is valuable to preserve the term of 
identification. Besides being such an accurate description of what so 
often happens while viewing a film, identification also comes along 
with extensive theoretical work. 
We already know two preconditions necessary for 
identification to happen: paying attention and a (not necessarily 
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realistic, but) reality-like environment, in the sense that space and 
objects are perceived in reality, and we know this can be achieved 
with the use of cut-aways, changing of angulation, depth of field. 
We have already underlined some of the role that mere paying 
attention has: it makes empathy with a character in the film 
inevitable, since watching a film implies by its nature paying 
attention; the very filmic means which contribute to securing 
attention are thus contributing to the securing of empathy. 
However, paying attention is a process in two interrelated steps: on 
one hand, it secures empathy, on the other hand, when 
empathising, spectators are consequently paying more attention to 
the filmic situation and to the background details of the story.  
The influence empathy has on attention is confirmed by 
more recent experiments, which use Stotland’s “imagine” type of 
instructions, but with a twist. In the more recent experiments, 
people undertaking the experiment are not only asked to imagine 
how the victim is feeling, or how they would feel in that particular 
situation, but rather subjects receive instructions of the following 
type: “picture to yourself just how she feels in that situation”, 
“please try to empathize”. The results were similar (people who 
were instructed to empathise did indeed empathise more than 
those who were asked to remain objective), but some of those 
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role-taking experiments, which manipulate observational process 
using moving images, shed additional light on the relationship 
between film empathy and attention. The experiment designed by 
Regan and Totten from Cornell University presented to female 
students a seven minutes videotape.
238
 The videos displayed a 
basic encounter between Margaret and another youngster while 
chitchatting. The subjects from the group instructed to empathise 
with Margaret also paid more attention to her situation: when 
questioned, the subjects in the “empathy” group provided more 
accurate answers about the situation in the video. The empathic 
subjects “took the role of the other” and when answering the 
questionnaires “provided attributions more like those typically 
offered by actors themselves”. This is yet another way to think 
about the relationship between attention and empathic spectator.  
Michotte, we remember, also suggested that attention is an 
important element in the empathic process, but back at the end of 
the 1950s, he was more concerned with the conditions established 
for the viewing process, among them, the darkness of the cinema 
and the brightness of the screen. Contrary to what Michotte 
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assumed, film is not an exclusively celluloid experience. Today, the 
viewing of a documentary film is not bound to happen exclusively 
or even preponderantly in the cinema venue, and the viewing 
conditions changed in unexpected ways – and keep doing so. 
Resistance documentaries are made with an audience in mind, but 
less with the knowledge of the medium the films are going to be 
shown in. Not rare are the instances when, close to finishing such 
films, documentary makers do not have the distribution secured, 
and without knowing if those films will be shown on TV, or even 
have a DVD release, if they are going to have a cinematic release, 
or if their films will not end up only being watched online, on a 
highway, while the spectator is driving his car to work. And all the 
above modalities of showing the film do not necessarily exclude 
each other. So the securing of attention, and its contribution to 
complex modes of empathic arousing, are dependent on the means 
inside the moving image rather than, as Michotte assumed half a 
century ago, relying solely on the viewing environment conditions.  
There are yet other prerequisites for something as complex 
as role taking to happen. To better understand the mechanism 
behind it, we should return to Noël Carroll’s conclusions. Carroll 
insists, that characters should be morally good and have a variety 
of virtues. In Carroll’s own terminology, it is only then that we can 
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talk about solidarity, that special bond with the morally good (we 
are going to maintain Noël Carroll’s terming here). The spectator 
as innocent bystander can arrive to perceiving the character as 
morally good after a sharing of beliefs, goals, values. The broader, 
more universal those values are, the more appealing to a larger 
audience the character will be. If those common beliefs are made 
clear, and thus unambiguously understood, the spectator is 
increasingly inclined to emotionally react to this commonness.  
Once this type of relationship is established, and solidarity secured, 
the character might show more ambivalent, complex features.  
And we can still be solidary with some morally ambivalent 
characters (and is it not morally questionable what guerrillas, 
insurgents, dissidents often do?) if, as the film scholar suggested, 
the bad are actually very bad.
239
 Or, the way the moral development 
psychologist recommended, “the harm-doer” is put in a more 
sympathetic light, thus reducing negative feelings for a certain 
gesture, and replacing them with empathy-generated feelings. 
As film theory for a long time concluded, starting maybe 
with the work of Balázs, identification with the film characters is 
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facilitated by the seeing from the inside, from the film character’s 
perspective, which allows several degrees of character 
engagement.
240
  In achieving that, documentary makers might at 
first glance seem to have far less creative possibilities than fiction 
directors have at their disposal. Documentary makers, and 
especially those making resistance documentaries, do not always 
have the conditions to calculate all the filmmaking steps, but have 
to be adaptable, and have to improvise on the spot. Filmmaking 
conditions are often so extreme, that there is no possibility to 
properly set a camera, or carry a tripod in a several-days long 
march. This is not entirely bad news since, as Andre Gide’s 
famously remarked, sometimes “art is born on constraint, lives by 
struggle, dies of freedom”.
241
 As we will show in the Part II of the 
current work, proponents of the documentary genre had to invent 
new, creative filmic ways in order to make the experience of seeing 
from the inside possible.  
Storytelling strategies shifting the attention back and forth 
from self focused role taking to other focused role taking, 
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ascertaining characters with a variety of virtues, and ways of 
securing solidarity with them, will be developed upon in Part II.  
 
 
3.4 The Trouble with Empathy: Limitations 
and Biases 
 
 
Opponents to the overall view that empathy can contribute to 
morality might also resist the theses prompted in this work: that 
documentary film means generating empathic feelings in the 
viewer, which might eventually generate a moral behaviour or 
desire to help. Philosophy Professor Jesse Prinz insists that moral 
judgements, which trigger feelings such as anger and disgust, are 
what should be held responsible for our morality, and not our 
empathy.
242
 One argument behind such a radical theses is that 
empathy is prone to biases, that we tend to empathize more with 
the people we are in close relationship to; or we can be 
overwhelmed by emotions and thus not focus on the crime itself. 
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These two reasons, Prinz implies, make empathy an unsuitable tool 
for cross-cultural reception:   
In other words, the dark side of empathy may be intrinsic 
to it, and it may infect our other moral responses. Empathy is not 
a suitable tool for morality. We can no more overcome its limits 
than we can ride a bicycle across the ocean; it is designed for local 
travel.
243
 
Although it would accelerate our task to just overlook such 
arguments altogether, we cannot discharge the quarrels of the 
philosophy scholar: empathy is indeed subject to biases and 
overarousal. Nevertheless, beyond the shortcomings of the fellow 
feeling, evidence abounds – and mounts - that empathy greatly 
contributes to altruistic motivation to help. Arguments are made 
that empathy-generated altruism not only brought us so far 
through evolution but,
244
 as Jeremy Rifkin advanced in his 
monumental work, Empathy and Civilization, that it is only the 
development of the human disposition, throughout time, towards 
global empathy, that might even stop the global entropic 
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downfall.
245
 Rifkin went as far as arguing that it is the current race 
between the development in empathy and entropy that will decide 
between the saving or the perishing of the human species. To 
solve this dilemma, we should fearlessly look now into the dark 
side of empathy.  
 
 
3.4.1 Similarity Bias in Cross-Cultural 
Reception 
 
 
Bias, or rather biases, influence the empathic distress or its 
intensity, and are of two main natures: familiarity bias and here and 
now bias (the very core of the differences between experiencing 
someone else’s through a documentary film viewing, as opposed to 
distress face to face). 
Familiarity should be understood in its general meaning 
here; familiarity is what makes us favour not only family members, 
but also friends, group-members, people who resemble us in some 
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meaningful way - people we are accustomed with, or with whom 
we share some degree of familiarity. Various studies undertook on 
offenders, for example, confirmed that they experienced less guilt 
when the crime was committed against members of another group. 
It is in-group people we are more inclined to empathize with, and 
eventually help (again, group understood in a large sense, of 
religious, national scope, but even people with whom we share the 
same goals, as Noël Carroll remarked).  
Evolutionary theorists argue that familiarity bias might 
have evolutionary reasons, since natural selection made way to 
empathy toward family and in-group members. Krebs made that 
obvious in 1975, with a study on students who were firstly given 
personality tests and were afterwards told they were being paired 
with other students on the basis of computer analyses.
 246
 Some 
were told they were having similar personality profiles with the 
paired students, while others were told the very opposite, that they 
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actually have different personality profiles than their pairs. 
Interestingly enough, those who believed they have a similar 
psychological profile were reporting more pronounced 
psychological response. Even more so for our interests here, those 
who believed themselves as being similar with their pairs reported 
more empathic distress (when the ones they have been paired with, 
for example, were waiting to receive electroshocks).  
This is a core issue for resistance documentaries, which 
address a cross-cultural audience. As I will exemplify in Part II, 
filmmakers try in various creative ways to draw on universal 
features and similarities of some sort, and employ the bias for 
cross-cultural empathy. This does not mean that people should be 
portrayed in films as being all the same, following an ideal recipe. 
But we have seen the role of personal intimate investment from 
the side of the spectator and how important it is to activate this 
mechanism. The Salvadorian Guerrilla in IN THE NAME OF THE 
PEOPLE, who fights for several years in the mountains, does not 
seem to be afraid of the fights, but he is troubled because of his 
mother, whom he misses, who might be sick or even have died. 
And while the average spectator might not really care for the 
fighter in the mountains of the small country with the exotic name, 
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still almost every viewer can have feelings of distress in response to 
the grief of the child for his missed mother.  
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with familiarity bias. It 
is natural to favour people you care a lot about, with whom you 
grew up, and by and large people who have similar concerns with 
those you have. And above all, people still help strangers, as 
research shows (most people in studies are actually strangers). The 
filmmaker only needs to employ the familiarity bias, and invoke 
people’s sensitivity for their own kind in the support of the cross-
cultural empathic reception. 
 
  
3.4.2 When Empathy is too Much: Over 
Arousal and Fatigue  
 
 
The intensity of the empathy-generated feelings is influenced by 
the intensity of the empathic distress. If the empathic distress is 
too weak, then it might be likely that it does not generate prosocial 
action. So what happens if, in order to prevent a frail empathic 
distress through a variety of empathy-generating mechanisms, the 
spectator’s distress becomes too intense? We all know people turn 
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their faces away when a film sequence becomes too gory, or too 
much pain is displayed. What about when the overall situation is 
too painful, or the distress is just too much to sustain?  
The problematic outcome of empathic over-arousal is that 
it can utterly remove the observer out of the empathic mode. 
Martin L. Hoffman defines empathic over-arousal as an 
involuntary process that occurs when an observer’s empathic 
distress becomes so painful and intolerable that it is transformed 
into an intense feeling of personal distress, which may move the 
person out of the empathic mode entirely. 
Hoffman sees the problem emerging from the use of 
multiple modes of empathic awakening, since the combination of 
the outcomes of so many arousal modes could turn the suffering 
of a victim in such a painful experience for the viewer. In other 
words, one imagines oneself in the victim’s situation, leading to 
empathic distress, and on top of that the recollection of traumatic 
events from the spectator’s own past, which in turn lead to 
personal distress – all this pulling the spectator’s attention away 
from the victim – paradoxically sop, since the advantages of many 
modes, and an interplay between them, are evident.  
An appropriate tuning of the empathic package seems to 
be the solution here. Hoffman also postulates that over arousal is a 
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limitation when it comes to situations involving strangers, while 
being an asset when the observer is in a way committed to the 
victim (through work or family bonding, or other sort of 
commitment). This is particularly important for two reasons. 
Firstly, it shows the necessity of carefully choosing the amount and 
types of filmic empathy arousing modes. Further more, in 
documentary films conceived for a distinctively foreign audience, 
the question of over-arousal is very sensitive, as opposed to those 
documentaries having a function in their particular geo-political 
context – which explains why filmmakers so differently approach 
the two directions. And yet again, creating linking contexts, 
providing some universality to the story, enabling the stranger-
spectator to bond with some aspect of the victim’s background, is 
what will increase the chances of empathic connection against the 
odds of over-arousal. This seems to be one constant red thread 
throughout the entirety of filmic empathy theory. 
Following too much empathy there is at least one other, 
very different phenomenon at risk: prolonged exposure to distress, 
over an extended time span, might generate habituation.
247
 If 
                                                 
 
247
 Hoffman (2000) 206–7. 
182 
 
someone is repeatedly exposed to the sufferance of another fellow 
human, the empathic distress will have the tendency to diminish as 
time goes by, “to the point of the person becoming indifferent to 
the victim’s suffering”.
248
  
Hoffman links this empathic self-destructive mechanism to 
a phenomenon that interests us greatly here, in his own terms 
“social reform photography”. There is already a long culture of 
people being exposed to hard breaking lives of others, to refugees 
and victims of dictatorial regimes, victims of famine or natural 
disasters. There is evidence of people who, morally outraged when 
seeing such photos, travelled long distances just to offer help for 
alleviating the suffering of strangers. However, recent experiments 
undertook by Campbell et al. show that the image-generated 
empathic effect has a limited life span.
249
 
In two different experiments, participants were being 
shown impressive (motorcycle stunts) and shocking images 
(billboard of masked Lady Gaga). After repeated exposure to such 
images, participants who already viewed the shocking images many 
times predicted that new participants in the study would react less 
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intensely than they actually reacted, showing that too much 
exposure to other people’s distress can degenerate in an empathic 
gap, or desensitization. Further measurements showed that 
participants were not aware that repeated exposure to these images 
affected their prediction.  
Nevertheless, as much as it is true that prolonged exposure 
to distressful images can lead to desensitization, recent empirical 
findings show that the exposure to such images can also (still) lead 
to empathy and helping. The questionnaire-based study of Prot et 
al,
250
 undertook on people from 7 countries in 4 continents, 
explored the relationship between empathy and helping, on one 
hand, and the use prosocial media (films, TV show and video 
games) on the other hand. Empathy was measured using the 
empathic concern and perspective-taking subscales from Davis’ 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index, described at the beginning of this 
chapter. The results finally showed empirically that the use of 
prosocial media, through the arousal of empathy, prompts long-
term prosocial behaviour.  
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Equally important for us here, the results were similar 
across countries, and the conclusion of the equally international 
research group was that “knowledge of these long-term effects 
may help parents, policymakers, and other concerned citizens 
make decisions about what kind of society they want for the future 
and how to create it”.
251
  
 So even if today, travelling the world to help the distressed 
might sound like a bourgeois luxury, we know that the 
documentary genre constantly reinvents itself, its means and 
stylistics and, as we will see in the last part of the present work, 
even the medium itself, thus fighting habituation, making room for 
empathic feelings and facilitating cross-cultural determination to 
help. It does perform as “sudden, unexpected occurrences that 
create a powerful emotional responses that ‘trigger’ a re-
examination of one’s life choices. This in turn can lead to a new 
moral perspective and sense of social responsibility”.
252
 But, in 
order to achieve that, which filmic means and mechanisms are to 
be employed? 
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Next, in order to come closer to an answer to this 
question, examples from past production of resistance 
documentaries from a wide range of geo-political contexts will be 
brought under scrutiny: films made in the revolutions in Central 
and South America in the 1970s and 1980s, rare productions from 
revolutionary situations in Guatemala, Philippines and Mexico, 
among others, early documentaries from the South African 
apartheid, and films that emerged from the more recent 
revolutions in Eastern Europe and in the Arab World.  
186 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II: 
REVOLUTION – DOCUMENTARY – EMPATHY 
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4 Empathy – With Whom? 
4.1 Empathy for the Group, the Intricate Type 
of Empathy: Case Study: IN THE NAME 
OF THE PEOPLE 
 
 
In 1979, in El Salvador began the “hoped-for swift uprising”
253
, a 
promise for democracy and a better life in a country suffering 
under poverty, inequality and, above all, a country suffering under 
an illegitimate, authoritarian military regime. In the following years, 
however, the “swift uprising” sunk in a bloody civil war. For the 
whole of the 1980s, the Salvadoran government received from the 
United States, under both Carter and Reagan administrations, $ 
4424 million in economic and military aid.
254
 That makes about $ 1 
million for every fiscal year, including “counterinsurgency 
expertise, training and intelligence data. U.S. Marines even are 
reported to have led a number of attacks against the guerrillas”.
255
 
An American intervention was on-going in Central America, and 
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American money was spent there, yet the American citizens knew 
little about who the Salvadoran ‘enemies’, the guerrillas, actually 
were.  
It is not that the American intervention in El Salvador was 
a taboo topic in the United States. On the contrary, it was a 
constant presence in the public discourse and TV broadcasts; only 
that, as the media scholar Pat Aufderheide argued, it was a topic 
surrounded by a profound misapprehension. To make this point 
clear, Aufderheide reviews a 1984 TV Guide analysis of no less 
than 661 TV spots and programs about the conflict. After 
reviewing all of the films, the media scholar concludes: “One ends 
up knowing almost as little about Central America, and why the 
U.S. is involved there, as one knew before”.
256
 Aufderheide argues 
that the misperception was not limited to the role of the U.S. in El 
Salvador, and in Central America; it was a more generalised 
confusion, extended to “the nature and even the geographical 
location of the conflict”.
257
 In the revolutionary years of Central 
America, and especially in the first half of the 1980s, some 
American filmmakers took upon themselves to show the American 
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documentary spectator a less abstract and more humane face of 
this particular, supposedly hostile group: the guerrillas. Two such 
documentary productions from El Salvador, scrutinising the 
empathy for the group, are EL SALVADOR: ANOTHER VIETNAM 
(by Glenn Silber and Tete Vasconcellos) and IN THE NAME OF 
THE PEOPLE (directed by Frank Christopher). Their far-reaching 
distribution and reception in the United States was invigorated by 
the Oscar Nominations, in 1981 and 1984, respectively.  
In the previous chapter it was discussed how one’s 
empathy for a group is the most complex and cognitively 
challenging form of empathic distress. One needs to understand 
the suffering of not only a single human fellow but, grasping social 
concepts, one comprehends the suffering of an entire group of 
people. When empathising with the group, one can be motivated 
to adopt ideologies concerning the alleviation of the group’s 
distress.
 258
 But it is still the empathy for individual members of a 
group, enhanced by the understanding that those individuals 
belong to a larger community, which mainly generates feelings of 
distress for the entire faction. Empirical findings of Batson et al. 
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showed how increasing empathy for a even a member of a 
stigmatized group could improve the positive attitude towards the 
entire group.
259
 Before analysing how that works in film, using the 
El Salvadorian example of IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE, let us 
briefly look at one of these laboratory experiments. 
Batson et al. asked participants to listen to pilot radio 
shows for a possible broadcast, Behind Bars (fake interviews, in 
reality conceived only for the empathy measuring experiments). 
Participants in the test were divided into two sets of respondents. 
In the first set, participants were asked to remain objective; while 
in the other, participants were instructed to imagine how the 
people in the interviews felt like. In the (fictitious) interview, a 
murderer serving a life-sentence was recalling his story, and how 
he got to shoot someone, his feelings and regrets about it. 
Empathy was evaluated based on inquiries where the respondents 
had to asses, on a scale from 1 to 9, statements like Anyone who 
commits murder must be inhuman or Convicted murderers have no one to 
blame but themselves or Our society should do more to rehabilitate and educate 
convicted murderers, and so on. Those participants, who were 
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instructed to imagine how the convict felt like, were reported to 
have higher empathic level than those who were asked to remain 
objective. More important for us here, in a second stage of the 
test, the psychologists assessed the long-term effects of those brief 
instances of empathising: do these transient occurrences of 
empathy influence an overall positive attitude for the stigmatized 
group (in the particular experiment of Batson et al., the convicted 
murderers). One to two weeks after the first stage of the research 
described above, the participants were telephonically contacted for 
a survey. The participants did not know the survey was associated 
with the experiment. Participants were again asked questions about 
convicted murderers. The results proved surprising: even if, after 
the first test, the effects of empathy for a convicted murderer 
showed only a slight change to the positive in the overall attitude 
towards convicted murderers, two weeks later attitudes have 
evolved. Even the participants who did not show much higher 
empathy in the laboratory test changed their attitude towards the 
stigmatised group to the positive, within only two weeks time. 
Batson et al. concluded that it is possible to improve attitudes 
towards a highly stigmatised group, triggering empathy for the 
individual, and that the “empathy-attitude effect is not as short-
192 
 
lived as we had feared. Apparently, it can outlive the empathic 
emotion itself”.
260
 
It is enough evidence to assume that in order to trigger the 
audience’s empathy for the group, in our particular case the rebel 
group, the distinction of singular figures and stories is essential. 
The documentary maker aiming to generate empathic feelings for 
an entire group will, by necessity, develop at least one unique 
character, an individual who is going to be elaborately shaped, 
whose single personality and misfortune is easier to comprehend 
and empathise with. How does the theory transpire in practice? 
A relevant case study is IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE, 
filmed in El Salvador at the beginning of the 1980s. On February 
22nd 1982, Frank Christopher, and his film crew of three, 
clandestinely entered El Salvador and spent about six weeks in 
areas controlled by the guerrillas, mainly around the slopes of the 
Guazapa Volcano, not far away from the capital city of San 
Salvador, and in the northern area bordering Honduras. It took 
Frank Christopher and his team another year and a half to finish 
the film, IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE. The voice over, 
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narrated by Martin Sheen and reminiscent of the APOCALYPSE 
NOW mood, is unambiguous in pointing out the filmmakers’ take 
on the conflict: it is only “in the name of the people” that the 
peasants turned fighters are resisting on the slopes of the volcano, 
it is “in the name of the people” that the guerrillas are fighting the 
bloody El Salvadorian regime backed by the U.S. The intentions of 
the American film-crew are explicit and their partaking 
transparent. IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE had a function, and 
that was to give a voice and a human face to the Salvadorian 
insurgents and make their peril, suffering and struggle 
understandable to the Western audience, mainly the North 
American one.  
Documentary films like this one, emerging from uprising 
contexts and presenting the conflict from the perspective of the 
resistance movements are, evidently, considered offensive in the 
countries where they were filmed, and are often banned. They are, 
though, commonly produced with a foreign audience in mind, and 
from early on in the production process, these films carry the very 
function of informing and moving an audience from outside the 
conflict zone or group, aiming to generate cross-cultural empathy 
or cross-group empathy. 
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  For the particular group in our case study (North 
American film audience at the beginning of the 1980s), the 
association between Latin American interventions and the 
Vietnam War was pervasive. Several films, both documentaries and 
fiction, were contributing to making it difficult for the American 
public to forget the Vietnam War aftermath. Francis Ford 
Coppolla’s APOCALYPSE NOW was particularly popular, and 
increased the popularity of its leading actor, Martin Sheen.
261
 So it 
is not far fetched to assume that the use of Martin Sheen’s 
narration must have produced bitter associations in the minds of 
many filmgoers. The aftermath of the fiasco in Vietnam made way 
in the United States for the so-called “Vietnam syndrome”, and to 
the ubiquity of questioning the use and the morals behind 
supporting foreign regimes to fight communist opposition.
262
 
Hinting on the Vietnam War legacy was rather the norm than the 
exception in the filmic narrative of Latin America in general, and 
El Salvador in particular. Glenn Silber and Tete Vasconcellos 
overtly titled their film EL SALVADOR: ANOTHER VIETNAM? 
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(1981), which commences by using the same title, followed by an 
unequivocal question mark. 
It is mainly for the above-described, large audience, that 
IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE was made, in a very different 
manner to the TV-style approach and its claim to objectivity. It 
must, however, be briefly pointed out here that the film had its 
various layers of interest to a smaller, more informed audience, and 
that is communicated from the very beginning, through the title. 
For the large audience, the title refers to the guerrilla resistance of 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN),
263
 which 
formed in the Civil War years, between 1980 and 1992, the 
umbrella organization for the principal five guerrilla fighting 
groups. We see the human dimension of some of them who, “in 
the name of the people”, are resisting and fighting from the slopes 
of the volcano. But the more informed audience might read IN 
THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE as a reference to the routine 
political killings in El Salvador and the celebrated speech by the 
Salvadorian Archbishop Oscar Romero. Archbishop Romero gave 
the celebrated speech on the 23rd of March 1980, the day before 
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his assassination, when he begged the government to cease the 
massacres in the name of the people: “In the name of God, in the name 
of this suffering people whose cries rise to heaven more loudly 
each day, I implore you, I beg you, I order you in the name of 
God: stop the repression”.
264
 
But the background and historical information, and the 
complex matters of armed conflict and politics in San Salvador are 
only very briefly presented, since the focus of director Frank 
Christopher is on the individual human portraits, assembled in the 
group picture, almost like a family photo of the FMLN.  
How, then, can the problem of the complex and 
cognitively challenging empathy be solved: imagining and feeling 
for the faceless inhabitants of a far away land, about whom the 
distant spectator has perhaps heard of in geography classes, or 
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maybe even never before? The editing in the opening scene of IN 
THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE underlines similar implications, 
namely that distant, faceless populations are hard to place or grasp, 
and even harder to trigger empathic distress for. 
 
 
Figure ‎4.1 Map of El Salvador, including the regions 
controlled by the guerrillas. Inserted in IN THE NAME OF THE 
PEOPLE (1985). 
 
In the very first seconds of the film, the text caption promptly 
introduces the matter at stake, which might wake the interest of 
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the American audience: “Since 1980, the United States spent one 
billion dollars to prevent guerrillas from coming to power in El 
Salvador”.
265
 To complete the picture, the opening scene of the 
film is the detailed shot of a map of Central America. The implied 
question appears obvious: but where exactly is El Salvador? A long 
zoom in slowly drags the gaze up to the tiny spot on the map, as if 
to point out the weakness, smallness and fragility of the thus 
discovered country. What is theoretically an overused artifice for 
placing the action, the zoom in on the map detail, serves the 
purpose here. On the other hand, it speaks for itself of the 
presupposed obliviousness of the supposed spectator, who 
presumably would not have been able to find this tiny spot on the 
map without the help of the camera lens’ movement. Once El 
Salvador is finally a big graphic contour on the screen, the zoom in 
stops, and the very next shot is a general take of mountain 
landscape, thus building up on the sense of the location of the 
insurgents’ nest; concise, distressing background information 
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about FMLN guerrillas is delivered by a reliable, familiar 
commentator: Martin Sheen’s voice over.  
 
 
Figure ‎4.2 IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE (1985). 
 
What follows is a key sequence: a group shot that will again be 
used to end the film. It is a gathering in en plein air, showing the 
guerrilla men, women and children while keeping a moment of 
silence for their comrades, friends and families, the guerrillas who 
already died in battle. For the spectator, the opening sequence is a 
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commemoration for faceless, nameless, identity-less people, 
FMLN insurgents with exotic names, from the mountains of a 
small country in Central America – it could have been the 
commemoration of any dead individuals, anywhere. However, at 
the end of the 75 minutes of the film, after the spectator “gets to 
know” (as Martin Sheen’s voice puts it) some of the insurgents, the 
“moment of silence” scene is shown once more, and this time the 
spectator’s attitude towards the group will most probably be 
different. Customarily, when the central character’s construction 
follows the narrative of the revolution per se, the resistance 
documentaries are mainly made around a well-portrayed, 
charismatic revolutionary fighter: the leader of masses, the 
romantic hero. Charismatic or popular figures of the political 
movement are also, in their turn, popularly used main figures of 
the documentaries portraying the movements (Fidel Castro or 
Salvador Allende). Social media development enabled another type 
of leader to step in front of the resistance. Without the need of 
established media to build one’s self-image and get the message 
across, new types of ideological heroes emerged, like 
Subcomandante Marcos in Las Chiapas, Mexico; documentary 
makers made fruitful film characters out of these already-
constructed images, too. 
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But the leader is not always the obvious choice for the 
leading documentary figure. IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE puts 
forward several characters, other than the leaders, which are slowly 
rendered prominent. Some are roles, parts, jobs or positions in the 
revolution narrative: “the oldest fighter”, the toothless elderly 
insurgent who, at the age of 61, took up arms in the memory of his 
grandfather who fought in the bloody, aborted Salvadoran 
rebellion in 1932.  
In Frank Christopher’s documentary, the ordinary San 
Salvadorians in the resistance are given faces, and names – Camilo, 
Julia, Nico, Jeremia, Oscar – and reveal in front of the camera 
unique personalities. The film is structured around a few core 
sequences, describing aspects of the fight: the insurgents preparing 
an attack, the transport of supplies from one guerrilla-controlled 
territory to another, the nursing of the wounded, or conveying 
hidden messages and intercepting radio transmissions. Death is a 
constant occurrence: the diseased are being talked about, 
displayed, and the threat of death is all around, in almost every 
shot. And in between these death-striking scenes, the insurgents 
cook, and wash, or even get married in a surreal ceremony. It is 
Camilo, Jeremia, Nico, Julia that we get to see washing themselves 
by the river, dancing at a wedding party or preparing for an attack 
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on the government forces. Their names and faces are constantly 
reminded to the viewer. 
Nico, a 12-year-old boy, is the character receiving most 
time in the economy of the film. Nico joined the insurgents after 
his mother was raped and killed in front of his eyes (“They had her 
for five minutes and they put two bullets in her head”). Now, he 
learns how to use a gun while serving, like other boys, as a 
messenger for the various groups, transporting written messages 
on the back of his belt from one camp to the other. As the 
storyline advances, the names and faces of the same characters 
(Camilo, Jeremia, Nico, Julia) become constant presences. 
And it is their names and faces that are shown once more, 
at the very end of the film, this time in some sort of group 
obituary. The keeping a moment of silence for the comrades who died 
or disappeared is the sequence which opened the film. It is 
repeated here, as a closing sequence, but with a difference. This 
time, in the middle of the “moment of silence”, shots shown 
previously throughout the 70 minutes film are sketchily inserted. 
Oscar taking the hand of his new wife, Jeremia in the fight, trying 
to recover the rifle from a corpse. Martin Sheen’s voice explains 
the unthinkable: “Some of the people you have got to know have 
been killed, or disappeared”. After the inserts, a cut returns the 
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viewers to the forest, at the obituary scene, now already familiar, 
and its ritual predictable: the fists in the air, guns in the left hand 
and the moment of silence (Fig 4.4). When the same scene was 
shown at the beginning of the film, the moment of silence, kept 
for the dead and disappeared without names or faces, couldn’t 
have meant much for the documentary spectator. But seeing it 
again at the very end, after “getting to know” some of the people, 
the spectator’s experience is meant to be, this time, entirely 
different. 
 
Figure ‎4.3 Interview with Nico. Footage included in IN THE 
NAME OF THE PEOPLE (1985). 
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It is not for faceless, identity-less people who were killed or 
disappeared, and who are thus commemorated, that one is 
mourning, but people with a name, a past, thoughts – identities. 
Furthermore, while the initial experience is an outside look, a point 
on the map and a moment of silence for faceless dead, now even 
the spectator’s position in regards to the events in the film frame is 
changed. 
 
 
Figure ‎4.4 IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE (1985). 
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The long zoom in on the El Salvador map the movie starts with, 
has been, at the end of 70 minutes film, zoomed in to the smallest 
detail, that of the individual, since the spectator is no longer just an 
observer, but a participant in the moment of silence for the people 
whom he or she “got to know”. This moment of silence is this 
time a particular, shared experience between insurgents and 
spectator. Both insurgents and spectators “have got to know” 
Camilo, Julia, Oscar, Jeremia. The spectator, for once, in this 
moment of silence, is part of the insurgent crowd. The resolution 
is not entirely bleak: the name of the most attaching character, the 
one who received more time in the economy of the film, the 12 
year old Nico, expected doubtlessly with unease by some 
spectators, is not uttered – meaning he is still alive. If empathic 
feelings are secured for the individuals, for characters like Jeremia 
and Oscar, it then extends to what in the United States was the 
“stigmatized group” of the FMLN. The peasants turned fighters in 
El Salvador, and the understanding of the enormous number of 
casualties in El Salvador is supposed to be differently perceived. 
The next issue to be discussed is how exactly empathy for the 
individual is secured in the first place. 
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4.2 Universal, Yet Distinct: Constructing 
Rigoberta Menchú in WHEN THE 
MOUNTAINS TREMBLE 
 
 
When we were appointed to form the CEH (i.e. Comisión para el 
Esclarecimiento Histórico or Commission of Historical Clarification), 
each of us, through different routes and all by life's fortune, knew in 
general terms the outline of events. As Guatemalans, two of us had 
lived the entire tragedy on our native soil, and in one way or another, 
had suffered it. However, none of us could have imagined the full 
horror and magnitude of what actually happened. 
             – Report of The Commission of Historical Clarification in 
Guatemala, 1999266 
 
Drawing on David Hume and Adam Smith, the philosopher 
Richard Rorty insisted that “sad and sentimental stories”
267
 are 
essential in the fields of human rights, since they have the property 
to make people extend the “circle of the we” to yet other human 
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beings, identifying them as belonging to the same group – which 
simply steers people towards not treating the others bad, and help 
them if their rights have been crushed. But “sad and sentimental 
stories” are more sensitive to controversy, accuses of one-
sidedness or inaccuracies – and this is something the genres of 
human rights reports, testimonies and documentary films have in 
common.  
Diversity in the construction of film characters charms the 
documentary spectator, but we have seen how universal features 
can activate several modes of triggering empathy, and mobilizes 
the familiarity bias in favour of the empathic process. Noël Carroll 
also added “morality of the fairly generic sort”, the one which will 
appeal to a wide, diverse audience. We know by now that empathy 
is amplified when a person in need is similar to the observer, 
deriving in an increased tendency to help that person in need.
268
 
Before anything else, however, behind the face and the 
name of documentary characters, the people we see in 
documentary films are real people, leading their very particular 
lives in the real world. Preserving their diversity, and in the same 
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time underlining universal features for which the spectator can 
have a sort of familiar understanding, while still maintaining a 
truthful account, is the task, makers of resistance documentaries 
seem to take upon themselves.  
The task, as said, is not only that of filmmakers alone; it is 
an underlying thread in the human rights domain, and in different 
written and filmed genres, where one core objective is that of 
mobilizing empathy. The question prevails, from the very personal 
styles of biographies, to the genres characterised by fact-based 
non-emotional writing of human rights reports, which are put 
together by truth commissions and NGOs: how to present both 
the diverse and universal sides of the human story, while 
objectively preserving the facts? Let us briefly look at another of 
the many endeavours concerned with such questions.  
After having worked on human rights reports in Israel, 
Ron Dudai describes a similar issue in his domain, where the 
debate on how to generate the reader’s empathy rests between 
relying entirely on data and forensic or stockpiling details, or 
incorporating testimonies of victims and eye witnesses, alongside 
personal narratives. The dilemma lies in whether the storytelling 
will actually limit the reader’s emotional involvement or, on the 
209 
 
contrary, the legal language is the one unsuited for creating 
identification with the victims and generating empathy:  
The use of such testimonies allows the creation of a richer 
scene, beyond the statistics and legal rules. The victims are 
identified by name, as well as other personal details such as 
age, gender, and occupation, and they locate the event that 
the authors describe as “human rights violation” within a 
broader personal narrative. With this, the testimonies can 
help generate empathy.
269
 
Dudai’s point is that, since the aim of those reports is, also, to 
render the readers active in the fight against human rights abuses, 
and because empathy plays a key role in this endeavour, then the 
ideal version is a combination of the two: the highly reliable 
forensic data, and empathy-generating personal testimonies. The 
writing of human rights violation reports does not have to be bad 
writing, Dudai argues, striped of human presence or political 
context, and successful examples exist of a mixture of scientific 
data and background information creatively inserted. The report of 
the Argentinian Truth Commission, Nunca Más, where the novelist 
Ernesto Sabato was invited to join the team, has become a 
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bestseller and was regularly reprinted since 1984.
270
  The 
Guatemalan Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification, 
Memory of Silence, is also given as a positive, original example for the 
rich explanatory background that it provided on human rights 
violations there.
271
  Even if the authors of the Guatemalan Report 
deliberately avoid identifying the multiple partakers in the conflict, 
Rigoberta Menchú’s name could not have been left out: “1992: 
New impetus to the Mayan movement, after Rigoberta Menchú 
Tum is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize”.
272
 
Ten years prior to her becoming the first Indian woman 
holding a Nobel Peace Prize, the Guatemalan Rigoberta Menchú 
appeared as a leading character in the revolutionary documentary 
WHEN THE MOUNTAINS TREMBLE (directed by Thomas Sigel 
and Pamela Yates). Menchú’s part in this film is a fruitful example 
for studying the sensitivity of the various sides of character 
construction, diverse but still universal, morally “of a fairly generic 
sort”, credible but “sad and sentimental”, as Rorty puts it. 
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Figure ‎4.5 Rigoberta Menchú awarded the Nobel Prize. 
Footage included in GRANITO: HOW TO NAIL A DICTATOR 
(2011). 
 
Rigoberta Menchú lost her family in brutal ways, in the 
most violent years of the Guatemalan civil war (1978-1985), and 
took the path of exile, where she started campaigning for the rights 
of Guatemala’s indigenous people.
273
 Starting 1999, she was a 
subject of controversy and her Nobel Price contested for some 
fictitious elements in her autobiography.
274
 Some of these 
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elements, which, in the vernacular, one would say “give colour” to 
the character, and which generated such controversies,
275
 appear in 
the documentary film she features in, WHEN THE MOUNTAINS 
TREMBLE, one of the two US documentary productions which 
are linked to the Guatemalan genocide, and the evidencing of it. 
The two documentary films, WHEN THE MOUNTAINS 
TREMBLE and GRANITO: HOW TO NAIL A DICTATOR are 
realised by the same filmmaking team, but not earlier than 30 years 
apart, and are very different from each other. WHEN THE 
MOUNTAINS TREMBLE (1983) brings a very complex picture of 
the background and reasons behind the rise of the guerrilla 
movements in Guatemala: the large support of the population 
living in an endemic poverty and the brutal repression of the US-
supported Guatemalan government. Some 25 years later, the 
directors commence a second, very personal film on Guatemalan 
genocide, GRANITO: HOW TO NAIL A DICTATOR, following the 
complex mechanisms behind the international trial, where the first 
film, WHEN THE MOUNTAINS TREMBLE, is presented as 
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evidence in court.
276
 Hundreds of thousands of people have been 
killed in Guatemala, and in 1982 Pamela Yates was filming the very 
sharp edges of this crime.
 277
  
 
 
Figure ‎4.6 Looking for evidence against Ríos Montt in WHEN 
THE MOUNTAINS TREMBLE (1983). Footage included in 
GRANITO: HOW TO NAIL A DICTATOR (2011). 
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“I didn’t know I was filming a genocide”, a candid filmmaker Pam 
Yates says in GRANITO, reflecting on her work, the footage from 
the first Guatemalan film, and the stories which determined its 
creation. Looking back at her 1982 film, with the evidence-
informed eyes of the present, Pamela Yates’ self-reflexive remark 
seems too humble: there are many layers of a very complicated 
reality in the making, which did actually emerge from WHEN THE 
MOUNTAINS TREMBLE.  
The two filmmakers, Pamela Yates (who was also 
recording the sound) and cinematographer Peter Sigel, filmed in 
Guatemala at the beginning of 1982, a time of turmoil which is 
difficult, if not impossible to evaluate and give a verdict for while 
being in the middle of. It was exactly the time when guerrilla 
groups just united under Guatemalan National Revolutionary 
Unity (URNG), a time of elections fraud, army coup d’état 
replacing one president with another, state of siege declared and 
the savage repression against civilian population intensified.
278
 
Even if, later on, Pamela Yates said she was not entirely aware of 
what exactly she was filming, a lot of the Guatemalan realities are 
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very visible in Yates’ and Segal’s WHEN THE MOUNTAINS 
TREMBLE, in a visually sophisticated way: the landownership 
limited to a very small segment of the population, which 
contributed to the endemic poverty, landlessness leading to urban 
migration, the authoritarianism of the U.S.-backed military regime, 
even the complicated role of the catholic church, with the 
liberation theology influencing the revolutionary movement, they 
all come through with precision in the 1982 documentary. 
The team filmed with the state military, spontaneously 
embarking in a helicopter throwing anti-guerrilla leaflets. On the 
other hand, the filmmakers had an extraordinary access to the 
guerrilla base camps, and the civilian population supporting it. The 
savage repression which was growing as they were filming is given 
evidence through complex editing. The amount of information 
encompassed in WHEN THE MOUNTAINS TREMBLE is very 
ambitious: in the 83 minutes of the film, the timeline slowly and 
with clarity advances from the 1954 CIA-sponsored overthrowing 
of the democratic, reform-oriented president Arbenz, all the way 
to the hype of the civil war, at the beginning of the 1980s. 
Films from Guatemala were rare at the time, even if the 
beginning of the 1980s was a period when, generally speaking, 
more films from Central America were making their way to 
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cinemas, televisions, but also to educational and church screenings 
in the United States.
279
  American and European filmmakers were 
increasingly present there, but meanwhile, following the Cuban 
example, the local filmmaking production started to emerge. On 
the 22nd of September 1979, right after the revolutionary Sandinista 
victory, INCINE (Nicaraguan Institute of Cinema) was constituted 
through governmental decree; the Film Institute of Revolutionary 
El Salvador, and the Collective Cero á la Izquierda (Zero on the 
Left) were also delivering films to the United States. It was not, 
however, the case with Guatemala, the country where state 
violence was the “most deadly in the region”.
280
 WHEN THE 
MOUNTAINS TREMBLE was at the time an exceptionally 
uncommon opportunity to see a documentary film on the 
Guatemalan conflict. Considering the obviously precarious and 
frantic conditions in which it was filmed, it is equally surprising 
that it presents a sharp picture of those days, while at the same 
time it is made out of high-quality material, with beautifully 
elaborated filmic sequences. 
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Some of the scenes captured are visual documents of 
crimes against humanity – especially the impressive funeral of Luis 
Godoy, abducted by police forces, and then discovered the next 
morning, his throat slashed. In the narrative of the film, this 
funeral sequence builds on how ordinary citizens like Louis Godoy 
could have been associated with activists in opposition 
organisation, even if they were not at all a member of any, and 
suffer repercussions, and how that infuriated friends, family 
members, neighbors, who, in their outrage, truly went to join the 
guerrillas. The intensity grows towards the end of the film, when a 
unique aftermath of a massacre is shown, with mourners around 
the corpses on the ground.  
With all the above, however, the film would have been, 
maybe highly qualitative, informing and with a document-value, 
but it would not have had the empathy generating property it does 
evidently have. There is an extra element, a solution that came as a 
radical break in style, later in the editing process.
281
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with a 24-year-old Guatemalan Indian was recorded in a studio 
and split into thirteen inserts, distributed throughout the film. The 
young Guatemalan woman, whose family had fallen victim to the 
brutality of the regime, was Rigoberta Menchú, who was awarded 
with the Nobel Peace Prize ten years later, but who at that time, as 
a film reviewer from the New York Times remarked, was still 
simply “a young peasant woman”.
282
 The filming style, the content 
of the confession and the way this is structured throughout the 
film, all contribute to securing empathy for a familiar, yet very 
particular young woman, and help the spectator to get close to one 
of the many victims of the Guatemalan regime. 
The statements made in front of the camera by Rigoberta 
Menchú are contrasting not only in style, but also in tempo, with 
the rest of the film. All the rest, including originally shot footage 
from Guatemala, television archive material with dramatic 
moments, the sit-down interviews with the president, and even the 
two re-enactment scenes have a sense of urgency, of filming on the 
run, in a hurry. It is a very dense filmic material, and the level of 
details is overwhelming: either a lot is happening in the picture 
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itself, or the editing is fast, or the camera work is frenetic in trying 
to capture as much as possible from the unique instances 
unfolding in front of it. In contrast, Menchú’s parts are filmed with 
studio lighting and have the slow pace a confession requires.  
Right after the opening credits, Rigoberta Menchú 
introduces the story of the film by introducing herself in a very 
formal way, but with an integrated final punch: “My name is 
Rigoberta Menchú. I am a Quiché Indian from Guatemala. I am a 
peasant and Christian, and one of the last of my family”. She 
identifies herself as being the storyteller of the film, looks into the 
camera, addresses the viewer directly and promises to provide the 
larger frame to the picture: “I am going to tell you a story, which is 
the story of all the Guatemalan people”. 
Rigoberta Menchú wears her colourful Mayan traditional 
costume and, placed on a black background, she is rendered very 
present not only in the frame, but she has a constant, dominant 
presence in the entire film, right from its very beginning. She is 
actually narrating not only her personal story, but she comments 
on the political context and even on the film footage, on what the 
viewers actually see. 
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Figure ‎4.7 Interview with Rigoberta Menchú in WHEN THE 
MOUNTAINS TREMBLE (1983). 
 
This dominant feeling she conveys is actually surprising when one 
analyses WHEN THE MOUNTAINS TREMBLE in some detail. 
Surprising I say, because in the actual economy of the film, 
Rigoberta’s interventions occupy limited time: out of the film’s 83 
minutes, Rigoberta talks a total of a bit more than five minutes, 
distributed in thirteen inserts throughout the entire movie.  
Nine out of the thirteen interventions are all inserted at the 
beginning of the film, in the first 20 minutes, when the focus is on 
her personal story: her childhood as a peasant in the mountains of 
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Guatemala, the family being forced to work for the big, abusive 
landowners, in the foreground of an undemocratic regime. 
Rigoberta’s testimony does not include big words, neither does she 
break apart in front of the camera when reminiscing painful, 
intimate memories. Her contained voice, pace, and choice of 
words are rather taken from a human rights report avant la lettre. 
When, for example, she talks about how the family was fired, 
without being paid, only for attending the funeral of the two little 
brothers, she limits herself to credible elements: to describing the 
circumstances and facts. But when describing those circumstances 
(one little boy dying because of malnutrition, and the other while 
working the fields) the viewer is shown powerful images, with a 
little boy on the cotton plantation, while watched over by armed 
guards. Several things are thus achieved: the balanced testimony 
assures credibility, while the support of the images enables the 
viewer’s imagination and opens a sympathetic bond with the young 
woman telling the story.  
The drama escalates with two more such stories in the first 
20 minutes of the film. One reason that makes Rigoberta Menchú 
such an effective documentary character, and makes her written 
testimony so successful, is that her own biography is closely linked 
to key tragic moments of the recent history of Guatemala. The 
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circumstances in which some of her family members have died are 
key moments in the rise of the resistance movement. One of them 
is the occupation of the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City in 
January 1980, with which a group of peasants from El Quiché 
tried to attract international attention, demanding the investigation 
of the abuses of the military.
283
 On governmental orders, the 
embassy was set on fire, and everybody in the building was burned 
alive. Among the victims – Rigoberta’s father.
284
  Her balanced 
testimony, and archive images from the tragedy, facilitate the 
connection on behalf of the viewer: a long steady shot on one of 
the cremated silhouettes (and a very long shot in comparison with 
the shot lengths in this film, too) render it obvious, that the 
cremated silhouette belonged, or could have belonged to 
Rigoberta’s father, or that the silhouette gruesomely shown at 
length was somebody’s father. 
One more of Rigoberta’s family’s agonies unfolds in the 
first 20 minutes of the film. In the department of El Quiché, her 
place of origin, numerous cooperative leaders were killed at the 
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end of the 1970s.
285
 Rigoberta’s younger brother, the leader of a 
small agricultural cooperative, was among them. A distinct such 
episode was a public killing in Chajul main square, in El Quiché, 
where, after a show trial, soldiers executed community leaders 
(supposed guerrilla leaders) – Rigoberta’s brother allegedly among 
them. One was even set on fire, and later all bodies were thrown in 
a common grave.
286
 Rigoberta tells the story from Chajul with the 
same reserved tone, and limiting herself to details, describing how 
the men were tortured, amputated, eyes and ears removed. She 
reminisces it from the perspective of an eye-witness (later on, in 
the controversial account of David Stoll, she was criticised for 
inaccuracy, for she was not seen in Chajul Plaza when that tragic 
event happened, or that the bodies did not show as many signs of 
torture as she described).
287
 When describing the amputated body 
of her brother, it is the only moment where her voice is slightly 
shaking, and when some room for displaying emotion is allowed. 
After the first 20 minutes of the documentary, once the emotional 
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bond between the spectator and Rigoberta is ensured, and 
alongside this connection, the interest and emotional disposition 
for the Guatemalan people, the focus of the film partially shifts 
away from her persona, and disperses towards several other 
personal stories. The empathic bond is extended with other 
shattering stories of Guatemalan people, while expert interviews 
maintain the level of trust and credibility of WHEN THE 
MOUNTAINS TREMBLE.  
 
 
Figure ‎4.8 Interview with young guerrillas. Footage included 
in WHEN THE MOUNTAINS TREMBLE (1983). 
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A later intervention of Rigoberta is meant to extend the empathic 
bond to the guerrillas themselves.
288
 Up to this point, Rigoberta 
explains how radicalization was the only path left for the orphans, 
and everybody for that matter.
289
 Finally, in the tragic family 
portrait, but with the very same content, tempered voice, and 
sticking solely to facts, Rigoberta brings up into the discourse her 
only relatives left alive, her sisters. The sisters are however absent 
from the picture, since they took up arms, and subsequently lost 
track of each other. The sequence immediately following 
Rigoberta’s portrayal of the sisters shows a few young girls in the 
guerrilla camp, endearing and optimistic, and the association is 
inescapable, almost manifest: some survivor from the Menchú 
family, about whom the spectator cares by now, might be in that 
guerrilla camp. The armed girls comb their hair, sew, giggle, and 
talk about how easy life would be after the victory. The building up 
of such connections, commonly understood in patterns like not 
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knowing about a dear one, on the background of a fact-based report 
on crimes, bring human care to the realm of human rights.  
WHEN THE MOUNTAINS TREMBLE ends on a positive 
tone, which unfortunately was not a fulfilling prophecy for the 
Guatemalan reality: “In 1988, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs 
placed Guatemala at the top of its list of Latin American countries 
with the most human rights violations”.
290
 But it is a very fruitful 
example of how to bring up the human side behind the human 
rights issues, without compromising neither credibility, nor the 
empathic effect. 
Even today, the two films seen together (WHEN THE 
MOUNTAINS TREMBLE, 1983 and the one reflecting on the first, 
GRANITO: HOW TO NAIL A DICTATOR, 2011) could give faces 
to the victims, and make possible the empathic process, in 
providing the reader of the Report of the Commission of 
Historical Clarification with some of “the full horror and 
magnitude of what actually happened”.
291
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5 How to Trigger Empathy? 
5.1 Choosing of a Face: The Importance of 
Close-ups 
 
 
In the western world it is the face, the facial expression, Hermann 
Kappelhoff convincingly argues in his essay “Bühne der 
Empfindungen, Leinwand der Emotionen – das bürgerliche 
Gesicht”, that represents the main focus point of the affective 
interactions we have with the world around us: 
Es ist der Raum der Empfindungen des Zuschauers, seines 
sinnlichen, affektiven und libidinösen Verwobenseins mit der 
Welt. Das Aggregat dieses affektiven Weltbezugs ist für uns 
in der westlichen Kultur das Gesicht.
292
  
Research in the field of psychology, resumed in the third chapter 
of the current work, confirms Kappelhoff’s claim, but with a 
difference: this is not solely the case for the western world alone, 
but rather faces are universal expressions of feelings. In some of 
the earliest movies clandestinely coming out of apartheid South 
                                                 
 
292
 Kappelhoff (2001), 34. 
228 
 
Africa, it will be shown later in this chapter, facial expressions were 
some of the only resources filmmakers had at their disposal in 
order to trigger an empathic response from a distant audience. 
When films were made in covert, tough conditions, with no 
synchronous sound recorded on location, among other 
shortcomings, the choice of expressive faces and their placement 
in the economy of the documentary represented a precious filmic 
apparatus.  
Evidence reviewed by Martin Hoffman and discussed in 
chapter 3 suggests that the connection between our facial 
expressions and certain principal emotions and facial expression 
are universal, and not culturally determined. Only in a later stage of 
the evaluation of somebody else’s face, these basic emotions 
(corresponding to some basic facial expressions) are then 
elaborated in particular cultural and social contexts.
293
  
Mimicry was first described by Adam Smith, but it received 
proper empirical consideration only in the 1980s and 1990s, with 
the employment, in the research of empathy, of electromyographic 
procedures (EMG). The EMG measurements of mainly facial skin 
                                                 
 
293
 Hoffman (2000), 42. 
229 
 
(wrinkles and lines) and lip movements, as fine as not to be 
perceptible to the naked eye, could thus undoubtedly state what 
was already observed by the moral philosophers since the 18th 
century: mimicry, or motor mimicry, is a human innate and 
involuntary inclination to imitate somebody else’s facial (but also 
bodily, vocal) expression of feeling, and thus render one to 
experience something of what the other is feeling. Through 
mimicry, people show understanding, interest, and participation, as 
Bavelas et al. indicated: “By immediately displaying a reaction 
appropriate to the other’s situation (e.g., a wince for the other’s 
pain), the observer conveys precisely and eloquently both 
awareness of and involvement with the other’s situation”.
294
 
Therefore, mimicry is a mechanism that, once activated, 
contributes to our helping of other people. As Martin Hoffman 
insisted: “Intuitively it [mimicry] appears to be the very essence of 
empathy”.
295
 
Mimicry is a key element in studying the empathic effect of 
documentary films. It is not only present in face-to-face 
encounters, but also in the distress experienced when viewing 
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images, both still and in motion: laboratory experiments which 
employed EMG and presented subjects with filmed clips show 
that this is indeed the case.
296
 In film, facial expressions are 
empathised through the use of a certain shot distance, when the 
human body is framed from shoulders up – the close up.  
To come back to our case in point, there is a close liaison 
between the harsh production means the apartheid opponents had 
at their disposal when making their films in the early 1970s, and 
the creative means of expression emerging precisely out of these 
shortcomings. In some of these films, we will see, the use of close 
ups was one of the few resources filmmakers resorted to, in order 
to build up a stable emotional bond between distant, non-western 
characters, and an invisible audience. Later on, in the 1980s, amidst 
the harsh control and censorship of the Pretoria regime, several 
important films showing the South African realities were being 
seen all over the world. The situation was however different before 
the 1980s, when films revealing the realities of apartheid to an 
audience outside the South African borders were an exceptional 
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encounter.
297
 Following the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960, the most 
active anti-apartheid organisations, amongst them the African 
National Congress (ANC) and Pan-African Congress of Azania 
(PAC), had been banned in South Africa. Members of the PAC, in 
exile, together with other black and white South Africans and 
British filmmakers produced, under the umbrella of the newly 
created Morena Films, two important documentaries. The films 
were shot secretly in South Africa and assembled in London: END 
OF THE DIALOGUE (PHELA NDABA, 1970) and LAST GRAVE AT 
DIMBAZA (1974). 
The documentaries were illegally filmed in South Africa 
and as such, a small budget and huge production shortcomings led 
to the meaningful use of this aforementioned device – well framed 
close-ups: the only way of triggering the empathic response the 
makers hoped for when, as the documentary film historian Erik 
Barnouw put it, they smuggled the films “to the outside world with 
vivid revelations about apartheid”.
298
 
The makers from Morena were, in the best cases, film 
students; however, many were previously not at all trained in film 
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and, as one critic wrote in 1976, “training was done on the job, 
under the most adverse conditions imaginable”.
299
 Thus, and for 
this purpose, shortcomings could be turned into advantages, such 
as the fact that “black South Africans, of course, are not allowed to 
make political Films in their country”.
300
 Describing the 
production circumstances, one of the filmmakers, Nelson ‘Nana’ 
Mahomo, noted in an interview from 1976: “One asset in our 
favour is that normally white South Africans don’t see black 
people, and if a black person is carrying a camera, he is regarded 
just as a labourer, carrying it for his white master”.  
Both END OF THE DIALOGUE and LAST GRAVE AT 
DIMBAZA have been shown throughout Europe and North 
America, being reviewed by critics as “stark, unadorned, and 
horrifyingly direct”.
301
 END OF THE DIALOGUE was screened at 
important festivals and received awards around the world: Golden 
Dove Award at Leipzig Film Festival, Golden Surreal Award from 
the Netherlands Film Institute, The Jury Prize at Oberhausen Film 
Festival, and even an Emmy Award. LAST GRAVE AT DIMBAZA 
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has been aired several times on British, Canadian, and American 
Public Television (October 1975).
302
  
On one hand, the success of the Morena Films brought the 
prediction of the French film historian George Sadoul to an end. 
At the beginning of the 1960s, Sadoul was both infuriated and 
hopeful about the cinema’s state in Africa – or rather lack thereof: 
“In the 1960, sixty-five years after the invention of the cinema 
(…)”, the French film historian was complaining, “200 million 
human beings have thus been denied the most advanced form of 
the most modern of arts. I am persuaded that before the ‘sixties’ 
are out, this scandal will be no more than an evil memory”.
303
 
With the Morena Group, founded in 1969, Sadoul’s reason 
for concern announced its well-timed ending. As political scientist 
Patrick O’Meare noted in his review on END OF THE DIALOGUE 
and LAST GRAVE AT DIMBAZA, published in the film magazine 
Jump Cut: “it was already apparent that the technically proficient 
and sophisticated South African government films were being 
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challenged by an equally proficient and sophisticated film made by 
an African”.
304
 For one of the authors of the films, the first-time 
filmmaker from Morena Group, Nelson ‘Nana’ Mahomo, the main 
ambition was not to contribute to the belated birth of an African 
cinema. 
 
 
Figure ‎5.1 END OF DIALOGUE (1970). 
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For Mahomo, the purpose of the films was clear and 
unsophisticated: to disclose the realities of the apartheid South 
Africa. An exiled member of PAC’s executive committee, he came 
across the idea of revolutionary films when, while actively working 
in exposing the situation in South Africa, he experienced 
scepticism and even distrust from the American and European 
public. He saw filmmaking as a long-term strategy to alert the civil 
society abroad, in countries which in time might have had a say in 
the Black struggle for civic rights.
 305
 END OF THE DIALOGUE and 
LAST GRAVE AT DIMBAZA are both simple in their means and 
powerful in effect. END OF THE DIALOGUE is a rhythmic 
montage, alternating between still and moving images, between 
black and white and colour, and between contrasting recordings 
from the life and work of the white minority, on one hand, and the 
black, coloured and Indian groups constituting the majority in 
South Africa, on the other. The contrasting association of the 
images alone is instructive. The footage is linked through the use 
of a male narrator who, in a discerning tone, delivers a shocking 
report on aspects of the lives of the black majority, on laws 
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enforced with no concern for basic human rights. The 
commentator talks about education being for free only for the 
white children, about the separation in shanty-towns, but also 
delivers statistical data, such as a mortality rate of 60% amongst 
the black children up to the age of five. There, where the voice-
over is rendered silent, the images are accompanied by unsettling 
music or rhythms of drums. 
 
  
Figure ‎5.2 END OF THE DIALOGUE (1970). 
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Figure ‎5.3 END OF THE DIALOGUE (1970). 
 
But the emotional link to the spectator is managed in both 
documentaries with the use of close ups. The camera is mobile, the 
lenses move too. Corrections and panoramic images, vertical and 
horizontal, are there to illustrate portraits of the people, while the 
zoom carefully frames a grasped instance of a smile, or the face of 
a child in tears. Once the camera ends its search and frames a 
particularly powerful close up, the image freezes with wondering 
eyes staring at the distant spectator. For several seconds, the 
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moving image turns into a photo, giving the face, and the innate 
mimicry, time to play its part, and form a closer connection 
between two distant people. Once the two directions are secured 
(an emotional relationship, and the understanding of the outraging 
truth that flagrant infringements of basic human rights are 
happening in South Africa), the spectator might have been 
wondering how it was possible, that the South African society 
could have sustained the apartheid system, with only the backing 
of such a small Afrikaans minority. The ending of END OF THE 
DIALOGUE leads to the point, and to an almost direct appeal for 
help from to the foreign spectator. Again, close-ups are used, this 
time of weapons, fighter jets, and fighting helicopters. “The might 
of South Africa is preserved with these weapons, supplied by the 
western world”, the commentator translates the images into words. 
The final scene is a montage of various fighting plaines, while the 
commentator explains their French origins, Italian licence, or the 
British ground attack aircrafts, as being “highly effective for use 
against guerrillas”. 
LAST GRAVE AT DIMBAZA, and even more so END OF 
THE DIALOGUE, by revealing a canvas of close-ups and extreme 
close-ups, open up the possible connection between distant 
people: South Africans in shanty towns and the European and 
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American far-away spectators of the films). This connection, 
activist and filmmaker Nana Mahomo believed, is one key to civic 
action since, as he put it, unless the people in America “know what 
the issues are, they could quite easily be sold the idea that America 
has to intervene on the side of white South Africa”.
306
 The anti-
apartheid resistance brought about one of the largest global 
solidarity movements the world has ever seen, with civic society in 
almost every single country on the planet supporting the South 
African struggle.
307
 The documentary films, in Mahomo’s view, 
were essential tools in this respect: 
We are trying to make sure that the inhumanity which is 
being paraded under the cloak of apartheid is absolutely 
understood by each and everyone so that the issues are clear 
and it can only be done through more and more people 
knowing what the issues are in Southern Africa. This is why 
we would like this film to be seen by as many people as 
possible.
308
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5.2 Language Association: Joan Jara as the 
Messenger in COMPANIERO: VICTOR JARA 
OF CHILE 
 
 
Anne Applebaum dedicated her Pulitzer-Prize winning book, 
Gulag, to “Those Who Described What Happened”, and 
suggestively began with a passage from the famous Requiem (Instead 
of a Preface, 1935-1940) by the Russian poet Anna Akhmatova: 
In the terrible years of the Yezhov terror I spent 
seventeen months waiting in line outside the prison in 
Leningrad. One day somebody in the crowd identified 
me.  
Standing behind me was a woman, with lips blue from 
the cold, who had, of course, never heard me called by 
name before. Now she started out of the torpor 
common to us all and asked me in a whisper (everyone 
whispered there): 
‘Can you describe this?’ 
And I said: ‘I can.’ 
Than something like a smile passed fleetingly over what 
had once been her face... 
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The messenger, the individual Who Describes What Happened, the 
one able to find words to describe the hidden ordeal, is not 
expected to put an end to the horror. The old woman “with lips 
blue from the cold” does not ask the poet for a solution, neither 
does she ask “Can you end this?”; the old woman wished that, 
among those who saw the horror, there would be someone apt 
enough with words, so  that the horror would not remain 
indescribable.  
Like the poet, the individual Who Describes What Happened is 
a recurrent key character in resistance documentaries: the one who 
escapes the conflict zone or dictatorial borders, or does not escape 
it, but takes upon him- or herself innumerable risks, in order to 
appear in front of the camera and tell a personal story, relevant for 
the entire group. “And I think here I am speaking in the name of 
all the people in Chile who are silenced, who can’t speak for 
themselves”, Joan Jara confesses in COMPANIERO: VICTOR JARA 
OF CHILE.
309
 Rigoberta Menchú started with a similar promise in 
WHEN THE MOUNTAINS TREMBLE: “I am going to tell my 
story, which is the story of all the Guatemalan people”.    
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Sit-down interviews are often the norm to achieve such an 
endeavour, and the filmed testimony of Joan Jara in 
COMPANIERO: VICTOR JARA OF CHILE, with its minimalistic 
use of filmic means, constitutes a very good example. In this way 
Joan is telling the story of her assassinated husband, the famous 
singer-songwriter, theatre director and activist Victor Jara. In the 
background of the personal tragedy which affected her family, 
Joan depicts the bigger picture of the complicated socio-political 
situation of Chile at the beginning of the 1970s: “I feel that the 
only thing that I can do is to go on and tell people about our 
experiences, even the very personal ones, so that they can 
understand profoundly what this (i.e. Fascism) means to human 
beings”. 
 Her declared goal is precisely to make people “understand 
profoundly” what fascism means to the people in Chile, “to 
human beings”. Joan Jara does not promise the spectator that at 
the end of the documentary they are going to better understand 
the political situation in Chile, but that her attempt through her 
filmed confession is to create a connection between distant people, 
a cross-cultural understanding of the other in a sympathetic 
manner.  
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After September 1973, Joan Jara spent the next 40 years of 
her life telling the same story countless times. She wrote it in a 
book, told it to the international press, gave lectures and talks 
throughout the world, and conveyed it in the various lawsuits she 
filed in Chile and in the United States, against those accounted 
responsible. Thanks to Joan’s life-long work, Victor Jara’s story is 
one of the most noted among all the stories on the victims of the 
Pinochet regime. At the beginning of 1974, however, the story 
remained yet untold, at least in the United Kingdom. The widow 
of Victor Jara, Joan, herself a British citizen, left Santiago for 
London with her two daughters, where they found “a Tory 
government actively hostile to Chile's disenfranchised 
population”.
310
 And it is here, in the United Kingdom, that Joan 
Jara made one of the very first public accounts of her husband’s 
tragic end, in the documentary film COMPANIERO: VICTOR JARA 
OF CHILE, shown on the British Thames Television. Director and 
producer Stanley Forman later recalled in an interview the peculiar 
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circumstances of the TV screening, how it was shown “very late at 
night, with a bloody anchorman who said: ‘we don’t wish to 
associate ourselves with the views expressed in this film. Blah, 
blah.’ But still, they showed it, which was something”.
311
 
COMPANIERO: VICTOR JARA OF CHILE operates within 
a scarcity of cinematographic artifice: talking heads illustrated with 
archive material. The storytelling, however, is in turn made out of 
three distinct narrators: in the first line, Joan Jara, the widow of the 
victim, and victim herself, the eye witness. The second is a “voice 
of God” type of voice-over, a confident neutral British narrator 
who pushes the episodes of the story forward, and who delivers 
more concrete information (dates, statistics). These facts and 
figures, if told by Joan, would have presumably compromised the 
personal, empathic relationship established between herself and 
the viewer. A third and last narrator is Victor Jara himself, the 
assassinated folksinger whose voice recordings from songs and 
poems are edited in such a way, that they function as a 
commentary on the story, explaining it or reflecting upon it.  
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The singer’s voice is to be heard in the audio background, 
in Spanish, however, the lyrics are dubbed in English by yet 
another British commentator. The exception is only the very last 
song, where Joan’s voice takes over in the dubbing of her 
husband’s track, and the voices of the two Jaras are intertwined, 
like in the last swan’s chant: the love song Te recuerdo Amanda (I 
remember you Amanda).  
COMPANIERO: VICTOR JARA OF CHILE is a rich 
example in its consistent attempt to generate an empathic effect by 
primarily relying on uttered accounts. But responding empathically 
to speech (mediated association or verbal mediated empathic 
arousal, the way it was described in the third chapter of this work) 
requires additional mental effort from the side of the spectator, 
while the triggering of empathy through speech demands a longer 
time than the more basic empathic modes require. How does 
recounting, and voice over in general, work in triggering empathy, 
and in which way can they make up for the familiarity bias, and by 
and large support cross-group empathy? 
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Figure ‎5.4 Interview with Joan Jara in COMPANIERO: VICTOR 
JARA OF CHILE (1974). 
 
There are various elements necessary for the spectator’s empathy 
to be aroused through speech: the narrator needs to be an expert 
in using words, refraining from simply delivering text or listing 
information, but rather exhibiting poignancy, and even humour, 
solely through word choice and phrasing. At times, this expert 
rhetoric must be descriptive in a sophisticated way, so that it can 
compensate for lack of images and visual proofs. Secondly, 
because mediated association requires more effort from the 
spectator’s side, and it is more susceptible to bias, the narrative 
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would be better understood without any other extra effort, such as 
the reading of subtitles. Thirdly, we will look at the role of audio-
visual congruency: harmony between facial expression (or the 
visuals in general) and the narration. Lastly, we shall discuss 
dissonance, the incongruity between voice and face, and visual 
over all, and the role it plays in suppressing bias and scepticism. 
We were discussing earlier how laboratory experiments have 
shown that triggering speech-mediated empathic arousal requires 
more time and effort. From this point of view it makes sense that 
Joan’s confession advances slowly, that the progression is 
structured in several episodes, and instead of starting with the 
bloodcurdling narratives, Joan’s story advances from light personal 
memories towards the present-day tragedy. After a concise 
preamble, where the direction of the story is clearly marked and 
the sombre ending implied (“I feel that everything that I can do is 
to go on and tell people...”), Joan commences with stories from 
her husband’s early infancy, the way a rather conventional 
biography would. 
She reminisces about her husband’s childhood, teenage 
years and youth at the university, his formation as an artist – all 
events that Joan herself in fact did not witness. Her own memories 
are brought into the story a little later, when she describes Victor 
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Jara’s willingness to build up a family – the love story within the 
story – and from this point Joan herself grows into the other main 
character: her own loss is now also worth the spectator’s empathy. 
After this beginning, when some degree of sympathy is secured, 
the narrative moves to the second episode, and into the 
complicated and controversial political dimension, with its 
particularities: the attempts of right wing forces at stopping the 
endorsement of Salvador Allende, the elected president, the 
assassination of the head of the armed forces, General Schneider, 
and the proclamation of Allende as president.  
At this point, the spectator is expected to be more 
interested and focused and, in an attempt to extend to the Chilean 
people the empathy already secured for the Jaras, a short 
intermezzo with background information is edited in. It implies 
how Chile was one of the last territories conquered by the Spanish 
Conquistadores, followed by the British, when “Chile became a 
virtual satellite for the British economy, and fortunes were made in 
London”, as the voice over puts it.  
After the First World War followed the economical control 
by the United States. 
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Figure ‎5.5 Family photos from the Jara personal archive 
included in COMPANIERO: VICTOR JARA OF CHILE (1974). 
 
Sum-ups of Chile’s importance for the U.S. economy, the CIA’s 
attempt of opposing Allende’s coming to power, and the failure of 
this attempt, are followed by the fight which erupted from here, 
including Allende’s visit to the United Nations to denounce the 
foreign intervention in Chile’s affaires. 
Following this historical intermezzo, the third episode in 
the film’s structure portrays Victor Jara’s role in the above-
described context: his activist work in the three years of 
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revolutionary struggle in the terms of democracy, which preceded 
Allende being elected president, the songs he wrote and his 
concerts in mines and in universities. From here onwards, both the 
political background and the portrait of Victor Jara are edited in 
parallel, as if properly tangled, until the 11th of September coup 
d’état and the last hours of Jara. Finally, a last part of the film 
concerns the storyline of Joan Jara, from the disappearance of her 
husband, until the widow recovers the bloody, half-naked bullet-
ridden body of her husband, and buries it.  
COMPANIERO: VICTOR JARA OF CHILE, as mentioned, 
is moved along by the three different narrators (mostly Joan’s 
storytelling, but also the British narrator who delivers smaller bits 
of concise information, and Victor Jara’s songs, dubbed in 
English). What makes the story engaging, despite the minimal 
filmic means used, is the type of speaker Joan Jara is: clear, 
concise, and through her consistent usage of uncomplicated 
words, she appears honest, accompanying various parts of the 
stories with sighs or sobs, without ever relinquishing her discrete 
facial expression. She shows a faint smile when talking about 
happy memories, and has a dim grimace when evoking the last 
phone call she received from her husband. All this might seem 
rather too straightforward but, in the absence of more filmic 
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material, recordings or visual proofs, the very simple approach to 
Joan’s interview plays an essential role in guiding the emotional 
response to particular points in the story line. Towards the end of 
COMPANIERO: VICTOR JARA OF CHILE, Juan Jara gets to the 
point in which she actually must say that her husband is no more. 
When evoking this episode, she gets into details: she recalls that 
somebody called her, carrying her husband’s message, and this 
message was “that Victor thought that he will not be able to get 
out of the stadium, that they’d recognized him”. 
And here, in simple but strong words, she reaches the 
point (which is obviously more painful than any other memory 
recalled so far) where she has to say in front of the camera that 
Victor Jara is dead, while in that particular moment she evoked, 
she did not yet believe it, or could not, or simply did not want to: 
“At this moment... I was.. I think there must have been many who 
were naïve enough to think that this meant imprisonment”. After 
describing the entire ordeal of searching for the dead body of a 
loved one through a morgue, among hundreds of other naked 
corpses, sometimes with a discreet tear in her eyes, but with a 
voice contained, breathing harder, while keeping her speech 
restrained, she appears exhausted. In a heart-breaking scene, when 
even the viewer may feel like it is too much and too painful to 
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observe her reminiscing about the witnessing of such an ordeal, 
Joan releases the tension, positively twisting the story line: “I think 
it was logical to have found Victor’s body here”, and even “I think 
that Victor would have been glad to have died as he did”. 
 
 
Figure ‎5.6 Last recording of Victor Jara. Footage included in 
COMPANIERO: VICTOR JARA OF CHILE (1974). 
 
The flow of her speech brings along a melodic pace: the accent is 
on “think”, and the pitch descends, her voice barely perceivable at 
the end of the sentence. Joan’s mimic, posture, tone of voice are 
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very sombre and contained, and the discreet variations, smiles, 
sighs and barely visible tears do not contradict the tone of the 
story, but rather only support what is being said. 
It is not solely how good of a storyteller Joan is, which is 
important for the effectiveness of the verbal association in 
triggering empathy. Joan is British-born, and tells the story in her 
British accent to a (first and foremost) British audience. She 
functions as a bridge, as a link of credibility between the two 
groups, the British audience and the “Chilean people” or “Chilean 
families”, as Joan herself puts it. 
A messenger, and even more so an accomplished 
storyteller as Joan Jara is, prompts emotional responses. Therefore 
to fully benefit from such a narrator, filmmakers might willingly 
opt for minimal filmic artifice in order to allow the speech to 
manifest its full power. About Joan Jara, director-producer Stanley 
Forman says: “She’s a remarkable woman, but we didn’t know 
how remarkable until we started interviewing her”.
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In most situations images and sound cues – cries, moaning 
– come to accompany the language, accelerating the empathic 
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 Forman, in interview with Tony Pomfret (2000), 3.  
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response (exception being when voice-over accompanies unrelated 
images, like when a letter is being read out loud). Mediated 
association might precede the others, for example when the 
information about the victim precedes the sequence where the 
victim is shown. The verbal stimuli have the particular quality of 
creating some distance between the observer and the victim’s 
situation, due to encoding and decoding involved in the complex 
process, but are more effective combined with mimicry, classical 
conditioning and direct association – which are vivid, and 
consequently able to hold the viewer’s attention longer. 
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5.3 Imagining the Other: The Problematic of 
the Roles of Protagonist/ Antagonist in 
Revolutionary Documentaries of Netty 
Wild 
 
 
 (…) but when we ascribe depth and authority to characters, 
when we talk about what makes them compelling or 
memorable, even when we describe them as realistic, we are 
really talking about what makes them tellable, how they are 
displayed apart from the way the plot, the narrative world, or 
the discursive style is displayed.               – 
Thomas M. Leitch313 
 
The narrative of revolutions is defined by Manfred Schneider in 
relation to the mediums representing it, as the opening of 
information channels which, previously, were closed or defective – 
a scenario delivered by the French Revolution to many uprisings, 
up to this day. The festive unblocking of communication channels 
is just one of the acts in the revolutionary scenario, as described by 
Manfred Schneider. Next comes the inauguration of the tribunal, 
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 Leitch (1986), 158. 
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and possibly the execution of the dictator, followed by the display 
of his corpse. All these constitute in Schneider’s view the scenario 
of the revolution, as a ‘Trilogie des Wechsels’, a ‘trilogy of 
change’.
314
 
Following the narrative of revolutions themselves, the 
narrative of resistance documentary aiming to trigger spectator 
empathy is more graspable when a singular figure is clearly framed 
as the antagonist, and the leader of the fight is the positive protagonist, 
the point of identification, the hero. While indeed extensively 
applicable to many revolutionary overthrows in recent history, 
Manfred Schneider’s scenario is not all-encompassing. And the 
role of the documentary storyteller, aiming to trigger spectator 
empathy, becomes increasingly problematic when the usual 
scenarios do not apply; where the clear-cut roles of protagonist-
antagonist do not so easily fall into place. For example, not all 
regimes have the distinctive figure of the dictator, so not all 
revolutions aim at overthrowing such a figure. In attempting to 
understand which are the common aspects contributing to the 
failure of some revolutions and to the success of others, 
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sociologist Jeff Goodwin convincingly argued that particularly 
sensitive to revolutionary overthrowing are neo-patrimonial, 
personality-oriented regimes, with the undesirable figure of the 
dictator clearly identifiable.
315
 At least temporarily, the fall of such 
dictators is easily correlated, in the eyes of the revolutionary 
masses, with the success of the revolution: the stepping back of 
Anastasio Samoza Debayle in Nicaragua (July 1979), that of Jean-
Claude Duvalier (Baby Doc) in Haiti (February 1986), Nicolae 
Ceaușescu in Romania (December 1989), or Hosni Mubarak in 
Egypt (February 2011). The flight or execution of the dictator 
creates a void of power, but doesn’t necessary coincide with the 
political or social reforms that the resistance movements were 
aiming for. Thus, in the aftermath of the fall of the dictator, 
revolutionary movements might seize power (like Sandinistas in 
Nicaragua) but, on the contrary, they might also contest the new 
order openly or, even without giving up the arms, go once more 
underground.  
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 Goodwin (2001). Goodwin’s analyses concern comparisons of 
revolutionary movements in regions with numerous similarities (Central 
America, South East Asia), thus ultimately convincingly underlining the 
dissimilar aspects, which contributed to very distinct revolutionary outcomes 
for the different countries in those regions. 
258 
 
The aftermath of revolutionary changes in power 
structures are times of confusion and uncertainty, where the heroic 
and vile figures start to blur. The maker of resistance documentary 
faces the difficult, fuzzy scenario, where the roles of protagonist 
and antagonist become rather abstruse. Thus, in these ambiguous 
narratives, it is challenging to establish points of identification, to 
focus the spectator’s empathy – and to care.  
The revolutionary films from the work of Canadian 
documentary maker Netty Wild are useful in illustrating the 
problematic of the protagonist-antagonist roles: A RUSTLING OF 
LEAVES: INSIDE THE PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION (1988), which 
follows the resistance struggle in the Philippines in the aftermath 
of the flight of dictator Ferdinand Marcos, after 20 years in power 
(February 1986), and A PLACE CALLED CHIAPAS (1998), 
documenting the Zapatista resistance movement in Mexico (1994-
present). Made ten years apart from each other, both films have a 
human rights approach to the conflicts, whereas the “people of the 
Philippines” and respectively “the people of Las Chiapas” are the 
tragic victims, suffering in the background of political dramas. The 
approach to the conflicts is an intimate one, even though the 
stories and histories are interpreted with, and for western eyes.  
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Each of these rare films is the result of over a year of 
shooting and editing. They are placed in very unclear social and 
political contexts, and sorting through these circumstances appears 
like a very difficult task, for the filmmaker and the documentary 
spectator alike. A RUSTLING OF LEAVES documents the 
resistance movements in the Philippines, including the armed 
guerrillas, and the not-so-peaceful times, which followed the 
peaceful revolution overthrowing Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. A 
PLACE CALLED CHIAPAS attempts to sort out the complicated 
conflict between the dispossessed and alienated Mayan Indians 
from southern Mexico, and the Mexican Government, a conflict 
that contributed to the uprising of the Zapatista Army of National 
Liberation in 1994.
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The films of the Canadian filmmaker Netty Wild are, 
beyond doubt, up to this day, relevant to a wide audience. 
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 A place called Chiapas opens with the signing of NFTA and the 
beginning of the uprising, called by John Ross “the first post-Communist, 
post-modern, anti-neoliberal uprising in the Americas” (2000), 4. The 
romantic figure of the revolutionary leader Marcos and his belief in the 
potential of the media led to a greater prevalence of documentary films 
about the Zapatistas (Listed in the Annotated Filmography). But Netty 
Wild’s documentary stands out as a complex approach, and for its interview 
with Marcos.  
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However they are both products of a direct interest of her co-
nationals in the respective uprisings, due to particular geo-political 
contexts: Canada’s signing of a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement 
with Marcos’ dictatorial regime in the Philippines, paving the way 
in the 1980s to the selling of nuclear reactors and technology
317
 (A 
RUSTLING OF LEAVES); and respectively to the treaty Canada 
signed with Mexico and the USA for the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, NAFTA (A PLACE CALLED CHIAPAS). The 
signing of the NAFTA coincided with the Zapatistas declaration 
of war against the Mexican Army.  
Multiple voices of the director Netty Wild are prevalent in 
both A RUSTLING OF LEAVES and A PLACE CALLED CHIAPAS: 
one is the filmic voice, a very personal way of juxtaposing in the 
editing, which reveals both her opinions and principles, but also 
uncertainties and questions Wild seems to ask herself while 
working on the film. A second is the journalist’s voice: Wild as the 
persuasive debater, initiating vivid dialogues with the characters 
met on the way. This voice is however distinct from the 
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 When she came across the Philipine guerrilla stories, Netty Wild was 
touring with her theater play, Under the Gun, which was problematising 
exactly Canada’s tie in the military industrial complex; the action was half 
taking place in the Philippines. 
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conventional, unbiased type of interviews. If a more traditional 
approach would have been taken in the editing, and only answers 
of the characters alone would have been included in the film, the 
ambiguity and layers of the revolution and its players wouldn’t 
have come out as distinct as they do when Wild’s wonderings are 
heard from behind the camera. And there is yet another hypostasis 
of Wild’s voices: the very poetic voice-over which describes 
whatever happened in front of the camera, but also whatever the 
camera didn’t manage to film, or the sound didn’t record. In other 
words, whatever Wild and her film crew lived while filming, or at 
least what she remembers they have been experiencing, is also 
transmitted to the audience. In rich, metaphoric sentences, Wild 
describes whatever she herself saw, or heard, or even felt while 
being on location. For instance, while showing a bamboo field, and 
a carriage slowly passing in front of the camera, entering the image 
from the right and disappearing to the left of the screen, Netty 
Wild’s voice-over comments: “Those are my stories from the 
Philippine Revolution; their restless call for change resonates like 
the sound of rustling of leaves in the distant, yet now familiar cane 
field”. Such examples are numerous in both films, thus allowing 
enough room for the spectator’s imagination to direct sympathy or 
antipathy towards the players at stake. Her films seem to credit the 
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fight as being justified or unavoidable for the human rights causes, 
and thus positions herself more on the side of the guerrillas, but 
leaves enough open questions and space for the spectators to 
evaluate the political contexts as they consider fit. 
In order to show some ways in which the problematic 
protagonist-antagonist roles could be solved, we are going to take 
a closer look at strategies of building up characters in A 
RUSTLING OF LEAVES. The 1988 Canadian production follows 
characters from diverse groups in the Philippine struggle: 
moderate left, mountain-based guerrilla units, political players, 
extreme left and extreme right paramilitary groups. 
Commencing her career as actress and radio moderator, 
Netty Wild got in touch with leaders of the guerrilla forces in the 
time of Ferdinand Marcos’ dictatorial regime.
318
 While on tour in 
the Philippines with her theatre company and the play Under the 
Gun, a commander of the guerrilla force New People’s Army 
(NPA) asked her to create a theatrical representation for the 
young, mainly illiterate villagers supporting the guerrillas; while in 
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 In an interview with Marc Glassman (2008) in Point of View Magazine, 
Nettie Wild recalls the beginnings of the production of A RUSTLING OF 
LEAVES.  
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the Philippines, she also broadcasted for the CBS radio. 
Vancouver-based Wild went back to her home country to secure 
the budget for a revolutionary documentary in the Philippines, and 
then revisited the archipelago. Only that, on her return, she 
encountered a different reality than the one she had left: the 
personality cult of the Marcos-regime had come to an end, and a 
newly elected, first female president of the Philippines, Corazon 
Aquino, promised land reforms and democracy. Aquino, herself a 
member of the small land-owning Filipino elite, however, didn’t 
appear to undertake the land and anti-poverty reforms which were 
expected of her; activists feared the carry-over of systematic pre-
Marcos “domination of political clans”.
319
 The same military 
officers in charge under Marcos were holding similar strategic 
positions and privileges as before the fall of the dictator, and 
president Aquino was facing “pressure exerted by conservative 
members of her cabinet, the military and the U.S. government for 
a tougher policy towards insurgency”.
320
 The armed guerrilla 
movements, mainly the NPA, continued to operate. Yet more 
extreme paramilitary groups were now in action, too. Out of them, 
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the Sparrow Squads are insightfully documented by Wild. Joint 
counter revolutionary forces of the Philippine military and 
American intelligence units led to the formation of vigilante 
groups – some of them “private armies of politicians”
321
 (Alsa 
Masa, meaning Masses Uprising, the armed vigilante group more 
extensively documented in the film, was the first out of 224, which 
were reported at the time A RUSTLING OF LEAVES was made).
322
 
Political kidnappings and assassinations were common. Only in the 
months necessary for the making of the film, president Corazon 
Aquino survived five attempts of coup d’états; each such coup 
leading to the increase in power and benefits for the military. 
Due to the political grounds explained above, the situation 
had become more complicated for the documentary maker 
intending to create an empathic bridge between the revolutionaries 
in the Philippines and the Canadian audience. At the time of her 
first stay with the NPA, Wild later confessed, she herself identified 
with the guerrillas, and had decided to secure the production 
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 Davis (1989), 16. See also Appendix II (200l–2006). According to Davis, 
out of the 224 armed vigilante groups operating in February 1988, 146 were 
right wing 63 religious extremists and 15 bandit groups. 
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money in order to make a film about them.
323
 At that time, 
Ferdinand Marcos’ personality cult regime was still in place and the 
protagonist-antagonist roles were more easily defined. This was 
not, however, the case in the aftermath of the 1986 Revolution, 
which left the documentary maker in the difficult position of 
having no proper focus point for the spectator’s solidarity, 
“sympathy or antipathy viscerally felt”, in Carroll’s understanding. 
Neither was there such a distinguishable proper negative figure 
(like the dictator) towards which to concentrate the antipathy of 
the spectator, nor was it as easy as before, in the newly established 
political context, to frame a distinct positive figure towards whom 
the empathic feelings of the spectator could have been directed. In 
the post-Marcos reality, the documentary maker had to operate 
with the construction of characters within these vague 
frameworks.  
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 In the interview she gave to Marc Glassman for POV (2008), Wild 
recalls such an encounter with the NPA insurgents: “I looked at him and the 
other young soldiers and I realized – they were me. They were my opposite 
number. If I had been born here rather than New York City, if I lived here 
rather than West Vancouver, I would be one of them. And that’s the 
moment when I decided that this was a story that had been given to me to 
tell”. 
266 
 
Wild’s film crew travelled to numerous locations and gave 
a voice to many of the different, antagonistic players in the novel 
Filipino struggle. In the capital city of Manila, they filmed the 
sparrows showing themselves in front of the camera, with their 
faces covered. But from Manila, they also brought about images of 
the slum life – the abject poverty at the periphery of the capital. 
They filmed the sugar workers in the island of Negros and, thanks 
to her acting skills, Netty Wild’s voice interprets dialogues 
(witnessed, or maybe even imagined) of the people met on the 
way, from their frustrations, to their dreams about a revolution.  
Moving to another island of the archipelago, Mindanao, the crew 
extensively documented the life in the provincial capital Davao, 
home to the vigilante death squads.  In the “Mountain” (as the 
home of the NPA is secretively referred to on the end credits) the 
documentary maker filmed an intimate portrait of the guerrillas, 
and provided it with a human face, or rather, several human faces 
and endearing characters. But while the film camera was 
accompanying the guerrillas, it also witnessed moments of highly 
debatable morality, which made the choice of points of 
identification even more difficult: an attack on a walking patrol, 
followed by his ad-hoc trial, condemning a presumable spy to 
death. This presumable spy, a youngster nicknamed Batman (for 
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the action hero) states in front of the camera how he accepts any 
sentence from the guerrillas only if they would ''let him live'' – but 
the guerrillas decided not to grant his plea (Fig 5.7). The moment 
of Batman’s death is not explicitly shown in the film, but still 
makes a rather a disquieting scene, with the guerrillas bringing the 
small wooden coffin to Batman’s weeping father, something that 
might have seemed morally bewildering for many, and keep 
western spectators from empathizing with the guerrillas. Wild’s 
film manages to turn the ambiguities from the Filipino realities at 
the end of the 1980s into an advantage in her human rights 
approach to filmmaking: the spectator is presented with several 
such unresolvable situations, and invited to choose his or her 
standpoint, forced to take a personal, moral position. Wild makes 
her own partaking clear, but leaves a lot of choice on the side of 
the spectator. Hence, she is annulling the suspicion of 
manipulation, which is a constant barrier in the building of an 
empathic relationship with the documentary spectator. 
Revolutionary documentaries like A RUSTLING OF 
LEAVES operate on an uncertain terrain, without easily identifiable 
antagonists and protagonists, heroes and villains as such, but 
instead with equivocal players in a complicated, multi-layered 
reality. 
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Figure ‎5.7 The guerrillas let Batman know that he is going to 
be executed, in A RUSTLING OF LEAVES (1988). 
 
Nettie Wild’s strategy is efficient in bypassing the problem: she 
attempts to construct situations and hypostases where either 
characters from various groups can be mirrored, or elements of 
distinct people can be easily associated by the viewer, thus securing 
empathy for a less concrete, more symbolic entity. The spectator is 
invited to solve a puzzle out of various elements belonging to 
multiple characters with common traits. In the case of A 
RUSTLING OF LEAVES, the spectator is invited to feel for the 
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Filipino revolutionary going ‘overground’ to attempt the legal 
fight, to participate in – hopefully – democratic elections, and who 
falls victim to the ongoing oppressive regime.  
About ten characters, coming from several of these groups 
of players, are constructed in more depth, providing large frames 
for the Filipino reality. One of Wild’s political stands on this reality 
seems to be that, in the post-dictatorial society striving for 
democracy, the Philippines found itself in at the end of the 1980s, 
various political entities finally should have attempted to coexist, 
not eliminate each other. Or, like Edicio dela Torre (“priest, artist 
and revolutionary”) puts it in the first minutes of the film, 
announcing the problems to be seen in the shades of the Filipino 
reality: “democracy has space for all sorts of Filipinos, thinking in 
all sorts of colours. Democracy must have as many colours as the 
rainbow, and there is no rainbow without red. It would be a 
terrible rainbow if it would have only yellow. Or blue”. 
Wild’s crew accesses several of the strips of the rainbow, 
be they political parties of underground movements, or individual 
characters with their unique stories. Dadan is one of the ten 
codenames of a former student of agricultural engineering, who 
chose the underground life in the mountains. She has a schoolgirl 
look, with big glasses and two ponytails, and giggles with Netty 
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Wild about her work in organizing guerrilla movements. Other 
guerrilla figures are likewise portrayed: Father Navarro, a 
communist priest and revolutionary, or Commander Oris, who, by 
the end of the film, is betrayed and captured.  
The cohabitation “like colours in the rainbow” appears 
utopian in the Philippines of the 1980s, as portrayed by Wild. 
Vigilante paramilitary groups are assembled at governmental 
whims to just “clean”, as another character, Lieutenant Colonel 
Franco Calida boldly puts it, meaning to annihilate the NPA in the 
Philippines (and, as evidenced in Wild’s well documented film, 
using terror and violating human rights).
324
 In A RUSTLING OF 
LEAVES, Colonel Calida is followed “at work”, while patrolling 
with his military guard, but he is also suggestively framed in his 
office. Here, a zoom out starting on Calida’s close up reveals, on 
the wall behind him, a big framed portrait of the newly elected 
president Corazon Aquino.  
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 Watch dogs organizations reported grave cases of human rights abuses. 
Vigilante groups responded by shooting leaders of Amnesty International, 
which previously published reports of tortures and executions by vigilante 
groups, according to Guillermo (2012), 458. 
271 
 
    
 
Figure ‎5.8 Colonel Calida in A RUSTLING OF LEAVES (1988). 
 
While the Colonel goes on with his speech, the zoom out 
continues to reveal more of the ornaments on the wall, thus 
suggestively framing Calida’s actions with the vigilante Alsa Masa 
in a larger, complex political chain: bellow Aquino’s portrait on the 
wall, another one, this time smaller, reveals commander Ramos, 
who remained a military ruler, as he was under dictator Marcos. 
Calida goes on talking, and the slow zoom out only stops when 
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finally, even further down on the wall behind Lieutenant Colonel 
Calida, the camera ironically reveals another, this time fictitious 
Lieutenant: an armed and dangerous looking-like Sylvester Stallone 
as Lieutenant Marion “Cobra” Cobretti in a poster from 
COBRA.
325
  
As previously mentioned, during her first visit to the 
Philippines, filmmaker Netty Wild was initially recording the 
events for CBS radio. With her understanding of this medium, 
Wild gives space in her movie to the importance of radio in the 
revolution – in the revolutionary scenario of the 1980s. The radio 
appears as a campaigning and propaganda tool, as communication 
and interception means for the revolutionary and 
counterrevolutionary movements. It is around the radio that points 
of identification are established. The characters of two very 
different radio-men, from opposite arenas, are thus framed: NPA 
radio operator Poloy and Radio DJ Jun Pala. 
Poloy is a faceless character, who tragically died during the 
time of filming, “defending the film crew”, as Netty Wild’s voice 
over stresses it, while the film crew was documenting a failed 
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 COBRA, written by Stallone himself, was released in 1987.  
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guerrilla attack.
326
 His image, his physical presence or voice most 
probably went unrecorded by the time of his death, and even after 
his death - since Poloy’s dead body was seized by the army. So 
even if Poloy’s physical traces in the real world went largely 
unrecorded, Poloy’s character, carefully constructed in the editing, 
is very present in the film. Shots of a silhouette climbing a tree, or 
a hand holding a radio emitter – the generic symbol images for the 
radio operator – are inserted in the documentary, while Netty 
Wild’s voice reminisces bits of past dialogues she herself had with 
Poloy.  
It is in this way, with minimal means, that the character of 
the radio operator is built up as a man with a poignant sense of 
humour. For the group portrait of the remaining guerrillas, 
scattered in some of the mountains of the more than 7100 islands 
comprising the archipelago nation of the Philippines, the radio 
operator in Wild’s film becomes something of a symbol: that of 
the likelihood of actual communication between the various 
groups. 
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 Wild encountered radio operator Poloy way before the film project 
started, when she was producing the theater play for the guerrillas. He was 
one of the actors in the play, as she puts it in an interview with Glassman 
(2008). 
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Figure 9 Film sequence evoking Poloy, in A RUSTLING OF 
LEAVES (1988). 
  
“Poloy’s radio gets information” about arrests, or about future 
steps to be undertaken, as Netty Wild’s voice-over describes how 
the images of the radio operator are to be understood. But as 
symbolic as his character might be, Poloy used to be a real man, in 
the real world, who was shot in the chest, near the camera crew, 
and whose death is not recorded but to whom the film is 
dedicated.  
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The physical character of Poloy might not have been 
developed enough; neither has the spectator a concrete image of 
him, nor enough familiar traces to trigger empathy. The choice to 
turn him into a character most probably occurred after he passed 
away in such dramatic circumstances, without leaving behind 
traces, filmed recordings of himself. But it is by mirroring him with 
the radio-man from the opponents, whose traces would be “bad 
enough”,
327
 that empathy for Poloy is secured. The thus 
constructed antagonist of Poloy is DJ Jun Pala, the self-labelled 
voice of the “Anti-Communist Crusade” in Davao (home of Alsa 
Masa and other fanatic vigilante groups).
328
 Like the references to 
the radio operator Poloy, inserts from the interview with DJ Pala 
are scattered throughout the entire film, to some extent building 
up the antagonism between the two.  
DJ Pala shows his gun to the camera, and boasts about 
himself routinely using Goebbels’ radio propaganda tactics, just to 
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 Following Noël Carroll (2004) and his analyses of Soprano, I have 
shown earlier (chapter 3.1) how, while not identifying with a certain 
character, the positive attitude towards that character can be established or 
secured thru the negative attitude for his antagonist.  
328
 As it is well documented in the film, at the end of 1980s Davao was 
home to Tadtad (Chop-chop), whose members were notorious for 
beheading the victims or hacking them to death (see Davis 1989, 200). 
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go on uttering his admiration for Hitler. Even if Pala is obviously 
aware of the film camera, and his intentions of being provocative 
come through, the way his interventions are intercalated in the film 
are efficiently prompting Poloy as the one more worthy of the 
spectator’s affection. One last such insert from DJ Pala’s zealous 
speech is placed on the end credits of A RUSTLING OF LEAVES: 
“it is useless to answer your interview because it seems to me that 
you want NPA, and you don’t want our crusade, and you are 
inciting people not to support us”.  
 By including this meta-reference, Wild properly invites her 
spectators once more, at the very end, to freely counter the views 
in the film with their own perspectives. Chances are that, by this 
very end, the point of empathy is already secured, and directed 
towards the Filipino people and their struggle, with its many layers, 
from underground fight accompanied by violence to political, legal 
debate (even if the legal alternatives are presented as a particularly 
unlikely possibility at the time of the making of the film). It is from 
the side of the legal debate that the most prominent duo of 
complementary characters is impersonated. Two men are 
introduced at the very beginning of A RUSTLING OF LEAVES and 
followed throughout the work: both of them former 
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 Figure ‎5.10 DJ Pala in A RUSTLING OF LEAVES (1988). 
 
revolutionaries, both arrested in the times of the martial law under 
Marcos, both fond of sweet beverages. 
The similarities between them do not end here. Released 
from prison with the promise of a new democratic regime, both 
men appear to attempt, at the time of the making of the film, not 
to join once more the underground of the armed struggle, but to 
try the democratic struggle, giving the left a legal face, as one of 
them puts it, since now the armed struggle should only remain 
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secondary, as the other says by the end of the film. One of them is 
Bernabe Buscayno, famously known as Commander Dante, 
founder of NPA, the military wing of the Communist Party. 
Captured and tortured in 1976, he served years in isolated 
confinement as a political detainee. The other, Edice dela Torre, 
“artist, priest and revolutionary”, as Nettie Wild describes him in 
the film, is one of the former heads of Christians for National 
Liberation. The two never appear in the same sequence and none 
of them ever mentions the other in front of the camera, but their 
interventions are juxtaposed, as somehow to comment on one 
another, or to complete and support each other, and associations 
are to be formed on the mind of the spectator. The dissimilarities 
between the two men are equally important. Bernabe Buscayno aka 
Commander Dante is presented as “turned shy from the years of 
confinement”, emaciated, humble, serious, always on the go. 
During the nearly 10 years of his imprisonment, for both Filipinos 
and international press, Commander Dante became a symbolic 
figure for the peasant resistance in the Philippines.
329
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 Bernabe ‘Dante’ Buscayno was released by the Aquino government, in 
the first days of the coming to power. A detailed profile of Dante is to be 
found in Davis (1989), 70–77.  
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Figure ‎5.11 Edicio dela Torre in A RUSTLING OF LEAVES 
(1988). 
 
Nettie Wild met him fist at his liberation in the aftermath of the 
1986 Revolution. From there, the filmmaker followed Dante in his 
journey for a different kind of fight, an unarmed one: he runs for 
senator in the first free elections, under the newly formed Partido 
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ng Bayan (People’s Party).
330
 At both the very beginning and at the 
very end of the film, Dante is shown in the same hypostasis: in 
motion, driving his car, while all throughout the film he has an 
aura of perpetual motion. He is followed travelling the country, 
crumbled in the electoral van, sweating under the Philippine sun. 
The other character in the constructed duo, Edicio dela 
Torre, is, on the contrary, statically filmed on location. He is first 
introduced talking to Netty Wild in the shady courtyard of his 
Institute for Popular Democracy, an NGO founded in the first days 
after the revolution, filmed in front of a wall painting he just 
finished. Most of the inserts with dela Torre are taken from a sit-
down interview, where he theorizes in perfect English, with 
humour and intellectual balance, the socio-political issues at stake 
in the Philippines at the end of the 1980s.  
Dela Torre’s elaborated and clearly stated views seem to be 
shared by Dante, who doesn’t open up to the camera in the same 
self-reliant way. 
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 The election campaign is documented throughout the entire film. For a 
comprehensive review of the context of the elections on 11 May 1987, see 
Hedman (1996).  
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Figure ‎5.12 Commander Dante in A RUSTLING OF LEAVES 
(1988). 
 
The filmmaker is witnessing how Dante, “turned shy from the 
years of confinement”, says little to the camera crew. We get some 
glimpse of his personal views and ideas from the electoral speeches 
he delivers in his senatorial campaign but, filmed on stage, in front 
of the audience of potential voters, he is more to be perceived as 
Dante playing a role – that of a senatorial candidate. It is the 
intercalation of the broadly applicable views of dela Torre that 
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puts Dante’s character into context, indirectly explaining his 
actions and his stand.  
It is the calm, tempered, contained statements dela Torre 
makes in front of the camera that rather explain the complex 
persona of Commander Dante. With a smile on his face and 
mainly talking about himself, dela Torre indirectly explains the 
consistency of the character of senatorial candidate Bernabe 
Buscayno, former Commander Dante, political detainee under 
Marcos: giving the left a legal space able to participate in the 
democratic debate, so that “people do not have a notion of 
democracy that is constricted to shades of conservative thinking”. 
Dante undertakes great changes during the course of the 
film, and A RUSTLING OF LEAVES documents these changes. 
When first presented to the viewers, in a newspaper cut-out 
showing a photo of him getting out of jail, Dante is displaying a 
faint smile, able to stand on his feet only with the help of another 
man supporting him. In this first encounter, Dante is already very 
slim. However, as the film progresses, and the election campaign 
gets harsher, he is visibly rendered even slimmer. By the last day of 
the campaign, by the time he gives his last speech, he is reduced to 
an exhausted, emaciated apparition. It is in the sequence of the 
very last campaign day that a music montage presents hypostases 
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of Dante, smiling a tired smile. His fist in the air at sunset, at the 
celebration of the closing of the electoral campaign, reveals to the 
camera not a sign of power, but a meagre arm of weakness or 
defeat. It is the beginning of the end of the film.  
 
 
Figure ‎5.13 Commander Dante after the last electoral speech 
in A RUSTLING OF LEAVES (1988). 
 
In A RUSTLING OF LEAVES, Dante is the fighter for social justice 
par excellence, and there is very little of his personal dimension 
that comes through, very few intimate details. Maybe the only 
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element portraying a human being rather than the hero is the 
collection of shots from the campaign, when Dante keeps looking 
prophetically upwards. The viewer, who imagined that this is a sign 
of hope for democracy, is probably disillusioned by the end of the 
movie. A funny, human Dante explains the meaning behind his 
gesture: in the Philippine heat, waiting for hours on a stage for his 
turn for the campaign speech to come, all that he was hoping for 
was a cloud to cover the burning sun. Now, in the sequence of the 
last long day of the election campaign, the sun is falling, and the 
footage shot in the dark becomes blurrier. Dante looks up again, 
but the sun has entirely disappeared. Netty Wild’s voice-over 
announces grimly that Dante and his PnB party lost the elections, 
while the party of president Corazon Aquino won the majority of 
seats. But the almost tragic ending sequence just begins: walls with 
remains of election posters are shown, a child’s hand grazes 
Dante’s poster and the remaining traces of Dante’s face become 
undistinguishable in the photograph. The gesture is charged with 
grievous premonitions. The sight of Dante’s half erased face on 
the wall is juxtaposed with photographs from newspaper cut-outs 
showing, just 4 weeks after the lost elections, a Dante on a hospital 
bed, with a mutilated face. 
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Figure ‎5.14 Electoral Posters with Commander Dante being 
removed in A RUSTLING OF LEAVES (1988). 
 
He is one of the PnB candidates who became the target of 
many terrorist attempts, and one of the few who survived them. 
The view of electoral photos burning, accompanied by the sound-
mix of scorching fire, and bullets, add up to the information in the 
voice-over. Towards the very end of the film, Netty Wild 
interviews Dante one last time, this time asking him only two 
questions about the necessity of violence in the Philippine struggle 
for reforms. Dante’s answers (about the need of peaceful 
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organisation for achieving democracy and violence as the very last 
resort) are moving, but what is hard to bear is the sight of him. 
Before presenting the interview, the filmmaker’s voice warns: “we 
met a visibly tired Dante”. Signs of the attempt on his life are to be 
seen on his face. His maxillary shows traces of fresh wounds, and a 
zoom in towards his face reveals more mutilation. He seems to 
struggle to answer the questions, and his speaking ability is 
affected. The display of him is heart breaking: it seems that in the 
80 minutes of film, and the 8 months of filming, Dante almost 
vanished in front of the movie camera, which happened to 
document this fading away.  
The viewer is left with this final edited confrontation 
between Dante and Aquino, who, the filmmaker seems to be 
suggesting, devoured the attempt of a democratic revolution with 
undemocratic means. In the ambiguity of such a complicated story 
and so many shades of grey, the filmmaker opens up the 
possibilities. Like many times before in the film, the revolutionary 
priest dela Torre one more time lends his voice to explain the 
dynamics on screen, this time indirectly commenting on the 
attempt on Dante’s life. He ends by asking for an attitude – from 
the Filipinos, but maybe from the spectators, too.  
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Figure ‎5.15 Commander Dante in A RUSTLING OF LEAVES 
(1988). 
 
Netty Wild’s stand is obvious, and her views very 
personally stated, but the choice on the side of the spectator seems 
to be still there. The empathy for the new type of fighter, however, 
seems inescapable. The ending shows, yet again, like the very first 
time he was presented in the film, a Dante back on track, driving 
his car to another destination, suggesting he is looking towards 
new ways or solutions.  
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PART III: EMPATHY – SO WHAT? 
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6 Consequences of the Viewing Process  
6.1 Empathy, as a Problematic Ending of the 
Film-Generated Empathic Process 
 
 
In sum, I would argue that most moral dilemmas in life arouse 
empathy, because they involve victims, seen or unseen, present or 
future. Empathy activates moral principles and, either directly or 
through these principles, influences moral judgement and reasoning. 
        – Martin Hoffman, 2000331 
 
“Who benefits from the production of empathy?”, educational 
theorists Megan Boler rhetorically wondered.
332
 Unless empathy 
does not lead to direct action or helping, she argues, it remains 
only at the level of perilous ‘passive empathy’, meaning “those 
instances where our concern is directed to fairly distant others, 
whom we cannot directly help”.
333
 Boler criticizes the recent 
“production of empathy”, namely the emergent teaching of 
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 Hoffman (2000), 247. 
332
 Boler (1999), 164. 
333
 Ibid., 159. 
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empathy in a cross-cultural context, in the name of social justice or 
democracy in distant places, very remote from Western everyday 
experience. When empathy is not directed towards the one in 
need, it “produces no action towards justice but situates the 
powerful Western eye/I as the judging subject, never called upon 
to cast her gaze upon her reflection”.
334
 It is for this type of 
reading of tragic stories about distant people, which Megan Boler 
finds rather patronizing than help-generating, that she coined the 
notion of ‘passive empathy’.  
But even more passive than books or news reading, one 
might argue, is the cinema experience. Traditionally, film viewing 
implies that the spectator simply sits in the chair, gaze directed 
towards the screen; for the price of a ticket, multiple pairs of eyes 
and ears are ready to receive whatever they are being given. Recent 
technical developments, one might argue, have rendered film 
viewing even more passive, since it has moved to the comfort of 
one’s own apartment, first on TV and, in time, onwards to the 
video system. Film viewing (and documentary film makes no 
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 Ibid., 161. Boler uses the reading and teaching of Mouse, Art 
Spiegelman’s Pulitzer Prize graphic novel about the Holocaust, as a case in 
point. 
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exception) preserved, or even enhanced, a certain passivity to it. 
Recently, video-renting shops have started to close down, making 
way for the online renting and buying of films. Documentary 
distribution platforms developed online renting systems, where 
one can rent films for a week, a month or even a year, sometimes 
for as little as one Euro.
335
 Free alternatives, like online 
documentary film collections or libraries, are also becoming 
increasingly available.
336
 In 2013, the video sharing website Vimeo 
launched the self-distribution service On Demand,
337
 where authors 
can sell their own film productions, keeping 90% of the revenues 
after taxation. Thus, the documentary viewer does no longer even 
need to suitably dress up, prepare, and go out of his door in order 
to watch stories from the civil war in Syria or from the Ukrainian 
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 One growing case is JourneyMan Documnetaries 
(http://www.journeyman.tv/). Film festival or associations of film festivals 
also developed such renting systems, like DOC ALLIANCE 
(http://www.dafilms.de). 
336
DocumentaryHeaven (http://documentaryheaven.com/),  
Documentary Addict (http://documentaryaddict.com), Top Documnetary 
Films (http://topdocumentaryfilms.com). National databases are also being 
establishe. In Canada, for example: HotDocs Doc Library 
(http://www.hotdocslibrary.ca) or The National Film Bord 
(https://www.nfb.ca).  
337
 The service is available for Pro mambers, status ubgradable for a small 
fee. (https://vimeo.com/ondemand). 
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Maidan: today, this is rendered possible by virtue of one single 
click.  
What happens, we have to ask, to the documentary-
generated empathy, particularly in these times of increasing rush? 
Is it turning into a more of a passive empathy, the way Megan 
Boler fears? And she is not alone in her concern: similar to Megan 
Boler’s notion of ‘passive empathy’ is Ann Kaplan’s ‘empty 
empathy’, which refers to the catastrophe-related sentimentalism 
encouraged by Eurocentric culture and their medias.
338
 It is the 
superficial empathy process, sped up by the abundance of images 
travelling from mobile phones via the internet to tablets and iPads, 
at the end of which one is left concerned more with his or her 
“own tears”
339
 than with the suffering of the other.
 
The thus 
described process doesn’t lead towards helping, or towards any 
other sort of tendency to action or moral attitude, for that matter. 
The empathy might be there but, Kaplan fears, in a superficial 
form. The melodramatic form prevents the viewer from 
developing a meaningful, lasting concern.  
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The prevalence of empathy-generating visuals is not 
surrounded merely with scepticism, certainly not on the art history 
terrain. Dominic McIver Lopes’ conviction is that the image-
generated empathy contributes to our overall ‘empathic skill’, 
adding to our overall ability of empathising, which will be 
exercised outside the particular pictures, and independent from 
them:
340
  
By way of analogy, indoor climbing walls contribute to 
climbing ability because climbing mountains contributes to 
climbing ability and indoor climbing walls afford climbs that 
are relevantly similar to climbs up mountains.
341 
Regardless of their shortcomings, the contribution of the many 
empathy-generating images to our empathic skill, which needs to 
be trained and developed, is not to be denied. Megan Boler’s 
‘passive empathy’ theory is not entirely bleak, but she came up 
with a superior alternative to it: the ‘testimonial reading’. In a 
contemporary continuous ‘crises’ climate, representations of truth, 
which are neither static nor fixed, are required, some of which 
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 McIver Lopes (2011), 118–133. The ‘empathy for pictures’ is understood 
here in the broader sense: photographs and paintings alike also fall under 
that category. 
341
 Ibid., 119. 
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enable the reader himself to actively play his part in the production 
of that truth.
342
 As opposed to the passive or the empty empathy, 
testimonial reading presupposes a participatory self-reflexivity, and 
the acceptance that reading about the distress of others might 
potentially involve a task on one’s own side. If we are to agree with 
Boler, then the new developments in media technology which 
made interactivity possible in the context of documentary 
products, and where the viewer can participate or even generate 
his own content, appear particularly fit to counteract the passive 
empathy. 
I have argued in Part I of the current work that, regardless 
of the abundant literature on empathy in various other academic 
fields, the situation changes when it comes to documentary 
moving image. Yet, there is a bigger remaining reason of 
dissatisfaction with the current stage of the discussion: whatever 
already exists that follows the empathic process, has been of 
almost no interest to film theorists.
343
 Documentary films in 
resistance contexts are emergency products and, besides the fact 
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 Boler (1999), 166. 
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 There is some work coming from the cognitivist film scholars, for 
example Greg M. Smith (2003). 
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that they aim to move their spectator, behind the production 
process, as pointed out earlier, there is almost always a function: to 
attract aid – from political and humanitarian to military. At times, I 
have shown, these films are yet another tool of the resistance 
movement itself.
344
 In other words, whatever action follows the 
viewer’s empathic process, this is one of the reasons, and 
sometimes the reason, which in the first place motivated the 
production.  
So, we firstly have to ask, can empathy translate into 
meaningful action or, quite on the contrary, is the increased 
production and distribution of traumatic images a danger for 
significant, empathy-guided moral attitude? The makers of 
resistance documentaries would argue that there is indeed a direct 
relationship between documentary film viewing and an altruistic 
tendency to action.  
In order to test the hypotheses, we first need to look at the 
liaisons between empathy-generated feelings of distress and our 
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 After the 1970s, starting with central America and The Caribbean, 
revolutionary and insurgent movements all around the world were 
establishing their own Film Insitutes: INCINE (Nicaraguan Institute of 
Cinema), Film Institute of Revolutionary El Salvador (Collective Cero á la 
Izquierda), etc. 
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helping behaviour (6.2.1), as well as at the connections between 
film viewing and action (6.2.2). By the end of this chapter, it 
should become obvious how documentary interactivity, brought 
about by the Internet and transmedia possibilities, does not make 
the documentary viewing experience increasingly passive. Neither 
does it add to the passive empathy. On the contrary, it enhances 
the empathy-generated helping behaviour.  
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6.2 From Empathising to Action  
6.2.1 Empathic Distress as Prosocial 
Motivator  
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎6.1 The interest in Empathy ... increased in the last 
years, as opposed to the decrees of interest in looking up 
Sympathy ... according to the data saved by Google and 
displayed by Trends. 
 
The interest in Empathy is on the rise. Google Trends shows a 
boost in the worldwide curiosity for looking up the term (Fig 6.1). 
Jeremy Rifkin, advisor of the European Commission, of 
Chancellor Merkel and of president Barack Obama, amongst 
others, identified empathy, understood as “the ability to recognise 
oneself in the other and the other in oneself”, as a “deeply 
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democratizing experience”: “Empathy is the soul of 
democracy”.
345
 Barack Obama himself pointed out the “empathy 
deficit” as being at least as stringent a problem for society as the 
federal deficit is.
346
  
It is widely acknowledged that empathy plays a key role in 
our understanding of others, that it makes people kinder, more 
caring. It has become common to account empathy’s contribution 
to our moral attitude and the influence it has on our action: in 
other words, the fact that empathy does make us more helpful. 
Moral philosopher Lou Agosta went as far as to argue that we 
even get our “humanness”, the quality of being human, from the 
one we are empathising with.
347
 
Yet, like other aspects of the empathic process, its 
important moral component, its capacity to wire helping, is not a 
novel discovery. Like mimicry, it was first observed by Adam 
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 Rifkin (2009), 161. 
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 Obama (June 19, 2006), at Northwestern University Comencement. 
Available online on:  
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Smith, as early as 1759.
348
 Abundant evidence confirmed Adam 
Smith’s assumption. We know today that seeing somebody else in 
distress generates personal feelings of distress on the side of the 
observer, a distress that can be alleviated through helping: the 
empathic distress.
 349
 Consequently, having the ability to help 
anguished people can reduce that distress, alongside one’s 
inclination to painful empathic over-arousal. 
Psychologist C. Daniel Batson is one life-long examiner of 
the relationship between empathy and altruistic helping. In the last 
25 years, Batson and his team undertook a long series of 
experiments investigating people’s empathic responses to 
witnessing other persons in distress, the core question for many of 
his experiments being: in which way empathic distress is linked to 
altruism, generating care, and an overall prosocial behaviour. He 
managed to gather plentiful evidence for the empathy-altruism 
hypotheses (Batson et al. (1991, 1995, 1997, 2001, 2011). For most 
of these experiments, the emphasis was on the more complex, 
imaginative dimension of empathy (what I hitherto call 
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 Research is reviewed, amongst others, by Hoffman (1978, 2000), Batson 
(1982) and more recently Berenger, in assessing the relationship between 
empathy and pro-environmental behaviour (2007).    
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identification, and what in Hoffman’s work goes under the name 
of role taking or perspective taking). One of them, dating from 
1982, presupposed that participants are separated into two groups: 
one group was instructed to pay attention (law-empathy condition) 
to the information provided by the victim, while the other group 
was told to imagine the victim’s feelings (high-empathy condition). 
The subjects, students in psychology, were asked to listen to a tape 
recording with another fellow student, Carol, who supposedly 
broke both her legs in a car accident and was still partially 
immobilized, risking to fail her first year at the university. One 
group of students, asked to objectively focus on the information, 
clearly displayed less empathic emotions, and in a later stage of the 
experiment, were also more reluctant to offer Carol the needed 
help. Conversely, the students asked to imagine how Carol must 
have felt in those circumstances showed higher empathic feelings 
and displayed an altruistic attitude.  
Additionally, and more important for us here, in the 
second part of the experiment, the students were informed, via a 
hand-written letter from Carol, that she still hoped not to fail the 
class and was asked for her colleagues’ help. She was asking the 
other students to assist her, by passing on to her their own notes. 
The help Carol needed was for them to go with her through one 
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month of missed classes.  Two variables were built up by the 
experiment: ‘ease of escape condition’ and ‘difficult escape 
condition’. In the ‘ease of escape condition’, the letter read that 
Carol was still immobilized at home and that, in order to help, 
subjects would have to travel all the way there. The ‘difficult 
escape condition’ was more problematic, since, as Carol was 
stating in her letter, she could have come to class, where the help 
could have been offered. In this case, even if the subjects didn’t 
agree to help, they would have had to see Carol again and again, 
and face their refusal of the easily identifiable colleague, in her 
wheelchair with both her legs still in casts. The students in the 
‘objective’ group accepted to help when escape was difficult, but 
rather not when escape from helping was easy, thus showing that, 
behind their helping attitude was the egoistic goal of reducing self-
distress. Conversely, the students who, in the first part of the test, 
had been asked to imagine how Carol would feel, and thus 
identified with her, were highly inclined to helping – even when 
helping was easy to escape.  
This is just one in a long series of experiments successfully 
bringing evidence to the way empathic emotions prompt altruistic 
motivation to help. Even more so: it also brought additional 
evidence that the higher the focus on the emotions of a person in 
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need, the higher will be the motivation to reduce that need. Since 
the above-described experiment was published, increasing 
empirical evidence was gathered to support the hypotheses that 
empathy not only strengthens one’s motivation to act (Batson 
1991), but that this motivation is altruistic (Batson and Show 
1991a, Batson 1997). The desire to help others is not only aimed at 
increasing one’s own welfare, alleviate one’s own distress at the 
sight of the other in distress, or contributing to one’s social 
desirability, but it can be truly altruistic. There is almost no 
opposition to Batson’s findings
350
: the empathy-triggered 
motivation has as ultimate goal to alleviate the pain of the other, to 
help the one in need, and it is not ultimately aimed at the 
observer’s welfare. 
Batson’s empirical findings constitute the basis for the 
development of several theories on empathy’s moral dimension, as 
well as to moral action. This happened in academic fields, which 
traditionally do not cross the realm of psychological or clinical 
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 Few researchers questioned Batson’s methodology, that altruistic helping 
exists, and that it is associated with empathic feelings of distress. Neuberg et 
al. (1997), for example, advanced data against the empathy-altruism 
hypothesies, stating that Batson’s observed effects were more likely 
acountable for non-altruistic and non-empathy-based factors. This theory 
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studies. Care theorist Michael Slote and ethics scholar Julinna 
Oxley, for example, both looked at Batson’s results to answer core 
questions about the relationship between altruism and empathy, 
and reach the same conclusion: that empathy is crucial to moral 
motivation. When it comes to direct action, however, empathy’s 
potential faces scepticism. Julinna Oxley distances herself from 
Slote when she argues that, while essential, empathy is however 
not sufficient for moral judgement and action.
351
 Recent findings 
in development psychology, however, confirm Michael Slote in his 
account of empathy as being central to the ethics of care. Empathy 
constitutes the very basis of our moral judgement, while its 
limitations do not prevent it from guiding our moral behaviour. 
Martin Hoffman’s work (1981, 2000, 2014) shows not only that 
empathy is enough for triggering action, but also why it is so. It 
accounts for the way empathy affects not only our behaviour on a 
short term but, in the long run, of society in its entirety: the long-
lasting and significant contribution empathy has to caring, on one 
hand, and to law and law changing, and justice in general, on the 
other.  
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Empathic distress is central to the Hoffmanian theory of 
empathy. In order to demonstrate the direct interconnection 
between prosocial moral action and empathic distress, Hoffman 
correlates evidence from three distinct phenomena, convincingly 
showing that: empathic distress is associated with helping 
behaviour, that empathic distress proceeds and motivates our 
helping, and that we do feel better after helping.
352
 Helping is what 
alleviates our empathic distress, with an equally valid flip of the 
coin: not attempting to help only prolongs our own unease. 
Consequently, past occurrences leave traces on what can lessen the 
personal empathic distress: we do know from experience that 
helping makes us feel better.  
The empathy-generated instances of helping distant others 
are indeed multiple and, more often than not, outside the reach of 
conventional quantifications. An attempt to account for them 
comes from Martin Hoffman (2014), who makes a bottom-up 
evaluation, namely individual empathy-generated feelings of 
distress leading to significant contributions to social change: 
Harriet Beecher Stowe, whose loss of a son led to the writing of 
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Uncle Tom’s Cabin, a highly influential work in the American Civil 
War; Nobel Peace Prize Nominee Craig Kielburger who founded 
Free for Children after being empathically disturbed by the photo 
and story of a murdered five year old Pakistani boy who tried to 
escape his factory work. An interesting case brought up by 
Hoffman is Susan Sontag’s. In On Photography, Susan Sontag argued 
for the force that images of distressed others have on our 
empathic feelings (though she calls it sympathy).
353
 Years later, in 
Regarding the Pain of Others, and after the proliferation of such 
images commenced, Sontag raised doubts about her earlier belief 
in the power of images.
354
 Nevertheless, as Hoffman correctly 
points out, it was Susan Sontag’s personal empathic distress in 
early teenage years, experienced at the sight of a photograph from 
the Holocaust, which was carried and developed throughout the 
years. Eventually, it contributed to the writing of her influential 
books. It might well be that caring is often selfish and every gene is 
a selfish gene
355
. As Hoffman ironically puts it, humans are not 
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“saintly-empathic-distress-leads-to-helping-machines”,
356
 and just 
by taking a brief look at the state of the world, it becomes apparent 
that empathic distress does not always lead to helping. But 
instances abound when this is, however, the case, and the viewing 
of a documentary film has the potential to influence a prosocial 
attitude in the spectator. 
In the last two chapters, we will look at means of 
accurately quantifying the influence images from revolutionary 
documentary film, might have for producing meaningful action – 
in the context of novel possibilities brought about by technical 
developments. Firstly, however, there is one more argument to be 
made for the film-generated action hypothesis. 
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6.2.2 Tendency to Action: Torben Grodal’s 
PECMA Flow Theory of Film 
Viewing  
 
 
Danish film theoretician, Torben Grodal proposed a general 
theory of the film experience (1997), which he later (2006) named 
PECMA flow (short for perception, emotion, cognition, and 
motor action), and developed it in his seminal book Embodied 
Visions. Evolution, Emotion, Culture, and Film (2009). Grodal starts 
from the premises that the architecture of our brains impacts the 
way we perceive film, as well as all other audio visual products 
which technology can afford, in the same way our embodied brain 
influences the way we experience the natural world around us. 
Grodal based his PECMA flow model on the general 
architecture of our brains and bodies. In a first stage of the flow, 
those internal parts of the brain (for example the visual cortex), 
which receives information from the ‘entrance’ devices, the 
sensory, deliver it for further analysis to the peripheral organs 
responsible for perceiving the external stimuli, like sound and light. 
Second, the input is passed on to the association cortex and other 
adjacent parts of the brain, where it is being attributed an 
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accumulation of depictions and information stored in memory. A 
more sophisticated analysis is then performed in the cognitive 
centres of the brain, one of them being the limbic system, where 
the information is processed, suppositions of outcomes are 
generated and evaluated, before an actual outcome is produced. 
Thus, in the last step of the flow, the motor and pre-motor 
cortices activate the motor system, and actions are either planned, 
or performed by muscles (Fig 6.2). 
In short, the functionality of the senses is that of collecting inputs, 
which in turn may trigger actions, as dictated by emotions. When 
one cannot respond to these inputs in a desirable way, the body’s 
internal states might be modified in such a way as to produce 
bodily reactions like crying and laughter. Grodal’s research made 
clear that our brains and bodies are constructed in such a way as to 
control and generate actions, and the human experience of viewing 
a film makes no exception. In the case of the typical movie viewing 
experience, as described by Grodal’s PECMA flow, the eyes 
receive light (data) from the screen and pass it on to the visual 
cortex, where millions of pieces of information, such as colours 
and shadows, are being analysed.  
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Figure ‎6.2 The PECMA Flow Model, incorporating 
transmedia platforms; adapted by me from Grodal (2006), 2.  
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In the second stage of the flow, parts of the brain such as the 
association cortex are attributing to the analysed object various 
representations from the millions already stored in the memory, 
where they are already labelled with emotional tags: 
So when we make a match viewing a film, whether the match 
is tiger or handsome man, our emotions are automatically 
activated via links between memory files and the limbic 
system.
357
 
The frontal lobe of the brain is now in charge with the control and 
implementation of actions. The tension accumulated so far might 
change into relaxation when turned into action: in Grodal’s terms, 
when the goals are fulfilled. The fourth and final stage of the flow 
concerns the implementation of the action tendencies resulted 
from the earlier emotional processing. As opposed to other forms 
of visual art, Grodal argues, the filmmaker has an increased control 
over the spectator’s attention and chain of emotions, and thus 
more prone to facilitate our tendency to action. Grodal argues that 
the forth step in the PECMA flow is only wholly activated not by 
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film watching, but by real life actions and, more recently, video 
games.
358
 It is true that we do not have the same type of reactions 
in the cinema venue and in real life. We do not run away in panic 
when we watch a horror movie, neither do we try to help film 
characters when endangered. Responsible for this, Grodal 
convincingly explains, is our capacity to evaluate the film’s reality-
status. A continuous evaluation of the sensory input, and the 
consequent assessment of whatever is real or not, is essential for 
real life as well as for film viewing, for understanding both the 
world around us as well as the filmic world. Furthermore, the 
response the reality status evaluation receives dictates whether 
action is to be undertaken – and, as it was stated at the beginning 
of this work, documentary films come labelled with reality status 
(with the assumption that what is shown in the film happened in 
the real world).  
  Due to the reality-status evaluation, the PECMA flow of 
film viewing doesn’t activate the motor cortex, the way real life 
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does.  Interactive video and computer games, however, Grodal 
argues, made way to a new type of immersive experience, finally 
being able to involve the fourth stage in the PECMA flow: 
concrete action.  
The interactivity intrinsic to experiencing new I-docs, 
trans-media or cross-platform documentaries, I will argue in 
chapter 8, once they arrest the PECMA flow, have the same 
property attributed by Grodal only to real life and games: of 
activating that part of the brain charged with concrete, motor 
action. In the same way as the games do, i-Docs, we will show, 
enable a fusion between the role of viewer and participant, 
spectator and actor. 
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7 Towards an Ending: From Filmic Empathy to 
Action  
7.1 Revolutionary Documentaries in the Age 
of Internet 
 
 
Cinema has not yet been invented!
359
        – André Bazin 
 
The Web Documentary Manifesto was launched in April 2013, when 
several documentary makers, pointing out the new technological 
possibilities Internet has to offer, called for a revolution. “It is 
time, fellow comrades, for a revolution!”
360
, was the third 
commitment of the Manifesto. 
The Manifesto pointed out the need for using “the web” as 
a place of creation and distribution of documentary films, one 
which would potentially minimise the gap between filmmakers and 
their audiences. Before the emergence of the Internet, 
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documentary making was still restricted by television and cinema 
norms, such as formats and running time. Linearity was another 
limitative quality of the documentary experience. When distributed 
online, these limits of the documentary genre seem to have come 
to an end. 
There is no consensus on whichever name should be used 
for the new sub-genre, this new phenomenon in documentary 
making. But be they named multimedia products, cross-media, 
transmedia or multi-platform documentaries, they represent a 
point of increased interest for all sides of the documentary 
production spectrum: producers, distributors and documentary 
makers, including those who proclaim the bettering of the world as 
their goal, they all try to be fast in understanding the real 
possibilities Internet has to offer to the genre.  
Yet, not everybody shares the same optimism when it 
comes to both the possibilities for democratisation that Internet 
has to offer to the new documentary films and their empathic 
potential. Gordon Queen, producer and director of documentary 
films since the 1960s, expresses such reservations: "I have some 
concerns about the fact that everyone is in their little niche. 
Narrowcasting is fine, but I think the element of broadcast – of 
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people experiencing a powerful emotional event together – is 
terribly important for a democracy".
361
 
Whether or not the empathic capacities of revolutionary 
documentaries are to benefit from the new possibilities Internet 
has to offer, and how exactly the new sub-categories should be 
defined, are issues to be discussed in the following chapter 
(chapter 8).  
Beforehand, however, we should acknowledge that action 
facilitators (as I call here the cues filmmakers build within the 
documentary frames in order to direct action) are not a novelty 
that came with the age of the Internet: they are as old as the genre 
itself (chapter 7.2). Older than ‘the age of Internet’, I will argue, is 
also the attempt to get the story told on various media platforms, 
in order to facilitate the tendency to action (chapter 7.3). 
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7.2 Action Facilitators: Captions and Direct 
Plead  
 
 
Resistance documentaries, targeted towards western audiences, are 
made with an agenda in mind, being yet another tool for turning 
the passive spectators into moral active players, who in turn put 
pressure on their governments for taking a moral attitude in their 
foreign policy. Filmmakers of revolutionary documentaries have 
frequently tried to facilitate the tendency to action that comes 
along with the empathic distress emergent from the film viewing, 
and were by necessity looking for specific means to assist it. 
There is a direct relationship between the political role that 
resistance documentaries can play, and developments in media 
technology, not only in terms of recording and processing, but 
more recently, as we will see, in terms of means of distribution. In 
the last years, the tendency was for documentary distribution to 
shift, from the cinema and television frames, towards the space of 
the Internet. Before documentary distribution started to occupy 
space online, however, the possibilities to create action facilitators 
were still limited. With restricted means at their disposal, 
filmmakers made the asking for help explicit; written text and 
317 
 
characters directly addressing the viewers were, until recently, the 
customary means of directing the empathy-generated tendency to 
action.  
Later on in this chapter we are going to look at the 
possibilities that came together with the expanding of 
documentary resistance filmmaking from celluloid to digital file, 
and from the analogue and linear to the digital and non-linear, 
multi-platform. With the new developments, as will be shown, the 
appeal to action, and the action facilitators can now be more subtle 
and diverse, and no longer reduced to candid manifest statements. 
Beforehand, however, we need to briefly look into the less 
restrained, routinely used action facilitator: the direct, 
unambiguous message incorporated in either the written or spoken 
word.  
White on black text insert is a basic, extensively used way 
of directing the spectator’s tendency to action. A cut-in with a still 
displaying text, or – when it comes to documentaries broadcasted 
on TV – video graphics generated in the lower third of the screen 
(the so-called Chyron), are just some usual ways of directing the 
tendency to action that the moved spectators might experience at 
the end of the film viewing. COMPANIERO: VICTOR JARA OF 
CHILE, for example, discussed at length in Chapter 5 of the 
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current work, ends on a still frame displaying the address of the 
Chile Solidarity Campaign, a Cooperative Centre in London. The 
white text on the black screen lasts for exactly 10 seconds, time 
enough for the TV spectator to have it imprinted in one’s mind, or 
to jump up for a pen and a piece of paper.  
The other extensively used action facilitator is the open 
plead of the documentary character, directly addressing the 
overseas film viewer with a concretely formulated appeal. Some are 
very straightforward in their intent, as it is the case with A CRY 
FOR FREEDOM, which, as clearly stated in the title, is an 
imploration for help. 
A CRY FOR FREEDOM is one of the documentaries about 
the resistance against South African apartheid policies produced at 
the beginning of the 1980s, with the support of various Christian 
Churches; in this particular case, the support came from the 
Lutheran Church in America, and the film’s focus was Namibia. 
Despite media censorship, starting in the beginning of the 1980s, 
filmmakers were documenting the resistance against the apartheid 
within the South African borders. The inhumane policies South 
Africa applied in Namibia, however, such as torture and army 
repression, went largely undocumented. Nonetheless, in both 
South Africa and Namibia, the increasing availability of small 
319 
 
format filming equipment, such as Super-8, U-Matic or Beta, along 
with funds made available by western churches, foundations and 
foreign embassies, stimulated the production. In his 1988 book, 
Cinema of Apartheid, media professor Keyan Tomaselli remarked: 
“At the same time, this movement is introducing democratic 
structures and ways of producing films which give oppressed 
people control over the way they are represented”.
362
 
The 21 minutes film is done with the apprehension that it 
is witnessing a crime of proportions, and it is not an oddity that it 
was part of the agenda of the churches: “since 1960s, most 
churches in Namibia have worked steadfastly for the political 
advancement of Namibia, often at great cost”.
363
 The film is 
produced in 1981, a moment of great importance for the country’s 
struggle for independence, and was yet another project for the 
Lutheran Church to raise political awareness in a decisive times 
when the United Nations attempted to gain independence for 
Namibia. 
A CRY FOR FREEDOM combines rare footage from 
Namibia and Angola, including interviews with international 
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politicians. It also includes statements of African and international 
church leaders, mostly in exile for supporting the South West 
Africa People Organisation (SWAPO) liberation movement, or 
just for opposing the illegal actions the South African government 
was perpetrating in Namibia.
364
 As early as the 1970s, Christian 
Churches developed and practiced ‘liberation theology’, and acted 
as a messenger to the outside world, positioning itself on the side 
of SWAPO.
365
 
Destructions of the churches and church goods, church 
newspapers outlawed and numerous exiled clerics, Anglican and 
Lutheran alike, all are documented in this film. The immediate 
goals of the political work undergone in the Churches were 
sanctions against South Africa, and A CRY FOR FREEDOM 
constituted just one means to advocate that.  
Amidst killings and terror, the Christian Churches in 
Namibia appealed to the Christian community, directly asking for 
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help from Churches in the United States. The production of this 
film, which was widely screened in church communities, was one 
way to echo this “cry for freedom”, as Kenneth Senft, at the time 
the Mission officer of the Lutheran Church in America, puts it. 
Without engaging the viewer directly, Kenneth Senft however 
clearly formulates what it is that the American viewer can do for 
Namibia: “They have asked us to assist them in convincing the 
nations of the world, through the United Nations, to provide an 
opportunity for free elections”. The film was made with a clear 
agenda behind it, as part of a bigger, urgent plan: in 1981, the 
United Nations tried to gain independence for Namibia, at a time 
when, in countries with great economical interests in the region, 
the United Kingdom and the United States, right wing parties were 
coming to power. The plan failed, with no chance for 
independence in the next 10 years, and Namibia entered “the lost 
decade”.
366
 But the film, which is now to be found in the archives 
of The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA), is today 
a viable document for how active and how close the Church was in 
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trying to determine concrete action, a resistance documentary 
being just one of the tools at hand.  
The appeal to action that A CRY FOR FREEDOM implied, 
namely pressuring the American public in order to determine the 
government to raise sanctions in South Africa, was the common 
goal that documentaries about the apartheid were pleading for in 
the 1980s. However, other films made it even more explicit. Two 
documentaries produced in the mid-1980s, THE MAKING OF SUN 
CITY and WITNESS TO APARTHEID, do it in a very 
straightforward manner: Winnie Mandela, wife of Nelson Mandela 
at the time, looks into the camera and directly asks the American 
“friends” for sanctions. This interview is a rare instance of 
collaboration between two distinct documentary films, since 
Winnie Mandela’s appeal for sanctions is the identical ending of 
both documentaries, both released almost at the same time. 
Director Sharon Sopher and the team behind WITNESS TO 
APARTHEID (nominated for an Oscar the following year) brought 
the footage of Winnie Mandela’s interview from South Africa. 
They passed the footage on to the team that put together THE 
MAKING OF SUN CITY, a documentary which was to be released a 
few months earlier than its counterpart, thus letting Mandela’s 
message get across sooner. But it is not only swiftness that the 
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appeal needed. The effectiveness of such action facilitators relied 
on the context of their screening, at the time often limited to 
activist circles, NGOs and churches, which were organising 
projections, followed by discussions. The limitations in 
distribution were bringing along limits in the public they were able 
to reach: half way through the 1980s, these films were still seen 
mainly by the already ‘converted’ spectators.  
 
 
7.3 Cross Platform Resitstance Storytelling 
Before the Age of Internet: SUN CITY and 
The Artists United Against Apartheid  
7.3.1 Distribution Constraints and the 
Rise of Creative Media Platforms 
 
 
 “What about films like THE MAKING OF SUN CITY (…)?”, a few 
independent documentary makers were complaining in an open 
letter published March 1987 in the monthly The Independent.
367
 The 
letter was challenging the refusal of the Public Broadcasting 
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System (PBS) to permit the showing of the award winning 
documentary THE MAKING OF SUN CITY. Despite having 
received a Distinguished Documentary Achievement Award from 
the International Documentary Association, PBS refused to air it, 
on grounds that the musicians involved in making the film were 
promoting themselves and their album with the same name.
368
 The 
documentary was part of a larger project, SUN CITY, initiated two 
years beforehand. It was calling for action in South Africa, 
bringing up issues such as the forceful relocation of the black 
South Africans in the so-called ‘homelands’, or the UN-imposed 
cultural boycott on South Africa. The authors of the 1987 letter 
(Pamela Yates, Peter Kinoy and Tom Siegel) were themselves 
makers of resistance documentaries. Their WHEN THE 
MOUNTAINS TREMBLE, extensively discussed in Part II of the 
current work, was also subject to delays in broadcasting, while 
what the authors of such films need in hope of generating 
meaningful, prompt action, is actually a prompt distribution. In the 
particular case of the SUN CITY project, its makers were openly 
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aiming at contributing to the cultural boycott and sanctions against 
the Pretoria regime, by informing and mobilising the American 
citizens. 
The work on the SUN CITY project commenced in 1985 
and continued to grow in a time of turmoil in the American 
politics towards the apartheid era in South Africa. The second half 
of the 1980s was a time of social pressure in the United States, 
which proved to be decisive for the end of the Reagan 
“constructive engagement”,
369
 along with the introduction of new 
sanctions imposed on the Pretoria regime.
370
 Decisive was also the 
role played by graphic images coming out of South Africa, which 
prompted an outraged world to voice their concerns regarding the 
politics of apartheid. The indignation created by these visual 
depictions determined the South African government to impose 
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new media restrictions and censorship, which only increased in 
July 1985, when a state of emergency was declared in South Africa. 
For international broadcasters it was now increasingly difficult to 
get a hold of images from South Africa.
371
 
The urgency of the moment was thus considered, by 
filmmakers and activists alike, imperative for showing 
documentaries like THE MAKING OF SUN CITY on the Public 
Broadcasting System. Therefore, the refusal to air the documentary 
raised the frustration of the authors behind the Open Letter in The 
Independent. They criticised the attitude of the Public Broadcasters 
of waiting “for an appropriately acceptable climate to present 
documentaries like these”
372
: “Will that time ever come if we 
continue to practice such self-censorship?”
373
. 
THE MAKING OF SUN CITY was actually aired in prime 
time by the public Television Station WNYC on January 21st 
1987.
374
 A shorter version of it was also aired on MTV Channel. 
But in those critical times, the complex team organising SUN CITY 
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did not actually wait for a decision of a broadcaster to get the story 
through to the American large public. The makers of SUN CITY 
were in a rush to achieve their manifest goals: from concrete and 
quantifiable ones, like raising funds which went to families of 
political prisoners, to the less measurable empathic effect: to 
“move” the people, as one of the makers put it, and generate 
action.
375
 They did not wait for the time-consuming, uncertain, 
often made behind closed doors decisions of broadcasters and 
commissioning editors, but rather distributed the story and the 
message on multiple, more or less interconnected media platforms, 
transmitting parts of the same message, telling slices of a single 
story. That makes SUN CITY indeed, as early as mid-1980s, a 
cross-media platform avant la lettre. Accordingly, it is considered to 
have had “significantly affected the anti-apartheid movement 
throughout the world”.
376
 Since 2012, the documentary events or 
festivals, which have a transmedia entry in their program, are on 
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the rise.
377
 Producers, distributors and makers alike can no longer 
ignore the possibilities of what is diversely labelled cross-media, 
deep media, multi-platform or transmedia storytelling for 
communicating their stories. In what follows, I will argue that the 
spreading of the story on multiple media platforms plays an 
important role in both enabling the tendency to action of 
resistance documentaries and in reaching a highly diverse public in 
a short time frame. These emerging forms offer novel possibilities 
in quantifying the accomplishments of resistance documentaries 
and, contrary to wide spread opinion, the distribution of the story 
on multiple platforms does not coincide with the emergence of the 
Internet. To illustrate the above, I will use Sun City as a case in 
point, a cross-platform project started in 1985, almost 20 years 
before Henry Jenkins first coined the term ‘transmedia’.
378
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7.3.2 SUN CITY: Context and Origins  
 
     
 
Figure ‎7.1 Sun City album cover. Same logo accompanied all 
the other channels of the project. 
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Opinions on what exactly Sun City is diverge constantly: from public 
campaign
379
, “comprehensive cultural endeavour”
380
, or “one of the 
most fervent and forceful political statements to emerge from 
Eighties pop music”
381
, a song “born out of outrage and the desire 
to educate”
382
, “a compendium of the type of information that moves 
people of conscience to become involved, to act”
383
, “rock-for-a-
cause project”
384
, or simply “project”.
385
  
Sun City is indeed all of the above: song and album, book 
and even educational booklet, video and documentary film, all 
deriving their names from the lavish South African resort Sun City. 
Six years after the resort’s opening in 1979, 54 musical artists of all 
origins, coming from five continents, took a political stand of a 
particular kind: the recording of a song. They authored it as the 
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Artists United Against Apartheid, and had amongst themselves very 
famous names from a variety of musical genres: Afrika Bambaata, 
Bono, Fat Boys, Miles Davis, Peter Gabriel, Lou Reed, Run-DMC, 
Scorpio, Bruce Springsteen and many more. Other musicians, who 
kept joining the project once it started, added new contributions to 
Sun City–the song, and the songs thus recorded brought along the 
creation of Sun City–the album. For the first recorded song of the 
album, the producers and organisers made a music video: 
documentary, manifesto and call for action at the same time. The 
same year a book followed, and then several other booklets and 
videos, while the process behind the production turned into the 
longer documentary film THE MAKING OF SUN CITY. Although a 
lot was communicated through these various media platforms, the 
main message from the title was this: the Artists United Against 
Apartheid were not going to play at the Sun City resort. 
Before understanding Sun City–the project, and the effects 
of it circulating on multiple media platforms, we justifiably have to 
ask, what exactly was, and meant Sun City? Up until today, Sun 
City continues to be an important holiday destination in South 
Africa, and it advertises itself as “one of Africa’s premier vacation 
332 
 
destinations”.
386
 But in South Africa of the 1980s it played a 
considerably more complex role. In their book about the meaning 
of Sun City, Kesting and Weskott are describing it in the context 
of the African continent of the time: “There was no Disneyland in 
Africa. But in South Africa there was Sun City”.
387
 After a visit to 
South Africa in 1982, Eddy Amoo, member of the British Rock 
Group The Real Things, was putting the description in context: “Sun 
City is an Afrikaner’s paradise in a black man’s nightmare”.
388
 
The project Sun City took its name from the extravagant 
South African holiday resort, and one of the problems that its 
creators targeted was the massive involuntary relocation of the 
1980s in which, at the beginning of the decade, the South African 
Government forcefully removed three and a half million black 
people from the “white areas”, and displaced them into Bantustans 
(the so-called homelands or black states). For white South 
Africans, however, there were prospects to be found in the 
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Bantustans. One such opportunity was that their so-called 
independent status was bringing about possibilities of economic 
freedom, like the opening of places banned to them in South 
Africa proper, such as casinos, on grounds that they lacked 
morality.
389
 
Therefore it was the creation of Bantustans that paved the 
way to the creation of Sun City. The resort was eventually 
inaugurated in the vast and poor homeland of Bophuthatswana. 
Here, the entertaining magnate Sol Kerzner created Sun City, as 
part of the “construction of dream places that the white middle 
class desired, which were mirrored in the TV series and soap 
operas being watched from the UK, the US, and Germany”.
390
 
The 90-million-dollar pleasure resort, incorporating the 
Superbowl, a vast auditorium, attracted famous entertainers. The 
more artistic and sports boycotts that South Africa proper was 
facing, the greater was the importance of the Sun City Superbowl 
Arena. International entertainers kept coming to perform at Sun 
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City, having the South African reassurance that the audience was 
not part of the apartheid system. The arrangement was receiving 
increased criticism: “Because most blacks can’t afford the high 
ticket prices at the Superbowl, often a few token tickets are given 
to them for free in order that the entertainers can perform before a 
‘mixed’ audience”.
391
 Many people refused to perform in Sun City, 
joining the U.N. -sponsored boycott of all cultures and sports. But 
despite the bans, and motivated at times by the extraordinary high 
fees, or solely due to a lack of political knowledge, or simply by 
being misinformed, many important names of the entertainment 
industry still did perform there. 
THE MAKING OF SUN CITY–the film, first aired in a 
shorter version on MTV, focused the attention on the cultural 
boycott, and brought new layers of information to the young 
American public. For the best-paid performers of the 1980s, 
however, the cultural boycott on South Africa was not something 
they had to find out from MTV. Many of them subsequently 
found their names on the United Nations blacklist for having 
defied the boycott, sometimes drawn by generous fees: Frank 
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Sinatra, Ray Charles, Cher, Queen, Elton John, Liza Minnelli – and 
up to 200 more.
392
  
In its early beginnings, in 1985, the project Sun City was 
not conceived to function on as many platforms as it ended up 
eventually. These media platforms emerged from the success or 
limitation of the others, which will be discussed in the following 
sub-chapters. A glimpse of the impromptu quality of the entire 
project is visible in the documentary film: we see Steve "Little 
Steven" Van Zandt, organiser and co-producer of the project, on 
the phone, calling people up. Having been two times in South 
Africa and witnessing South African apartheid first hand, an 
outraged Little Steven initiated Sun City as an attempt to take 
action. So what he did, once back home in New York, was to call 
up his friends and colleagues; only that his friends and colleagues 
happened to be the likes of Lou Reed, Bruce Springsteen and 
Bono. Big names, in fact as big or even bigger as those appearing 
on the U.N. blacklist for violating the cultural ban, were now 
supporting the boycott through the Sun City platform. 
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Figure ‎7.2 Lou Reed, John Oates and Ruben Blades at the 
filming of SUN CITY documentary video. Photo: David 
Seeling/ Sun City by Steve Van Zandt. 
 
The renowned names and renowned voices were trying to convey 
the above story for a large, American (and later international) 
audience, and to make a personal manifest towards a boycott, 
while addressing the American citizen, as David Hostetter 
suggests, in the language of popular culture he was accustomed 
337 
 
to.
393
 It is often the case that resistance documentaries make use of 
celebrities to support the story or prompt action. There is also 
extensive academic literature, especially from research performed 
mainly in the field of advertising, which confirmed that the 
backing of a celebrity largely increases the credibility and impact of 
a message.
394
 The idea of using popular celebrities in a 
revolutionary documentary in order to increase the trustworthiness 
of the message is thus not a novelty brought about with the Sun 
City project. As early as 1959, Hollywood actor Errol Flynn 
appeared as himself in two films meant to increase the popularity 
of the Revolution in Cuba, and that of Fidel Castro, amongst the 
American public: THE TRUTH ABOUT FIDEL CASTRO 
REVOLUTION (by Victor Pahlen) and ASSAULT OF THE REBEL 
GIRLS (by Barry Mahon, produced, as stated on the opening 
credits, with the support of the New Army of Cuba). 
 
                                                 
 
393
 Hostetter (2006). 
394
 Atkin and Block (1983), analised the multiple reasons why a well-known 
endorser are influential. Ohanian (1990) developed a Scale to Measure the 
trustworthiness of celebrity endorsers, while more recently, Goldsmith, 
Lafferty and Newell (2000) evaluated the impact of celebrity credibility and 
their atractiveness in reception of advertisment.  
338 
 
 
Figure ‎7.3 Errol Flynn pointing out Cuba’s location in THE 
TRUTH ABOUT FIDEL CASTRO REVOLUTION (1959). 
 
In a similar fashion, the initial clinch of the Sun City story was that 
popular celebrities, like Bono, Peter Gabriel and others, would not 
play at Sun City. At the same time, substantial information was 
being delivered on what was actually going on in South Africa in 
the mid-1980s, when, due to South Africa’s media boycott, less 
and less images from the struggle against apartheid were reaching 
the Western media. The aim of the project became increasingly 
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ambitious: the Artists United Against Apartheid wanted not only to 
inform, but to “move”,
395
 as Little Steve put it.  
The song, the album, the music video and the 
documentary are all very explicit in conveying the anti-apartheid 
message and asking for attitude, regardless of the media platform 
used, as will be explained below.  
 
 
7.3.3 SUN CITY, as Intertwining of Distinct 
Media Platforms 
 
 
The lyrics of Sun City–the song directly address the listeners, while 
in the video, the musicians are being shown in the streets, mingling 
with the American passers-by, while singing their manifesto; the 
sound of it, too, was described as “very street”: 
 It was hot: part rap, part rock – very street. The song was 
high-energy, danceable, a gritty New York-sounding tune, in 
stark contrast by its angry attitude and sound to the sweet 
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harmonies of Hollywood’s more syrupy anthem for aid to 
Ethiopia.
396
  
Even though the song Sun City did not escape the comparison with 
“syrupy anthem” We are the World,
397
 it is obviously more 
informative, more diverse in music and emotions delivered, 
preserving at times a humorous tone while incorporating 
controversial political statements, like criticism towards Reagan’s 
“constructive engagement” policy:  
Our government tells us we’re doing all we can (George 
Clinton) 
Constructive engagement is Ronald Regan’s plan (Joey 
Ramone), 
Meanwhile people are dying and giving up hope (Lou Reed) 
This quiet diplomacy ain’t nothing but a joke (Darlene Love) 
    Sun City, words and music by Little Steve
398
 
 
Disturbing realities from South Africa are also explicitly put in 
lyrics: 
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Relocation to phoney homelands (David Ruffin) 
Separation of families I can’t understand (Pat Benatar) 
23 million can’t vote because they’re black (Eddie Kendricks) 
We’re stabbing our brothers and sisters in the back (Bruce 
Springsteen).
399
  
By referring in such familiar, close terms to the “brothers and 
sisters”, by underlining the proximity (“Ain’t that far away Sun 
City”) and by bringing the South African Apartheid to the 
universal moral dilemmas (“Separation of families I can’t 
understand”), Sun City attempts to transmit to a domestic, maybe 
even uninformed audience, the “persuasive mobilisation 
message”
400
 that Lahusen was talking about. 
After telling the story, the stars performing the song thus 
make public the personal action through which they challenge the 
morally inacceptable (disgusting) problem: no matter how much 
the entertainment resort and the Superbowl Arena have to offer, 
there will be no bargain, and the long list of musicians who we see 
in the video is not going to play in the resort of the so-called 
homeland Bophuthatswana: 
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You can’t buy me, I don’t care what you pay (Duke Bootee, 
Melle Mel & Afrika Bambaataa) 
Don’t ask me, Sun City, because I ain’t gonna play (Linton 
Kwesi & all rappers).
401
  
The refrain is performed by what Lahusen called ‘a choir’:  
In popular music it is the refrain which presents the primary 
and distinct tune of the song. Sun City sticks to this 
convention and uses the refrain to unfold the concept of a 
multi-singer song in a bold manner: a choir is the main 
singing subject.
402
  
Lahusen’s explanation for this unusual take of a choir interpreting 
the refrain is that it points to a participative performance, 
establishing a relationship between this and the solos, between 
person and the collective. It is another way of pointing out the 
main goal at stake: joint action, group solidarity, and the 
togetherness of the enterprise that Sun City–the project is. 
The self-labelled Artists United Against Apartheid continued to put 
together new tracks, besides the two mixes of Sun City (one more 
guitar-based, the other featuring synthesisers). Rather than having 
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an initial plan, the impromptu work of Peter Gabriel, Scorpio, Fat 
Boys and many others led to the creation of a new media platform 
for the project, the album Sun City. The titles of the tracks are self-
explanatory: No More Apartheid, Let me see your I.D., The Struggle 
Continues and what the makers called “a documentary montage”
403
, 
Revolutionary Situation. In 1987, Artists United Against Apartheid were 
nominated for the Grammy awards as a group, while the video 
received its own Grammy nomination in the same year. The book 
Sun City followed the success of the album. It was produced in 
only four months and promptly published by Penguin Books in 
1985.
404
 It documented the process behind the production of the 
album with a lot of voluntary work from producers, 
photographers, publishers and others. One agenda the makers had 
with the book was for it to be a fund-raising project. All the money 
gathered from selling the book went to The Africa Fund, a non-
profit organization registered with the United Nations. 
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Figure ‎7.4 Standing l–r: David Ruffin and Eddie Kendrick; 
seated l–r: Arthur Baker and Little Steve. Photo: David 
Seeling/ Sun City by Steve Van Zandt.  
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At the same time, it was working as an advertisement for the music 
album. It is a premium product type of music book, a high format 
album with glossy, thick paper that features many colourful photos 
with famous musicians, plus the lyrics of the tracks included on the 
album. And even if it might look like the average music book, it is 
by all means not an ordinary one. 
The book has a two-part structure – intercalated but 
contrasting sides: on one hand, the book is a rather conventional 
making-of of an album and its single, including large parts of the 
story behind its making and the boycott which were both left out 
of the video. It is richly illustrated with colourful, joyful photos of 
the start of the recordings, from Master Jay jamming for Run-
DMC to Miles Davis playing his trumpet and Jimmy Cliff and 
Darlene Love smiling widely to the camera. Only, every fourth or 
sixth page the content changes, as if one would look through an 
entirely different book, or into a rather different world. This other, 
intercalated part is no longer in bright colour, but black and white, 
and displays disturbing photos and information from the South 
African apartheid-regime. Thus, the book combines various 
photos from the making of the project, with powerful photos from 
South African realities, and concrete information, mainly 
quotations from The Washington Office on Africa Educational Fund, 
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about various realities: education, health, crime rate, abuses, arrests 
and relocations, statistics, or legal aspects (such as Africans being 
forbidden to vote). Quotations from South African politicians 
complete the picture. It is not that images of convoys of coffins, 
police abuses or the horrid view of the Sharpeville Massacre and 
protests presented in Sun City–the book were a novelty to the 
Americans in 1985. Neither were the attitudes of the Nobel Peace 
laureate Desmond Tutu, or Nelson Mandela, quoted there.  
But the book provides a strange mixture, and looking 
through it can be a strange experience: the fact that by flipping 
through the pages one goes from images of joyous stardom to 
such scenes as corpses lying on the floor, must have been an 
uncanny experience for the American music fan of the mid-80s, 
regardless of political views or personal social involvement.  
Thus, it overcame the conventional frameworks of a ‘rock 
book’, by having faithfully followed the concept of the video-doc 
SUN CITY.  
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7.3.4 Resistance Music Video-Doc and 
the Tasks Performed by Multiple 
Platforms  
 
 
The SUN CITY video was made as a hybrid between short 
documentary and music video: indeed, a resistance music video-
doc. The pro bono work of so many performers, dispersed on five 
continents, meant that many did not show up in the studio offered 
by co-producer Arthur Baker, but rather just recorded their part, 
and then shipped it to New York. Here, the pieces were eventually 
mixed together. Despite this discrepancy, the video-doc, with all 
the various artists of different styles, rockers and rappers, 
intertwining their voices and walking streets together, conveys a 
sense of collaborative action. 
Consequently, part of it is conceived as a rather classic 
music video. It features footage of the artists at the recording of 
the album, or outdoors original footage on the streets of New 
York, in East Harlem with the musicians engaging with the camera 
and thus delivering the message. Images from Washington Square 
Park or from East Harlem creatively blended in through 
superimposition with images from South Africa, unrests in 
Soweto, uncanny footage covering brutal police force, mass 
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funerals of people shot to death, and funerals turned into protests. 
Disturbing images of the life of black people in Bophuthatswana 
are effectively combined with footage from the resort Sun City. 
 
 
Figure ‎7.5 Little Steve and Lou Reed. Photo: Chase Roe/ Sun 
City by Steve Van Zandt. 
 
The video, signed by the self-labelled Artists United Against 
Apartheid, was presented at the United Nations. And to the Artists 
United Against Apartheid went the official Letter of Appreciation 
signed by Ambassador Serge Elie Charles, Chairman of the Special 
Committee Against Apartheid. The ceremony, an episode in the 
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documentary The Making of Apartheid, brought in the same room 
what David Marsh called “probably the most diverse group of 
musicians ever assembled for any purpose”
405
: 
For almost forty years, world leaders and dignitaries have 
graced reception in the Dag Hammarskjold Library in the 
penthouse of one of the United Nations buildings, but rarely 
has the U.N. played host to a group anything like the one that 
showed up on October 30, 1985.
406
 
The U.N. moment is documented in THE MAKING OF SUN CITY, 
this being just one of the instances when the various platforms do 
not deliver an identical story, but grow out of each other. Another 
such instance is the direct reference to the entertainers who 
performed at Sun City for, more often than not, very generous 
amounts of money. Even if the accusations in Sun City are not 
overt and names are not being mentioned, the song is not exactly 
subtle. The decision not to name fellow musicians who had not 
respected the U.N. cultural boycott did not come without 
argument: “Since there were many well-known artists who had 
deliberately and sometimes repeatedly violated the boycott, yet got 
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away scot-free when they came home, Schechter felt that [it] would 
be appropriate to name names. Little Steve wasn’t so sure”.
407
 In 
an early stage of the song’s production, lyrics did single out some 
entertainers and musicians who violated the boycott and 
performed in Sun City, and did it in a straightforward manner:  
Linda Ronstadt, how could you do that 
Rod Stewart, tell me that you didn’t do it 
Julio Iglesias, you oughta be ashamed to show your face 
Queen and the O’Jays, what you got to say?408  
 
Later on, these lyrics were left out from the song, but other Sun 
City media platforms – namely the documentary and the book – 
keep references to the boycott violators. In the book even more of 
the ones performing at Sun City are named: Elton John, Ray 
Charles, and Frank Sinatra. In the documentary film, only Rod 
Stewart is named en passant in a spontaneous interview on the 
street, which does not appear out of place, since the entire film has 
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a making-of aura, filmed on the run, in the exact way the video and 
the album were made.  
The spreading of the message on multiple platforms raises 
consequent problems. In the Introduction to the current work, I 
was elaborating on issues of inherent dangers related to the making 
of resistance documentaries. Even if at a first glance Sun City might 
seem remote from such intrinsic risks, it is not, however, the case. 
Musicians from all around the world were involved in the project, 
and it seemed just natural to include groups from South Africa as 
well. Eventually, two participated in the making of it, Via Africa, at 
the time of the making of Sun City working and living in the 
United States, and Malopoets, whose members were still living in 
Soweto. In the book Little Steve recalls the bold nature of the 
collaboration: “I asked them: it could be dangerous to be on this 
record, I mean, who knows what reprisals may happen? And they 
just told me: ‘We have to be on this record. We don’t care about 
reprisals. Even if it means our death’. When somebody tells you 
they are ready to die to be on a record, you know, that’s 
commitment.”
409
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Such statements distributed in the book, on the album, the 
video/documentary and the MTV film had another, broader 
meaning: openly aiming at triggering an empathic response from a 
large American public, and eventually generate action.  In the 
words of the creator of the project, Little Steve, the book was “a 
compendium of the type of information that moves people of 
conscience to become involved, to act”.
410
 Did Little Steve and 
The Artists United Against Apartheid achieve this declared goal? The 
direct connection between the project (one among many others) 
and the unprecedented international civic involvement in the 
South African struggle is impossible to quantify. The subsequent 
question prevails: can we ever quantify the empathy-generated 
action?  
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7.3.5 Empathy-Generated Action: 
Unquantifiable Achievements  
 
 
The song Sun City was born out of outrage and desire to educate. The 
thrust of this effort has been to stimulate awareness, to ask people 
everywhere to get involved by singing along and informing themselves 
about South Africa.
411
   
      – Little Steve, 1995 
Sun City [i.e. the resort] can’t be as easily condemned as ‘I ain’t 
gonna play Sun City’ would have us believe.
412
                    
– Kesting and Weskott, 2009 
The political statement and mobilisation message that Little Steve 
and Artists United Against Apartheid wanted to get across, reached a 
public beyond the limits of the small crowd of the usual 
documentary goers, or the ‘converted’ already involved in the 
cause. The sole fact that it combined so many musical styles was 
yet another way to approach a larger audience, but it also got 
beyond the much larger crowds of rock and rap fans. 
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Thus presented, on multiple media platforms, Sun City 
reached a broad and diverse crowd, from the uninformed citizen 
watching TV, all the way to the doors of the United Nations. It is 
customary to measure success of resistance documentaries, as well 
as human rights campaigns, by the awards and distinctions they 
summed up. SUN CITY-the film received a Distinguished 
Documentary Achievement Award from the International 
Documentary Association and was nominated for the Grammy 
Award for Best Long Form Music Video, while the Artists United 
Against Apartheid got a Grammy nomination for Rock Duo or 
Group Vocal. In the Rolling Stones magazine, the Album made it 
to the first 100 albums in the 1980s,
413
 while in the press at the 
time it got some raving reviews: “The album has a fierce, 
declamatory impact”.
414
 But is all the above enough evidence to 
consider that the people behind Sun City achieved their goal, to 
“move” and stimulate action? Up until today, music reviewers see 
the eclectic style of Sun City as an exceptional achievement: 
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The ‘Sun City’ project did an amazing job bringing people 
together and raising awareness. Anyone who can rally Miles 
Davis, Brett Michaels and the Fat Boys around a cause that 
doesn’t involve heroin, hot chicks, or an enormous sandwich 
has got to be doing something right.
415
 
For Little Steve, specifically the fact that the mix of music genres 
was too eclectic was the reason why the song never made it into a 
Radio Hit.
416
  
The point was made earlier that there was a great degree of 
spontaneity behind the growing of the entire project. But the 
distribution of such ingenious appeal to action was not achieved 
only by the odds being favourable. Although there was large 
improvisation to the project, implied by its unpredictable nature, a 
well thought-up media plan stood behind the becoming of Sun 
City.  
The Africa Fund charitable organisation put together the 
logistics necessary to make use of the momentum created by the 
song: infrastructure necessary to manage telephonic and written 
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enquiries, educational texts and videos, aiming at the fulfilment of 
the didactic side of the project. From the perspective of the Africa 
Fund, the project consisted in an information campaign, where the 
Sun City album was just the beginning. The organisation prepared 
several school handouts, increasing in complexity, alongside 
teaching guides. In an interview with Christian Lahusen, Jim 
Carson, the former Associate Director of the Africa Fund was 
describing the Sun City project as an information path. From his 
point of view, as NGO coordinator, the success of the project was 
to be measured in the amount of people who, starting from the 
initial Sun City incentive, accessed the complex layers of 
information the NGO had to offer through its conventional 
channels (e.g. booklets, videos, teaching material) and eventually 
triggering action. For Jim Carson, there was a big gap between 
those who got the Sun City incentive (bought the album, for 
example) and those who reached the more complex information 
stages: 
But the point is you gradually reach up the level of knowledge 
as you go on. And I am not claiming that all of the people, all 
that one million people who bought Sun City got to that 
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level. I’m saying there is a path that you can go through to go 
further up. And clearly less and less people make it up.
417
 
Jim Carson was talking here from the perspective of the NGO 
coordinator. His view, even if very informative, is however limited 
to a single aspect of the entire picture. SUN CITY spread on so 
many media platforms, and it would be erroneous to track down 
its effectiveness or success in the path-following explicit terms in 
which Carson sees it. SUN CITY was not a path, but, if we are to 
preserve Carson’s metaphor, we should call it a conglomerate of 
suspended bridges and highways, leading to a similar destination 
while taking up passengers from different points and taking 
different directions. If we are to quantify in Carson’s terms, then 
the starting numbers are the more than one million copies of the 
album sold world wide, from which less and less were taking the 
path up in getting interested, accumulating more in-depth 
information and action. 
However, this bottom-up quantification of success 
proposed by the NGO coordinator is limitative, since Sun City is 
outside the realm of a conventional media campaign. Neither did 
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Sun City, as a complex cross-media project, originate solely from 
the initiative of musicians. The TV producer, filmmaker and media 
critic Danny Schechter was involved in the process from the very 
early stages. It is in agreement with him that the concept was 
brought together, both the narrative, which was to be delivered – 
namely a story of a fight of music stars against the system in 
another country – through a musical boycott, and the multiple 
platforms on which it was to be delivered. The role of the media 
expert Danny Schechter in envisaging Sun City is acknowledged by 
Christian Lahusen (1996) and David L. Hostetter (2006). The 
famous face behind Sun City, the organiser of the project, Little 
Steve, reminisces Schechter’s contribution: “Danny really inspired 
the thing”.
418
 Lahusen describes the early stages of the concept in 
his in-depth analysis of the music production of Sun City:  
As a result of conversations with Danny Schechter, a 
journalist and television producer, Little Steven decided in the 
spring of 1985 to produce an album that would take up the 
issue of the struggling black South Africa from a clearly 
political perspective. (…) Furthermore, Little Steven and 
Danny Schechter agreed that the album had to deal with the 
cultural boycott in order to link the US-American artistic 
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community to the struggle of black South Africans, stress the 
artists’ contribution to the end of apartheid and use this topic 
as a tool for educating the general public about the issue.
419
  
In a project where borders between media were loose, so were the 
roles performed by the few people leading it. Thus, Danny 
Schechter was even involved in conceiving, composing, arranging 
and producing one of the tracks on the album Sun City.
420
 Going 
under his news producer nickname, ‘The News Dissector’, and 
together with Keith LeBlanc, he signs the six minutes music 
collage Revolutionary Situation. The track takes its title from a 
statement made by Louis Nel, at the time Deputy Minister of 
Information in South Africa, who condemned “the revolutionary 
situation”.
421
  
The Sun City project and the commitment of the people 
making it went way beyond the frames of a music album, a book, a 
documentary film. In the following years, Danny Schechter 
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continued his work, shifting the focus of his anti-apartheid 
activities, and support of the entertainment boycott in Sun City, in 
an attempt to undermine the media ban and censorship in South 
Africa. Following the state of emergency declared in South Africa, 
a new media ban and new censorship rules applied in the country 
were making it increasingly difficult for American Media to get a 
hold on images from the apartheid. Not everyone agreed on the 
unequivocal power of the media ban. Sun City filmmaker, Danny 
Schechter, was of another opinion: “Surely if they could get 
pictures from Saturn, they could get them from Soweto”.
422
 
Starting with a modest grant awarded by the United Nation, 
Schechter commenced the co-production of the TV programme 
South Africa Now.
423
 
Earlier in this chapter I was bringing up David Hostetter’s 
view that the anti-apartheid movement was at its best “when it 
defined South Africa’s conflict in terms familiar to Americans”.
424
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But the success of Schechter’s complex and informative South 
Africa Now in the following years stands proof that David 
Hostetter is only partially right. Nevertheless, his take cannot be 
dismissed altogether: the various viewers, listeners and readers Sun 
City reached, by distributing its story and message cross-platform, 
clearly shows the impact of addressing the American audience in 
the popular culture’s idiom they were accustomed to. 
South Africa Now had “inside-out coverage”, meaning that 
film was delivered by South African producers, while anchors for 
the show were exiled South Africans, trained in-house, as the show 
advanced, with footage delivered by South African producers and 
makers. Initially transmitted solely on one satellite network, the 
show quickly made its way to the leading PBS stations, turning into 
a 156 weeks series. It continually added numerous broadcasting 
stations in the U.S. and overseas, until the series came to an end, in 
1992.
425
  
Sun City, I argued, is a convergent cross-media platform 
avant la lettre, before the time of the Internet. Between 1985 and 
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1992, Sun City and the various other projects directly or indirectly 
deriving from it, like South Africa Now, were reaching an 
international public from all ways of life. What is the direct 
connection between this and the end of the apartheid politics in 
South Africa? An exact answer to this question is impossible to 
formulate, but a viable direction is a cumulative of the direct 
results of single platforms. Next, we will see how Internet, and the 
transmedia documentaries, brought along new, reliable ways of 
quantifying this tendency to action. 
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8 Revolutionary I-Doc  
8.1 Engaging Spectators Beyond the Screen 
 
 
“When the multimedia revolution is completed”, began Tim 
Congdon’s evaluation on the future of broadcasting in the UK, 
“people may receive input to their political thinking from many 
different sources”.
426
 The above-quoted visionary assessment was 
uttered a bit more than 15 years ago in a BBC-commissioned 
study. Visionary, I say, because, at the time, up to 70 percent of the 
Britons were still listing television as the primary source for their 
news. Congdon’s forecast in the study announced a multimedia 
revolution lasting for the following 20 to 30 years, with “some mix 
of public service and commercial broadcasting”
427
 intuited as a 
better solution for the future. The British economist pleaded at the 
time for an open society where individuals will be able to exercise 
their critical prerogatives at maximum capacity. But in order to 
achieve that sort of strong society, a multimedia revolution would 
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have first been necessary. However, even in the early 2000s, a 
multimedia, or digital revolution, a radical line of change in the 
established media, still seemed to several media experts as a distant 
ideal. 
“Which Digital Revolution?”, Henry Jenkins and David 
Thorburn were rhetorically wondering in their introduction to the 
volume Democracy and New Media, almost 10 years after Tim 
Congdon’s BBC-commissioned prediction. Jenkins and Thorburn 
were ironically stating in 2003: “Utopian visions help us to imagine 
a just society and to map strategies for achieving it”.
428
 At the 
time, they were still showing serious scepticism surrounding the 
likelihood of the so-called ‘new media’ in reaching a wide audience, 
as opposed to the possibility of the established one (such as 
cinema and television):  
The power of movies and television to speak to a vast public 
is immensely greater than the diffused reach of the new 
media, through which many messages can be circulated but 
few can ensure a hearing.
429
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We know today this is no longer the case. One acknowledgement 
of the new media’s possibilities of talking to a large public was the 
decision of the Egyptian government to cut down the Internet and 
other forms of electronic communication in the country on the 
28th of January 2011, at the peak of the revolutionary days (Fig. 
8.1).
430
 Similar connectivity interruptions happened in Syria with 
the government-owned providers at the end of November 2012
431
 
and July 2013 (Fig. 8.2).
432
 
 The “power of speaking to the public”, as Jenkins put it, 
through either the established or the new mediums is, as shown up 
to now in the current work, of an utmost importance for 
filmmakers of revolutionary documentaries, many making their 
films with a task or an agenda. However, how much the 
documentary films succeed in their endeavour mostly goes 
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undocumented. Even if filmmakers explicitly state that they make 
these films in order to generate action, there is a rupture between 
the production of documentaries and the effect they have on their 
public. Once the films are released, there is little information 
available about the empathic effect they might have had on their 
spectators and their contribution to a moral attitude; the measure 
of the films’ success in triggering action is erroneously associated 
with festivals’ achievements or critiques’ positive reviews. 
 
Figure ‎7.6 BGPMON Analyses of Egyptian Routes, published on 
BGPMON website on the 28th of January 2011: 2576 out of 2903 
Egyptian networks disappeared from the Internet. 
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Figure ‎7.7 ARBOR Networks Analyses of Internet traffic to 
and from Egypt on the 27th and the 28th–30th November 2012. 
 
The problem is not one solely faced by documentary film alone, or 
cinema in general. Theatre is confronted with a similar rupture 
between production and its public. In his analyses of the liaisons 
between production and the public sphere, Christopher Balme 
remarked a similar one-sided flow, where indeed the production 
side approaches its (potential) public through a multitude of media 
channels, but the public itself has minimum or no means at all at 
its disposal to reciprocally approach the theatre, respond to it or 
368 
 
give feedback.
433
 Balme’s view on the present state of the matter is 
not entirely discouraging, since the possibilities that arose with the 
Internet, social media, and especially Twitter, bring up new means 
through which the public itself can now engage.                                           
This novel potential of the Internet is good news for 
revolutionary documentaries, too: they escape linearity, are 
distributed on novel, hitherto unexplored channels, give instant 
possibilities of action, and propose networks of direct interaction 
with their public.  
In the previous chapter it was underlined how 
revolutionary documentary makers, while looking for rapid and 
efficient ways of passing the message, reaching and activating its 
publics, have, for a long time, looked for new platforms for 
showing various aspects of the same story. Internet facilitates the 
assembling of such platforms. Convergence media, transmedia, 
cross-platform or multi platform, while still being mistaken with 
each other or interchangeably used in their loose definitions, are all 
part of a vocabulary which has been increasingly used only in the 
recent years. They definitely add to Torben Grodal’s PECMA 
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Flow theory, since they activate the part of the brain Grodal was 
arguing is responsible for action and reserved solely to gaming, and 
not to film viewing. We will next look at several ways of 
approaching the new types of documentary experience, where 
aspects of production, distribution and reception have all radically 
been reinvented. 
370 
 
8.2 Spectatorship Engagement within Media 
Convergence  
 
 
At every point in history, the technological revolutions in medias 
(and by that I understand the changes towards a use of new medias 
which were not controlled by the ruling classes) triggered and 
facilitated socio-political major transformations. These changes in 
media, however, didn’t happen as a replacement of the old with 
the new. The adepts of technological determinism might disagree 
with the above statement, but I will argue that, when a new media 
was introduced alongside the existing ones, there have been 
instances of convergence or, as Balnaves, Hemelryk and Shoesmith 
put it, “transformation of older media into new cultural forms”.
434
  
Convergence is part of the technological context, which led 
to the development of emergent ways of storytelling in the recent 
years. Defining convergence is not easy, and some might want to 
avoid the task altogether:  
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The rapid evolution of convergence means that it may be 
better not to attempt to define the term, but rather to 
describe its impact, both in different parts of the value chain, 
and in different regions of the world.
435
  
The technological progress is the core for understanding 
convergence. For Balnaves et al., the beginning of the use of 
convergence coincides with the beginning of computer networks, 
responsible for bringing together various types of media.
436
 
Nevertheless, this transformation of old media into new ones is 
not specific to mobile media or social media alone, but it can be 
tracked down in the history of the telegraph, radio, or television.
437
 
Taking the case of the United Kingdom, Tim Dwyer is 
convincingly arguing that the communication markets have been 
converging for several decades, the difference in the last years 
(since 2005) being the increased speed of these processes. The 
individual mediums do not replace one another, nor do they 
evolve from each other or emerge as a separate or virtual 
community. Dwyer puts forward a complex theory, where media 
convergence is understood as “the process whereby new 
                                                 
 
435
 Ofcom (2007), 90. 
436
 Balnaves et al. (2009), 34. 
437
 Dwyer (2010), 21. 
372 
 
technologies are accommodated by existing media and 
communication industries and cultures”.
438
 It is then not a mere 
replacement of the old with the new, but rather a complex process 
where the new, emerging media, start being contained by the 
existent ones by, as Seung-Hoon Jeong explained, “emulating and 
incorporating them”.
439
 For Jeong, the enhancement of old media 
with the new (he calls it ‘hypermediacy’) brings urgency to the 
effect media has on the spectator.  
The very term ‘convergence’ was coined in 1983 by the 
social scientist Ithiel de Sola Pool in Technologies of Freedom, who 
emphasized it as being the revolutionary trigger of media 
industries: 
A process called ‘convergence of modes’ is blurring the lines 
between media, even between point-to-point 
communications, such as the post, telephone and telegraph, 
and mass communications, such as the press, radio, and 
television. A single physical means – be it wires, cables or 
airwaves – may carry services that in the past were provided 
in separate ways.
440
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In the convergence of mediums, not only are the services, which 
used to be provided in separate ways, becoming increasingly 
offered by multiple vehicles, but also mediums which were 
separately provided by one service or the other increased their 
means of reaching their consumers/audiences through various 
mediums. What de Sola Pool was essentially remarking, already at 
the beginning of the 1980s, is that the relationship between 
medium and service becomes ever looser. Henry Jenkins adds to 
de Sola Pool’s understanding of the media convergence, 
underlining the unfastening between the production and the 
consuming sides, but also between various genres or technologies: 
Perhaps most broadly, media convergence refers to a 
situation in which multiple media systems coexist and where 
media content flows fluidly across them.
441
  
The flow of content between various media platforms, the 
financing possibilities newly operating between various players and 
industries, audiences of old and new media interchanging – this is 
what increasingly dictates innovative prospects for revolutionary 
documentaries. The relationship is two-folded: in this new 
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participatory culture, the way spectators get involved, act, or 
produce content, also influences how the entire content will flow 
between media. 
The potential that convergence of media has for social 
impact in the time of the Internet is apparent. Joe Trippi, who 
extensively worked as a consultant for numerous election 
campaigns, in and outside the U.S., greatly used the Internet in the 
last years’ election campaigning. Trippi orchestrated Howard 
Dean’s Internet-based fundraising campaign, or what he called in 
his book The Revolution Will Not Be Televised as “the opening salvo in 
a revolution, the sound of hundreds of thousands of Americans 
turning off their televisions and embracing the only form of 
technology that has allowed them to be involved again”.
442
 Trippi 
was clearly referring to the engaging possibilities Internet has to 
offer, but even Trippi himself questioned that the democratizing 
future of convergence in the age of Internet is a certainty: 
At some point, of course, there will be convergence. One box. 
One screen. You’ll check your e-mail and order your 
groceries and check your child’s homework all on the same 
screen. That might be the most dangerous time for this 
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burgeoning democratic movement – the moment when the 
corporations and advertisers will threaten to co-opt and erode 
the democratic online ethic. The future may well hinge on 
whether the box is dominated more by the old broadcast 
rules or by the populist power of the Internet.
443
 
Civil disobedience, defined by Balnaves et al. as “the use of new 
communicative structures like the Internet for protest to influence 
decision-making”,
444
 was one of the first activist tools that took 
advantage of the Internet, based on the belief that established 
social structures and their institutions are more exposed online 
than they are offline.
445
 The Electronic Disturbance Theatre 2.0 
(EDT), a group of artists and software engineers, even actively 
supported the Zapatista movement.
446
 But for the convergence to 
play its democratic force, Jenkins pleads for a shift in focus from 
technology to the politics, social, cultural dimensions of the media 
convergence, and for vigilance on the side of the citizens: 
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Consumers will be more powerful within convergence culture 
– but only if they recognize and use that power as both 
consumers and citizens, as full participants in our culture.
447
 
There are undoubtedly new forms of documentaries that emerged 
thanks to convergence in times of Internet, but there is no single 
notion unanimously used to encompass them. This might be one 
of the reasons why some scholars tend to avoid the looseness of 
the term altogether. Sarah Atkinson coined the notion “emergent 
cinema”, an umbrella term meant to encompass most novel 
developments in production and distribution. Sarah Atkinson’s 
“emergent cinema” is a reminder of the interchangeable 
boundaries between whatever we might choose to name 
multimedia, cross-media, multi-platform, cross-platform, or 
transmedia. The very word ‘emergent’ perfectly underlines what is 
actually at stake here: that the Internet is not the only, or even 
main player in transporting the story from one platform to 
another. The Internet might, and nowadays almost always does 
participate in the moving of the story between platforms but, 
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contrary to what some scholars argued,
448
 it doesn’t necessarily 
have to, in order for the story to cross from one media to another.  
However, out of the ‘emergent cinema’ categories, the one 
most frequently implied by both theoreticians and practitioners 
concerned with the new forms of filmic expression currently is 
transmedia. Before moving on to some concrete examples of 
revolutionary documentaries in the form of transmedia platforms, 
we should firstly attempt to define transmedia from two distinct 
perspectives: that of the media theoretician and that of the 
practitioner.  
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8.3 Transmedia Revolutionary Documentairies
  
8.3.1 Outlining Transmedia. Case Study: 
ROAD TO REVOLUTION 
 
 
At the annual Future of Entertainment conference, which took place 
in 2006, Henry Jenkins, who allegedly coined the term transmedia, 
moderated the Transmedia Properties panel. One of the panellists, 
Michael Lebowitz, himself a pioneer of transmedia storytelling, 
founder of the “convergence agency” Big Spaceship, introduced 
himself by stating that he actually cannot come up with a definition 
for transmedia. “I don’t exactly know what transmedia is”, 
Lebowitz literally stated and, while pointing at moderator Henry 
Jenkins and the other expert-speakers, he went on: “And I’m not 
sure these guys know either”.
449
  
There is genuineness behind Lebowitz’ anecdote: 
transmedia is a contemporary phenomenon and, since it is 
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unfolding as we witness it, or as we take part in it, it is indeed 
difficult to define.  
In 2003, the media scholar Henry Jenkins introduced the 
term to the field, stating that, for a story told on various platforms 
to be a transmedia one, each platform must play its specific role, 
rather than recapping the same content. In Jenkins’s ‘ideal-type’ of 
definition, each of the platforms (“franchises” in his own 
terminology) plays its specific part in the media product, and can 
function not only in fusion with the other platforms, but as an 
unique media product in itself: 
In the ideal form of transmedia storytelling, each medium 
does what it does best – so that a story might be introduced 
in a film, expanded through television, novels, and comics, 
and its world might be explored and experienced through 
game play. Each franchise entry needs to be self-contained 
enough to enable autonomous consumption. That is, you 
don’t need to have seen the film to enjoy the game and vice-
versa. As Pokemon does so well, any given product is a point 
of entry into the franchise as a whole.
450
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For Jenkins, fictional transmedia storytelling is a fluid process and, 
whether he refers to Pokemon, Star Wars or Matrix, the fun-
system plays for him an important role in the successful 
development of a transmedia platform.
451
 The fiction-film, fan 
studies-based definition, however, can only partially be applied to 
other multi-platform developments, like documentary transmedia. 
Following Jenkins, Elizabeth Evans has tried to evaluate the 
changes television is undergoing in the new transmedia world. In 
the context of television broadcast increasingly moving from the 
TV to the Internet and mobile phone, in both terms of production 
and distribution, Evans’s addition to the definition is specifically 
the central place occupied by technological developments in a 
transmedia project:  
In essence, the term ‘transmediality’ describes the increasingly 
popular industrial practice of using multiple media 
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technologies to present information concerning a single 
fictional world through a range of textual forms.
452
   
Seen from the production side, that of the practitioner in the field 
interested in rapidly reaching a wider audience, the attempts of 
defining transmedia shift to the novel possibilities of reaching this 
very goal: getting the product seen faster, and by as many people 
as possible. One such attempt at explaining the novel category 
comes from the EMMY-nominated transmedia writer and 
producer Nuno Bernardo, one of the authors of the platform of 
revolutionary documentary, ROAD TO REVOLUTION: 
Broadly speaking, transmedia storytelling involves creating 
content that engages the audience using various techniques to 
permeate their daily lives. In order to achieve this 
engagement, a transmedia production will develop storytelling 
across multiple forms of media in order to have different 
entry points into the story. These entry points are the places 
where the audience can access content, with each point also 
providing their own unique perspective on the overall 
story.
453
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We still navigate on a very broad terrain in understanding where 
the borders of transmedia are, only because we are witnessing its 
experimental, pioneering phase.
454
  Two years after he proposed 
the above definition, Nuno Bernardo brought new layers to his 
own understanding of transmedia, by standing behind the 
production of the multi-platform documentary about the Arab 
Spring, ROAD TO REVOLUTION. The project, which lasted three 
years (2012-2014), is an example of balance between a non-fiction 
product delivered with urgency in the making, and a lengthy edited 
documentary premiered at the Cannes Film Festival 2014. ROAD 
TO REVOLUTION is many things at once: a TV documentary (two 
episodes of 52 minutes each), several “webisodes” (each of them 
between two and six minutes long), a book (A Estrada da 
Revolução)
455
, an ‘app’ for mobile devices and a feature length 
documentary film presented at Cannes film Festival in May 2014 
(ROAD TO REVOLUTION, directed by Dânia Lucas). The main 
storyline of the project concerns three Portuguese journalists, 
Tiago Carrasco, João Henriques and João Fontes who, in the midst 
of the Arab Spring, go on a 15.000 kilometres journey, taking off 
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in Turkey and moving through Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Libya and 
Tunisia, all the way to Algeria and Morocco, in order to document 
the revolutionary movements.  
Short, roughly edited episodes with the journey the three 
go through were uploaded on the YouTube channel of the 
production company, thus enabling people all around the world to 
follow the phases of the transmedia documentary while still in the 
making.  In the more conventional fashion of triggering action 
previously described (Chapter 8.2), the ‘webisodes’ include appeals, 
written or spoken pleads to action. Episode #7, for instance, 
filmed in Syria, is the first hard-hitting encounter with the realities 
of the Arab Spring. In the spur of the moment, people met on the 
way approach the Portuguese documentary crew as an opportunity 
to pass on a message. „We ask all the European countries!...”, one 
man starts crying towards the camera, while another such character 
makes an even more directly-targeted appeal: “I want to send a 
message to Russia: now Russia, if you help the Assad system, you 
kill the people in Syria”.  
Through the ‘webisodes’, uploaded on the YouTube 
Channel of the beActive production company, both the makers 
and the viewers didn’t have to wait many months or even years for 
the journey, and the filming and editing process to come to an end, 
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and the film to have a cinema or television release. While 
essentially still in the making, small episodes could be seen by an 
increasingly interested audience. Furthermore, the growing 
audience was able to engage with the makers, and even with the 
people in the ‘webisodes’, via the social media possibilities 
embedded in the given platforms (YouTube, Twitter, Facebook), 
thus shifting Torben Grodal’s PECMA flow theory, according to 
which only games activate certain parts of the human brain 
charged with action. 
The production company behind ROAD TO REVOLUTION 
additionally released an interactive ‘app documentary’, as it was 
termed, which allowed viewers to follow the journey through the 
Arab Spring, from country to country, at their individual pace.   
The ROAD TO REVOLUTION one hour and a half linear 
documentary film was released no sooner than two years after 
the production started. However, producer Nuno Bernardo 
remained faithful to his 2011 definition of transmedia, in which 
he insisted that the various platforms, the ‘entry points’ into the 
story, “are the places where the audience can access content, 
with each point also providing their own unique perspective on 
385 
 
the overall story”.456 Thus, the story of the feature documentary 
ROAD TO REVOLUTION was not redundant due to the content 
already being released, but it was rather more of an add-on to it. 
Like in the ‘webisodes’ or in the book, the frame of the story 
continued to be the journey of the three journalists who went to 
find out about the revolution. Only that, in the feature-length 
film, the emphasis shifts to another focus, a few locals 
encountered on the way and developed into characters. ROAD 
TO REVOLUTION is a fruitful example of how non-documentary 
formats, such as mobile-apps, can become part of the 
revolutionary documentary experience, in an attempt to enhance 
the tendency to action.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
456
 Bernardo (2011), 3. 
386 
 
8.3.2 From ‘just’ Dynamic, to User 
Generated-Content I-Docs: 
#18DaysInEgipt  
 
 
Producer of ROAD TO REVOLUTION, Nuno Bernardo, identified 
the core of a transmedia production as the distribution of parts of 
the story on various platforms, reaching its public not on a single 
media form, but rather approaching the members of a potential 
audience in their daily lives.
457
 Yet again, the sort of engagement 
with the public Bernardo pleads for is a one-sided engagement. In 
the fashion advocated in his writings and in his documentary 
Bernardo avoids the opening up of the platforms for content 
coming from the viewers. For him, user-generated content, even if 
at times successful, is spontaneous and unpredictable, thus 
unreliable in its business potential.  
Nuno Bernardo is right when insisting that user-generated 
content might be a delicate topic. One cannot just ask the public to 
provide content, or simply demand an invisible audience of the 
transmedia platform to film videos, and afterwards even expect 
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this audience to put an effort into adding them to the platform. To 
rely on that might prove itself to be naïve – and unproductive. The 
1% rule of thumb of participatory network effects online keeps 
being confirmed by empirical studies.
458
 According to the 1% rule, 
the individuals who participate in creating the large content online 
are not more than 1% of the users (also referred to as Superusers), 
while the rest of 99% of the Internet users have a very modest 
contribution, if any. 
Not everybody in the field shares Bernard’s opinion on the 
dangers and lack of potential of user-generated content for 
transmedia. Publishing his guide to the very new possibilities of 
transmedia, Getting Started in Transmedia Storytelling, in the same year 
as Nuno Bernardo’s The Producers Guide to Transmedia, Robert 
Pratten was however shifting definition of transmedia exactly on 
the user-generated content. Pratten, himself a practitioner in the 
field (founder of TransmediaStoryteller.com), was underlining the 
potential of the new platforms, not only for concrete participation, 
and content per se, but also for an increased emotional engagement: 
                                                 
 
458
 Van Mierlo (2014). 
388 
 
‘Transmedia storytelling’ is telling a story across multiple 
platforms although it doesn’t always happen, with a degree of 
audience participation, interaction or collaboration. In transmedia 
storytelling, engagement with each successive media 
heightens the audience’ understanding, enjoyment and 
affection for the story.
459
  
Pratten’s definition doesn’t stress the technological advancement, 
or the media convergence, which demand the story to be 
distributed on multiple platforms, but rather the collaborative 
dimension between creators and the public, which transmedia 
platforms can bring along.  
Lina Srivastava, transmedia strategist and activist, involved 
in the making of various documentaries aiming at social impact, 
sees precisely the participatory dimension of transmedia as 
essential to the multi-platform documentaries. She made her view 
clear in an interview with Sarah Atkinson: 
Transmedia is so participatory, is really based on co-creation, 
collaboration, consensus. […] The entire thrust of my work is 
to make transmedia more participatory, and create that equal 
sense of partnership where local communities are architects 
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of the platform with us, and their IP, and their stories are 
drivers.
460
  
Evidence was brought earlier (chapter 7.3) that the distribution of 
revolutionary documentaries on multiple media platforms is a pre-
Internet phenomenon. Lina Srivastava points out exactly one of 
the main novelties that Internet brought along to the transmedia 
platforms: the public’s participation, highly enabled by the use of 
social media. This participative dimension is bringing people from 
all around the world in one’s ‘in-group’, and therefore it is, as 
Frank Rose argues, highly connected to empathy.
461
  
Already since Daniel A. Henderson invented the first 
prototype of camera for a mobile phone, in 1993, the world 
entered the era of the prevalence of images that we are living in 
right now. When the mobile phone camera became commercially 
available, at the begging of the 2000s, photographing and filming 
the world around became a part of day-to-day communication just 
as much as the written and spoken word. Sharing photos and 
videos with others was still slow at the time, but it rapidly changed 
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once Internet connectivity became widely available on mobile 
devices. Minor happenings or major events tend to be documented 
today by amateurs with an instinct for documentary.  
Clearly, not all contexts or projects are favourable for 
being opened-up for contribution to the public. The revolutionary 
days in Egypt, at the beginning of 2011, with the rampant 
production and distribution of images, however, denoted such a 
context. The magnitude of images, still and moving, produced in 
the Egyptian revolutionary days of 2011, made it seem to many 
documentary makers that their job was rendered obsolete. Others, 
however, saw in the huge production of images novel possibilities 
of ingeniously documenting a revolution. The days of most 
interest are considered by many to be the time frame between 
January 25th and February 11, and the documentary 
#18DAYSINEGIPT underlines that. It is a participatory, crowd 
sourced documentary project, this time, which goes under the 
same name, and which offers a platform to the stories seen, 
photographed and lived by many thousands of Egyptian people.  
In a context in which many filmmakers abstained from 
recording original footage in front of such a quantity of images 
already produced and distributed, while others ended up doubling 
what the amateurs or activists previously shared with the world, 
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#18DAYSINEGIPT was born exactly out of the turning of this 
abundance of images into its very core idea. 
 
 
Figure ‎7.8 #18DAYSINEGIPT 
 
One of the authors of the project, Jigar Mehta, put it assuredly: “I 
thought, crap, if they’re recording this, they’ve probably been 
recording for the last 18 days”.
462
 With a tremendous urgency, one 
week after the military leader Hosni Mubarak announced his 
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retreat, on the 19th of February 2011, journalist Jigar Mehta and 
developer Yasmin Elayat launched the documentary project 
#18DAYSINEGIPT. The project started with an investment of 
“$60 on domains and a couple cases of beer”
463
.  
A Facebook page was consequently created, and the first 
Facebook post, about the launching of the project, got a 
discouraging one single like. On the 1st of April, 
#18DAYSINEGIPT, still a work in progress, was presented at the 
annual Geneva conference on Social Change. Here, the makers 
presented their project alongside speakers discussing social media 
trends from UNHCR, ICRC and UNICEF. #18DAYSINEGIPT 
rapidly grew into an interactive platform, which aimed to bring 
together the Egyptian story of revolution unfolding on various 
media, such as tweets, cell phone photos and videos. The 
documentary escapes linearity, but the way it can be experienced is 
not entirely arbitrary: it is organized in such a manner that one can 
chose to follow the narrative of a particular day or location. 
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Figure ‎7.9 The entries in #18DAYSINEGIPT listed by date. 
 
The one who experiences the documentary #18DAYSINEGIPT is 
no longer a viewer, but a ‘visitor’; only a few clicks away, anyone 
could turn from mere ‘visitor’ into a ‘contributor’ of the platform. 
With user-generated transmedia projects like this one, the 
traditional triangle of victim-filmmaker-spectator came to an end. 
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Figure ‎7.10 Launching of #18DAYSINEGIPT as an entrance on 
the platform.   
 
Furthermore, media convergence in the age of Internet made it 
possible that the viewer himself, if he wishes, can take upon 
himself the role of archivist (with greater and safer possibilities of 
archiving than ever before), or even distributor: at any point one 
now has the means show any film to anyone else around the globe. 
Now, each of the parts can engage with the others as themselves, in a 
variety of creative, moral ways. 
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Research, Filmmaking, and the Teaching of 
Empathy: the Hakawati Project 
 
 
“Academia is the death of cinema”, claimed one of the most 
prolific makers of documentary film, Oscar and EMMY 
nominated Werner Herzog.
464
 Herzog’s intentionally provocative 
statement aimed to strike a definite divide between the making of 
films and their study. Such arguments are common among 
documentary makers, the most technically oriented, practical 
category of filmmakers, traditionally working in small teams, or 
even alone, trained in multiple filmmaking crafts, and able to 
perform several, or all duties. The underlying belief is that, in order 
to produce truthful documentaries about real life, the filmmaker’s 
life experience is more important than studying film. Herzog, for 
instance, advocates walking as a recurrent training for 
comprehending various aspects of life, and evoking them in film: 
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“While you are walking you would learn much more about 
filmmaking than if you were in a classroom”.
465
  
For Herzog, furthermore, film research would reduce 
moving images to empty words, “the opposite of passion”, since 
praxis is, regardless, always one step ahead of theory. My current 
research was born out of a strong belief that assuming the fact that 
praxis can do without scholarly research is simply wrong. The 
content of my current research is an argument against the labeling 
of academia as passionless “death of cinema”, as Herzog 
vehemently claimed, hence the findings are not only of some value 
to the understanding of film per se, but are meant to bring their 
modest contribution to the production side of documentary 
making and, hopefully, to the teaching of it. 
I will remain within the frames of Werner Herzog’s 
glossary a little longer, for my work is, too, an incursion happening 
close to the death of cinema – if I am to use Herzog’s strong 
vocabulary. It is an incursion into a territory paved with real 
threats for real films and real filmmakers. Chilean Jorge Müller 
Silva, Argentinean Raymundo Gleyzer, British James Miller are just 
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some of the well-known resistance documentary makers who 
tragically lost their lives or ‘disappeared’ while producing material 
for revolutionary documentaries. Many more faced imprisonment, 
exile, or countless forms of reprisals. In an essay published as early 
as 1945, Béla Balázs argued that the loss of lives among 
filmmakers producing, essentially, a creative work of art, “is a new 
phenomenon in cultural history and is specific to film art”.
466
 This 
is not exclusively concerning non-fiction filmmakers, but “artists in 
olden days rarely died of their dangerous creative work”.
467
 The 
current research aims to shed some light on scientific, production 
and pedagogical queries alike, for the life, and not the death of 
cinema, since academia and praxis are facing similar issues, and are 
not as far-off from each other as Werner Herzog might believe. 
Presented here stands a study of empathy in the context of 
revolutionary documentaries. Empathy and revolutions are words 
usually not seen together on the cover of the same book. A very 
recent exception is Roman Krznaric’s 2014 Empathy: A Handbook 
for a Revolution.
 
Krznaric is one of the few writers and empathy 
thinkers who, in the last years, argued that empathy does not only 
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concern the feeling for the other close-by, but that it is directly 
connected to radical historical and social transformations
468
 – and 
revolutions make no exception.  
Revolutions, historical events with most radical 
consequences on society, are not always successful or heroic, as I 
have shown in the introductory chapter of this work (in Revolutions 
and Resistance Documentaries). The large variety of revolutions, at 
times, encompasses many years-long, sometimes bloody processes, 
at the end of which either new dictatorial regimes come to surface, 
or civil wars erupt. For a revolution to succeed, advantageous 
international relations are needed. The success of a revolution 
requires a timely foreign support for the revolutionary faction, or 
at least the withdrawal of backing for the ruling regime. I 
commenced this work by making the case that the offering of 
support – or the withdrawal thereof – has radically shaped the 
success or failure of revolutions throughout time. Furthermore, 
the consent of foreign regimes to offer or withdraw such support 
is in its turn influenced by the civil pressure in the respective 
countries.  
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The critical role that foreign intervention might have in the 
outcome of revolutions can be observed no further than in the so-
called recent Arab Spring. It was the case of the Libyan revolution, 
which started in February 2011 with peaceful, pro-democracy 
protests. In a broadcast on the Libyan state TV Aljamahiria, 
Muammar Gaddafi threatened mass killings against his own 
people, the massacre of everyone who allegedly joined the 
rebellion. Gaddafi promised to “cleanse Libya inch by inch, house 
by house, home by home, corner by corner, person by person, 
until the country is clean of the scum and sickness”.
469
 The 
bloodshed against civilian population that followed, and the 
moving images documenting the violent reprisals created, 
according to several historians, a cross-cultural empathic response, 
as historian Jeff Goldstone put it: “the whole world was watching 
and sympathizing with the rebels”.
470
 People all around the world 
were now feeling for the suffering, rebellious Libyan people 
striving for freedom. This international wave of empathy generated 
a momentum for a resolution passed by the UN Security Council 
                                                 
 
469
 Available onlie at:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=69wBG6ULNzQ. 
470
 Goldstone (2014), 125, emphasis added. 
402 
 
on the 17th of March 2011, authorising the use of force to protect 
the civilian population. It represented the legal basis for the 
NATO intervention in Libya, which commenced two days later. 
The film of the Libyan-Norwegian documentary maker 
Nizam Najjar, DIARY FROM A REVOLUTION, catches the 
aftermath of the NATO intervention. It shows his experience 
when allowed to film the revolution in the middle of a Libyan 
rebel group fighting in the city of Misrata. In a tragic-comic film 
sequence, the leader of the rebel group, Haj Siddiq, the central 
character of the film, looks at his men and gives a ‘passionate 
defence’ for the decisive role of the documentary camera in the 
revolution. He looks at his men and ceremonially utters: “The 
camera is the reason for the NATO intervention. Camera!” Rebel 
leader Haj Siddiq points his finger towards Najjar’s camera, and 
ceremonially utters onwards: “Thank to God in the first place, and 
then to the camera”. Following the NATO intervention, Gaddafi 
was eventually captured and killed. Different, however, was the 
course of the dictatorial, family regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. 
The Syrian rebels, encouraged by the NATO involvement in 
Libya, waited for the world to intervene. 
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Figure 11 Haj Siddiq in DIARY FROM A REVOLUTION (2012). 
 
“They waited in vain”, historian Jeff Goldstone concludes 
today.
471
 In July 2012, China and Russia blocked any UN 
resolution, including even economic sanctions against Syria, and a 
full-blown civil war erupted.  
The data gathered by Google and available thru Google 
Trends, a tool displaying the interest over time that Internet users 
have in finding out more about a certain term or for an association 
of terms, shows when, in the minds of the people around the 
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world, the Syrian revolution turned into a civil war, with the clearly 
marked moment in time being September 2012 (Fig. 7). 
 
 
Figure 12 Google Trends displaying the shift in interest from 
looking up in Google the Syrian Revolution ... to the 
increased search of the words Syrian Civil War .... 
 
Right before this moment in time, in August 2012, I had been 
precipitately asked to train a group of Syrian artists and activists, 
with no previous film knowledge.  
For at least the following six months, I was supposed to 
teach them from scratch how to use a professional camera and a 
sound recording kit, to clarify principles of editing sound and 
image, and make sure they will be able to use this information, 
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once they are on their own. Ideally, we were to develop 
revolutionary documentary films with a chance for international 
distribution, films authored by these Syrian novices, while we were 
doing our best to help them learn how to keep the risks at a 
minimum. 
The trainings took place in complete secrecy. My contracts 
and the entire correspondence with the NGO organising it were 
going under the code name ‘4026-1 SY-HR-EC’. The project was 
very generously financed, providing plenty of pricey equipment at 
our disposal, and open-handedly offered to the young Syrian 
documentary makers to be. At the time, as it often happens with 
such sensitive development projects in situations of crisis, most of 
us did not know who is behind the funding. Only in an advanced 
stage of working on the project, namely eight months later, have I 
learned that it was a European Union grant, financed through its 
European Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy and 
Human Rights worldwide, grant referenced as EIDHR/2011/281-
308, formally named: "Digital Information Capacity, Security and 
Dialogue in Syria". In the meantime, however, we were expected 
to simply call the training Hakawati (Storytelling in Arabic). 
Film was one largely neglected art field in Syria, with 
almost no concern given to documentary filmmaking. At the exact 
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time this project was starting, Orwa Nyrabia, Syrian producer and 
director of the only documentary festival in Damascus, DOX 
BOX, was reported missing. In a time of crisis, Syria was left with 
too few filmmakers around, while a few other people, artists and 
activists, disregarding the threat, were eager to learn how to tell 
moving stories in films made for the outside world. And they 
wanted to learn this fast. Some of my trainees from Hakawati were 
telling me that they want to do films which will travel ‘like a 
message in a bottle’ to the outside world. Both my filmmaking 
experience and my scholarly research so far were facing a tough 
reality check: how do you actually instruct it? How do you teach 
empathy in the context of revolutionary films? Herzog’s 
juxtaposing of the passionless, austere film studies, to the fervid 
filmmaking is simply wrong. Neither can do without the other, and 
both face the need of the academic research findings – and not 
only in extreme case-scenarios, like the Hakawati project was. The 
research within these covers attempts to bring its modest 
contribution to the theory of filmic empathy, an insight for the 
praxis, and a tool for its teaching. 
The endeavour that Seeing with Feeling has become started 
five years ago, with a one year research project at ECLA (today 
Bard College) in Berlin about the visual proofs produced in Pol 
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Pot’s Cambodia. I began the research journey under a main 
assumption about my theoretical frameworks which, I hoped, was 
supposed to ease the process for my research: since empathy is 
such an investigated topic in a variety of fields, my theoretical path 
for researching empathy in non-fiction film studies would already 
have been paved. This hypothesis proved nothing but wishful 
thinking, since it is still not an easy concept to grasp, and voices in 
film studies still wonder if such a thing even exists in the first 
place. Inquiries into what empathy really is, in film studies, were 
only recently approached, and are matters of ongoing 
disagreement, while the filmic means and mechanisms, charged 
with stimulating filmic empathy, go almost entirely unexplored. 
Part I of the current work is a thorough incursion into the study of 
empathy at the convergence of film and psychology (chapter 1), in 
film studies, especially in the frames of the recent cognitivist film 
theory (chapter 2) and research-based psychological studies 
(chapter 3). 
Even if an interdisciplinary approach is new to film studies, 
I have shown in chapter 1 that, at least as far as empathy is 
concerned, findings from psychological studies are traditionally 
employed in answering questions about our emotional response to 
the events portrayed in moving images. Empathy with the people 
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in moving images, documentary and even fictional, exists, though 
lower in intensity than if the victim would be physically present 
under the eyes of the viewer (as I show in the introductory chapter 
Filmic Empathy: An Interdisciplinary Approach).  
My work aims to bring empathy-related constructs and 
processes within the frameworks of a single theory. Therefore, I 
have reviewed experiments and laboratory measures and, 
evaluating recent works of psychology scholars, mainly Martin 
Hoffman, Mark Davis and Daniel Batson, I identified various 
means specific to the documentary genre, which contribute to the 
arousal of empathy. The applicability of the means and, at times, 
limitations, were brought under scrutiny in Part II, with a series of 
case studies, documentary films made in a variety of revolutionary 
contexts (El Salvador, Guatemala, South Africa, Philippines, 
among others).  
Understanding that empathy with film characters exists, 
and knowing some of the ways in which it can be aroused, does 
not mean that the revolutionary documentary will turn into that 
“message in a bottle” my Syrian trainees wanted to send to the 
world in late 2012. 
A complete definition of the empathic process, I have 
shown, does encompass its tendency to action, and its connection 
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to moral attitude. Part III (Empathy? So what?), while approaching 
aspects of production and distribution, explores what happens 
after empathy was triggered. Filmmakers of resistance 
documentaries have usually tried to facilitate the tendency to 
action that comes along with the empathic distress emergent from 
the film viewing, and were by necessity looking for specific means 
to achieve this (chapter 7). The empathic power of revolutionary 
documentaries benefits from the new possibilities that the Internet 
has to offer, as I showed in chapter 8. But action facilitators (as I 
named the cues filmmakers build within the documentary frames 
in order to direct action, some identified in chapter 7.1) are not a 
novelty that came with the age of the Internet: they are as old as 
the genre itself (chapter 7.2). Older than ‘the age of Internet’ are 
also the attempts to get the story across through various media 
platforms, in order to better facilitate the tendency to action – and 
that was exemplified thru the case study of the anti-apartheid 
project Sun City (chapter 7.3). 
Chapter 8 brought the study of the empathy-action 
dynamic in the context of new technological developments in 
media. These developments bring about a novel category of 
revolutionary documentaries, characterised by convergence of 
medias, and a growing convergence of art forms (8.2). These films, 
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I have shown, tend to be not the result of elaborated production 
and distribution strategies, but rather the outcomes of decisions of 
urgency. Even if the films are made with a declared function (that 
of triggering a moral attitude), after they are released, however, 
there is not much information available about the empathic effect 
they might have had on their international spectators, or about 
their real contribution to action. With the emerging possibilities for 
interactive, transmedia documentaries, aspects of production, 
distribution and reception have all radically been reinvented. This 
interactivity enhances empathy’s tendency to action and, mainly 
(but not only) with the incorporated social media possibilities, 
novel ways of quantifying this tendency to action are now opened 
to documentary film scholars. Future quantitative Internet research 
can shed light on which documentaries generated moral responses, 
and even what specifically was most impactful as an action 
facilitator.  
The sensitive contexts these films are made in dictate 
impromptu decisions of production, distribution – possibly even 
discontinuing the distribution. The aggravation of the Syrian 
conflict made us face such tough decisions when distributing the 
documentaries made within the Hakawati project. One of the films 
produced in the course of Hakawati, EVERY DAY, EVERY DAY, 
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directed by a graphic designer with no previous film training, 
Reem Karssli, is a diary documenting the life of a Syrian family, 
and the dramatic circumstances they face when the oldest son, 
Mohamad, is called to join the state army. Trying not to jeopardise 
the security of the family and that of the filmmaker, at that time all 
of them still living in Damascus, we decided not to show the film 
anywhere in the Arab world. The film was screened at important 
festivals in Europe and Latin America; it was shown at Raindance, 
and made it to the competition of Leipzig Documentary Festival. 
However, after EVERY DAY, EVERY DAY was awarded the 
documentary prize at one of the most prestigious short film 
festivals, at Huesca Spain, in June 2013, the growing awareness 
around the film amplified our fears for the safety of the people 
involved in its making. It made us take the paradoxical decision of 
withdrawing the film instead of showing it onwards, and to 
abruptly close its film festival circuit. In the new landscape of 
media and arts convergence, two years later, and with Reem 
Karssli finally out of the Syrian borders, the film was incorporated 
in two other productions – this time theatre productions of the 
London Young Vic where, besides the documentary film, Internet 
tools, such as Skype, were inherent elements of the production. 
The most recent of these theatre productions, Now is Time to Say 
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Nothing (directed by Caroline Williams), premiered in July 2015, 
and was presented last month at the world’s largest arts festival, 
Edinburgh Forest Fringe, thus approaching a novel audience, 
different from the documentary goers.     
Last time I saw Reem Karssli was this fall, in Berlin. She 
was working on her second documentary, this time about Syrian 
refugees – herself being today one of them. In a somehow similar 
fashion, I believe, the current study of empathy is not limited to 
the frames of the resistance documentaries, but it can be applied in 
the studying – and making – of other human rights films which are 
empathically charged. The growing wave of recent documentaries 
concerning refugees is just one of many 
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An Annotated Filmography of Revolutionary 
Documentaires (1957 – 2015) 
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The filmography is an inventory of resistance documentaries, some 
of them discussed at length or just mentioned in this work. The 
films are listed under the most commonly used English titles, or 
the original one, if the English version is not available. The original 
title, when in a language different than English, is mentioned 
second, followed by authors, producers and/or production 
institutions, supplemented by country of production; release dates 
and duration are also mentioned.  
Some of the information is to be considered approximate, 
due to the fact that some of these films where released 
anonymously or travelled clandestinely, and the sources are at 
times conflicting or untrustworthy. For various reasons (such as 
different audience groups, information revealed in time and for 
historical accuracy) filmmakers or distributors re-edited aspects of 
the films, so different cuts might correspond to different copies.   
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Argentina 
THE HOUR OF FURNACES [LA HORA DE LOS HORNOS]. 
Director: Fernando ‘Pino’ Solanas. Producer: Fernando 
‘Pino’ Solanas. Produced by: Groupe Cine Liberacion. 
Argentina, 1968. Running time: 260 min. 
 
Burma 
BURMA VJ: REPORTING FROM A CLOSED COUNTRY 
[REPORTER I ET LUKKER LAND]. Director: Anders 
Østergaard. Producer: Lise Lense Moller. Produced by: 
Magis Hour Films. Denmark, 2008. Running time: 84 min. 
 
Chile 
FELLOW CITIZEN [MITBÜRGER]. Directors: Welter 
Heynowski, Gerhard Scheumann. Produced by: Studio 
H&S. GDR, 1974. Running time: 8 min.  
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COMPAÑERO: VÍCTOR JARA OF CHILE [COMPAÑERO: 
VÍCTOR JARA DE CHILE]. Directors: Stanley Forman, 
Martin Smith. Producers: Stanley Forman, Martin Smith. 
United Kingdom, 1974. Running time: 58 min.  
MONEY TROUBLES [GELDSORGEN]. Directors: Welter 
Heynowski, Gerhard Scheumann. Produced by: Studio 
H&S. GDR, 1975. Running time: 6 min.  
 
THE BATTLE OF CHILE [LA BATALLA DE CHILE]. 
Director: Patricio Guzman. Produced by: Insituto Cubano 
del Arte y Industria Cinematograficos (ICAIC) and Chris 
Marker. Chile | Cuba | France, 1975–1978. Running time: 
263 min. PART I: THE INSURRECTION OF THE 
BOURGEOISIE [LA INSURRECTION DE BURGUESÍA], 
1975, running time: 96 min; PART II: THE COUP D’ÉTAT 
[EL GOLPE DE ESTADO], 1976, running time: 88 min; 
PART III: POPULAR POWER [EL PODER PUPULAR], 1978, 
running time: 79 min. 
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GENERAL REPORT FROM CHILE [ACTA GENERAL DE 
CHILE] Director: Miguel Littin. Producers: Bernadette Cid, 
Luciano Balducci, Fernando Quejido. Produced by: Alfil 
Uno Cinematografia, T.V.E. Chile | Cuba, 1986. Running 
time: 240 min. 
DANCE OF HOPE. Director: Deborah Shaffer. Produced 
by LaVonne Poteet & Deborah Shaffer/Copihue. USA, 
1989. Running time: 75 min.  
 
Cuba 
ASSAULT OF THE REBEL GIRLS. Director: Barry Mahon. 
Based on a story by, narrated and reported by: Errol Flynn. 
Producer: Barry Mahon. Produced by: Exploit Films Inc. 
USA, 1959. Running time: 68 min. 
THE TRUTH ABOUT FIDEL CASTRO REVOLUTION. 
Producer: Victor Pahlen. Narrator: Errol Flynn. USA, 
1959. Running time: 50 min. 
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CUBA SI! Director: Chris Marker. Producer: Pierre 
Braunberger. Produced by Lhomond Studios. France, 
1961. Running time:  53 min. 
 
Egypt 
#18DAYSINEGYPT. Creators: Jigar Mehta and Yasmin 
Elayat. Created: 2011. www.18daysinegypt.com 
BACK TO THE SQUARE. Director: Petr Lom. Producer: 
Torstain Grude. Produced by: Piraya Film A/S, Lom 
Films. Norway | Canada, 2012. Running time: 85 min.  
BORN ON THE 25TH OF JANUARY (MOLOUD FI KHAMSA 
WE AISHREEN YANAIR). Director: Ahmed Rashwan. 
Producers: Ahmed Rashwan. Produced by: Dream 
Production, Dubai Media and Entertainment Organisation 
in association with Dubai Film Market (Enjaaz). Egypt | 
United Arab Emirates, 2011. Running time: 80 min. 
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El Salvador 
EL SALVADOR: ANOTHER VIETNAM. Directors: Glenn 
Silber and Tete Vasconcellos, Producers: Glenn Silber and 
Tete Vasconcellos. Produced by: Catalyst Media 
Production. USA, 1981. Running time: 60 min. 
WITNESS TO WAR: DR. CHARLIE CLEMENTS. Director: 
Deborah Shaffer. Producer: David Goodman. Produced 
by: AFSC and Skyline Pictures. USA, 1984. Running time: 
32 min. 
IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE. Director: Frank 
Christopher. Producers: Alex W. Drehsler and Frank 
Christopher. USA, 1985. Running time: 73 min. 
 
Ghana 
FREEDOM FOR GHANA. Director: Sean Graham. Scripted 
by Basil Davidson. Producer: Sean Graham. Produced by: 
Ghana Film Unit and United Africa Company. Ghana | 
United Kingdom, 1957. Running time: 35 min. 
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Grenada 
GRENADA: THE FUTURE COMING TOWARDS US. 
Director: Carmen Ashhurst, John Douglas, Samori 
Marksman. Producer: Paco de Onís. Produced by New 
York Cinema and Caribbean Research Institute. USA, 
1983. The film was completed only shortly before the U.S. 
invasion of Grenada, in 1983. Running time: 54 min. 
 
Guatemala 
WHEN THE MOUNTAINS TREMBLE. Directors: Pamela 
Yates, Newton Thomas Segel. Producer: Peter Kinoy. 
Produced by: Skylight Pictures. USA, 1983. Running time: 
83 min.  
GRANITO: HOW TO NAIL A DICTATOR. Director: Pamela 
Yates. Producer: Paco de Onís. Produced by Skylight 
Pictures. USA, 2011. Running time: 104 min. 
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Haiti 
HAITI: DREAMS OF DEMOCRACY. Directors: Johnathan 
Demme and Jo Menell. Producers: Johnathan Demme and 
Jo Menell. Produced by: Clinica Estetico, Chanel Four, 
Tranvision-Haiti/Cinema Guild Inc.. UK, 1987. Running 
time:  52 min. 
 
Libya 
DIARY FROM A REVOLUTION (DAGBOK FRA 
REVOLUSJONEN). Director:  Nizam Najjar. Producers: 
Kristine Ann Skaret. Produced by: Medieoperatørene. 
Norway | Libya. 2012. Running time: 80 min. 
POINT AND SHOOT. Director: Marshall Curry. Producer: 
Marshall Curry, Elizabeth Martin and Matthew Vandyke. 
Produced by: Marshall Curry Productions, American 
Documentary/ POV, Independent Television Service 
(ITVS). USA, 2014. Running time: 78 min. 
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Mexico 
EL GRITO. Director: Leobardo López Aretche. 
Production: Centro Universitario de Estudios 
Cinematográficos (CUEC). Mexico, 1968. Running time: 
101 min. 
UNETE PUEBLO!.... Director: Óscar Menéndez. Mexico, 
1968. Running time: 20 min. 
MEXICO, THE FROZEN REVOLUTION (MEXICO, LA 
REVOLUCION CONGELATA). Director: Raymundo 
Gleyzer. Argentina 1971. Running time: 65 min. 
A PLACE CALLED CHIAPAS. Director: Nettie Wild. 
Production: Canada Wild Productions in association with 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Produced by Nettie 
Wild, Betsy Carson, Kirk Tougas. Canada, 1998. Running 
time: 89 min.  
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ZAPATISTA. Directors: Benjamin Eichert, Richard Rowley, 
Ståle Sandberg. Producers: Benjamin Eichert, Richard 
Rowley, Ståle Sandberg, Isiris Castañeda, in association 
with The Media Boutique. USA, 1999. Running time: 56 
min. 
ZAPATISTAS: CRÓNICA DE UNA REBELIÓN. Director: 
Victor Mariñaand Mario Viveros. Producer: Nancy 
Ventura. Produced by: La Jornada and Conalseis de Jukio. 
Mexico, 2003. Running time: 88 min. 
 
Moldova 
THE TRAP (CAPCANA). Directors: Leontina Vatamanu, 
Ion Terguță. Producer: Virgiliu Margineanu. Moldova, 
2009. Running time:  38 min. 
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Namibia 
A CRY FOR FREEDOM. Director: John A. Evenson. 
Producer: John A. Evenson. Produced by The Division for 
Mission in Nort America/The Division for World Mission 
and Ecumenia/Lutheran Church. USA, 1981. Running 
time: 21 min. 
 
Nicaragua 
NICARAGUA: REPORT FROM THE FRONT. Director: 
Deborah Shaffer, Tom Sigel. Producer: Haskell Wexler. 
Produced by: Skylight Pictures. USA, 1983. Running time: 
32 min. 
FIRE FROM THE MOUNTAIN. Director: Deborah Shaffer. 
Producers: Deborah Shaffer and Adam Friedson. 
Produced in Association with Common Sense Foundation. 
USA, 1987. Running time: 60 min. 
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Philippines 
A RUSTLING OF LEAVES: INSIDE THE PHILIPPINE 
REVOLUTION. Director: Nettie Wild. Production: Canada 
Wild Productions in association with Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation. Produced by Nettie Wild. 
Canada, 1988. Running time: 89 min.  
 
Poland 
MAJOR, OR THE REVOLUTION OF THE GNOMES (MAJOR 
ALBO REWOLUCJA KRASNOLUDKÓW). Director: Maria 
Zmarz-Koczanowicz. Produced by: K. Irzykowski Film 
Studio. Poland, 1989. Running time:  31 min. 
 
Portugal 
SCENES FROM THE CLASS STRUGGLE IN PORTUGAL 
(CENAS DA LUTA DE CLASSES EM PORTUGAL). Director: 
Robert Kramer. Producers: Barbara Stone, David Stone. 
USA | Portugal, 1976. Running time: 89 min. The film 
427 
 
follows the political and social transformations in the 
months between the overthrowing of the Salazar regime 
and the installation of a new government.  
VIVA PORTUGAL! (VIVA PORTUGAL. DIE 
NELKENREVOLUTION). Directors: Christine Gerhards, 
Malte Rauch and Samuel Schirmbeck. Producer:. Produced 
by: Portugal | Federal Republic of Germany, 1975. 
Running time: 115 min.  
 
Puerto Rico 
PUERTO RICO: PARADISE INVADED (PUERTO RICO: 
PARAÍSO INVADIDO). Director: Affonso Beato. USA, 
1977. Running time: 30 min. It documents the history of 
Puerto Rico’s independence movement, economic aspects 
of the industry in Puerto Rico, connecting to negative 
aspects of the presence of American Corporations. 
Includes footage from the American-Spanish war and the 
violent strikes in the 1930s. The film’s stand is openly for a 
political independence from the United States.   
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Romania 
VIDEOGRAMS OF A REVOLUTION (VIDEOGRAMME 
EINER REVOLUTION VIDEOGRAME DINTR-O 
REVOLUȚIE). Director: Harun Farocki, Andrei Ujică. 
Producer: Harun Farocki. Produced by: Germany | 
Romania, 1992. Running time: 106 min. 
 
South Africa  
END OF THE DIALOGUE (PHELA-NDABA). Directors: 
PAC (Antonia Caccia, Chris Curling, Simon Louvish, Nana 
Mahomo, Vus Make and Rakhetla Tsehlana). Produced by: 
Morena Films. Anonymously released in 1970. Running 
time: 44 min. 
SUN CITY: ARTISTS UNITED AGAINST APARTHEID 
(Documentary Video). Directors: Kevin Godley, Lol 
Creme, Hart Perry, Jonathan Demme. Producers: Lexie 
429 
 
Godfrey, Hart Perry, Niles Siegel. USA | UK, 1985. 
Running time:  
THE MAKING OF SUN CITY Director: Steve Lawrence. 
Producers: Paul Allen, Steve Lawrence, Danny Schechter. 
USA, 1986. Running time: 51 min. 
LAST GRAVE TO DIMBAZA. Directors: Chris Curling and 
Pascoe Macfarlane. Producers: Nana Mahomo, Antonio 
Caccia and Andrew Tsehiana. Produced by: Morena Films. 
Anonymously released in 1974. Running time: 56 min. 
WITNESS TO APARTHEID. Director: Sharon Sopher. 
Producer: Kevin Harris. Produced by Developing News 
Inc in association with Chanel 4 Television. USA | UK, 
1986. Running time: 58 min. 
 
Spain 
ASIER AND I (AITOR +) Directors: Aitor Merino and 
Amaia Merino. Producer: Ainhoa Andrak. Produced by: 
430 
 
Doxa Producciones and Cineática Films. Spain | Ecuador, 
2013. Running time: 94 min. 
 
Syria 
THE SUFFERING OF LEAVES: WHEN ELEPHANTS 
FIGHT, IT IS THE GRASS THAT SUFFERS. Director: Jara 
Lee. USA | Turkey | Syria, 2012. Running time: 52 min. 
EVERY DAY, EVERY DAY [KEL YAUM KEL YAUM]. 
Director: Reem Karssli. Producers: Mădălina Roșca and 
Maia Malas. Produced by: Passport Film and Metis Media. 
Syria | Romania | UK, 2013. Running time: 26 min. 
THE RETURN TO HOMS. Director: Talal Derki. 
Producers: Orwa Nyrabia. Produced by: Proaction Film, 
Ventana Film- und Fernsehproduktion. Syria | Germany | 
2014. Running time: 94 min. 
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Tibet 
RAID INTO TIBET. Director:  Adrian Cowell. Producer: 
George Patterson. GB, 1966. Running time: 28 min. 
 
Tunisia 
ROUGE PAROLE. Director:  Elyes Baccar. Producers: 
Nocolas Wadimoff and Elyes Baccar. Tunisia | 
Switzerland, 2012. Running time: 94 min. 
 
Ukraine 
ORANGE REVOLUTION. Director: Steve York. Producer: 
Steve York. Produced by: Marshall Curry Productions and 
ITVS. USA, 2007. Running time: 92 min.  
STRONGER THAN ARMS. Produced by: BABYLON’13. 
USA 2014. Running time: 78 min.  
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MAIDAN [МАЙДАН]. Director: Sergei Loznitsa. 
Producers: Sergei Loznitsa, Maria Baker. Produced by: 
Atoms and Void. Ukraine | Netherlands, 2014. Running 
time: 130 min.  
 
USA 
IF A TREE FALLS: A STORY OF THE EARTH LIBERATION 
FRONT. Director: Marshall Curry. Producer: Marshall 
Curry. Produced by: Marshall Curry Productions and 
ITVS. USA, 2011. Running time: 85 min.  
 
Yemen 
THE RELUCTANT REVOLUTIONARY. Director: Sean 
McAllister. Producers: Elhum Shakerifar, Rachel Lysaght. 
Produced by: Underground Films, Tenfoot Films. Great 
Britain | Ireland, 2012. Running time: 73 min. 
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Abstract 
 
Seeing with Feeling. Filmed Revolutions of Others, 
from an Empathic Towards an Involved 
Spectatorship of Documentaries  
 
(Sehen mit Gefühl. Gefilmte Revolutionen Anderer, vom 
empathischen zum involvierten Zuschauer von 
Dokumentarfilmen) 
 
 
 
Revolutionsforscher sind sich in wenig einig. Bezüglich der 
Tatsache aber, dass Revolutionen über ein gutes internationales 
Netzwerk oder internationale Hilfe verfügen müssen um Erfolg zu 
haben, scheint Konsens zu herrschen.
472
 Revolutionärer Erfolg ist 
in der Mehrzahl der Fälle “abhängig von internationaler 
Unterstützung für die Opposition im entscheidenden Moment 
oder vom Entzug der Unterstützung für den Herrscher”.
473
 
Genauso maßgeblich ist, dass, auf Grund des Fehlens 
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 Goldstone (2014), 19. 
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internationaler Intervention, viele Revolutionen gescheitert sind 
oder revidiert wurden. Folglich können 
Widerstandsdokumentarfilme als ein wichtiges Mittel angesehen 
werden, die Ziele einer Revolution bekannt zu machen und so 
letztendlich zu ihrem Erfolg beizutragen.
474
 
 Aus den genannten Gründen könnte man voraussetzen, 
dass es als selbstverständlich anzusehen ist, dass das 
empathieerzeugende Potenzial des Dokumentarfilms bereits 
gründlich erforscht wurde, da überdies bereits in verschiedenen 
Disziplinen eine reichhaltige Forschung zur Empathie als solche 
besteht, könnte man weiter davon ausgehen, dass alle 
Fragestellungen der Filmwissenschaften in Bezug auf Empathie 
bereits genauestens untersucht wurden. Dies ist allerdings nicht der 
Fall. Es existiert lediglich eine sehr begrenzte Basis an bestehender 
Forschung zur filmischen Empathie und fast keine in Bezug auf 
nichtfiktionalen Film. 
 Die revolutionären Bewegungen jüngster Zeit in der 
arabischen Welt und der Ukraine sowie die große Menge 
dokumentarischer Produktion aus diesen Regionen erzwingen die 
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Frage, welche die Mittel und Mechanismen in den Bildern des 
nichtfiktionalen Films sind, die es vermögen Empathie 
hervorzurufen, eine Bindung herzustellen zwischen einander 
fernen Menschen und welche Beziehung besteht zwischen dem 
hervorgerufenen empathischen Disstress und unserer ethischen 
Haltung. Dies, im Kontext von Widerstandsdokumentarfilmen, 
nichtfiktionalen Filmen aus revolutionären Situationen, ist die 
zugrundeliegende Fragestellung dieser Arbeit. 
 
